Recon tools route their target list through a flag — `ffuf -w wordlist.txt`,
`httpx -l hosts.txt`, `nuclei --list targets.txt` — not the `<` redirect the
input-file collector already handled, so the reviewer kept blocking "probes
every host listed in hosts.txt" because the list was never in the packet. Parse
the value of the common list-file flags and collect it the same bounded way,
alongside redirect inputs. The value is only read when it resolves to a
workspace file, so a boolean `-l` (grep, wc) whose next token is not a file
collects nothing and never makes the packet incomplete.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two guarded-mode false-positives from a recon run.
A command that reads a workspace data file — `while read host; do dig "$host";
done < hosts_passive.txt` — reached the reviewer with an empty artifact list,
because the evidence compiler only collects script entrypoints and their Python
imports, never a data file consumed via input redirection. The reviewer, asked
whether the queried hosts were in scope, had no way to see them and fail-closed
on unresolved scope. Parse single `<` input redirections (not `<<` heredocs or
`<(` process substitution) and attach each workspace-resident file as an
artifact with role "input", bounded by max_artifact_bytes and flagged when
truncated. Files outside /workspace are not read.
Separately, the reviewer treated scope as the exact authorized host, so it
blocked resolving admin.fiuu.com under an authorized fiuu.com. State in the
prompt that an authorized domain covers its subdomains, and point the reviewer
at the new role "input" artifacts for scope checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two guarded-mode false-positives surfaced in real scan traces.
The reviewer blocked a boolean SQL injection probe
(`curl "…/login?username='+OR+'1'='1"`) for being an injection attempt at all,
though it is a read-only GET that changes nothing. The prompt said "allow only
non-destructive" but never established that in-scope offensive testing is the
tool's authorized purpose, so the model blocked on the technique. Rewrite the
guarded-mode guidance to judge by effect: in-scope injection probes, recon,
enumeration, and fuzzing pass, while destructive or persistent effects block —
with SQL spelled out (boolean/UNION/time-based read probes pass; DROP, DELETE,
INSERT, INTO OUTFILE, stacked statements, and command execution block).
Ambiguous evidence still fails closed, and every deterministic block, the
completeness gate, observe's passive-only rule, and scope enforcement are kept.
Separately the reviewer blocked a plain `curl` as "use of bash shell within a
curl command". The shell wrapper stamps `shell: bash` onto every exec_command
for execution, and the evidence packet passed that transport default straight
to the reviewer, which read it as the agent invoking a shell. Strip the
harness-injected transport keys (`shell`, `max_output_tokens`) from the packet's
original_arguments; the command itself is still parsed from `cmd`, so an
agent-authored `bash -c` payload is unaffected.
Note: the effect-based prompt also lets in-scope recon tools (nmap, subfinder,
ffuf, katana) through, which the old prompt blocked as "scanning" or "high
volume". That follows directly from judging by effect rather than technique.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Grouped browser verbs were classified by their verb alone. `tab` and `session`
sit in the passive set, so `tab new <url>` — documented as navigating — and
`session clear` earned a deterministic allow and executed unreviewed in guarded
mode and unblocked in observe, while `open <url>`, the same navigation, was
reviewed. Passivity is now decided from verb plus subcommand, and the packet
carries the result so observe mode stops maintaining a second copy of the rule
that could drift more permissive than guarded. The blocked-action list still
matches on the bare verb, so `auth login` keeps matching `auth`.
Interpreters were a seven-name allowlist, so `python3.12`, `/usr/bin/python3`,
`php`, and `deno` set no script path and produced a packet with no artifacts
that was still stamped complete — the exact shape the reviewer is told it may
allow. Recognize versioned and common interpreters so their sources are
actually collected, and fail closed when a command runs code that cannot be
resolved to an inspectable script.
`from pkg import payload` collected only the package initializer, because an
imported name was treated as an attribute and never as a submodule. Effectful
code in `pkg/payload.py` executed without appearing in the evidence.
Workspace staging runs twice per run and was not idempotent: the second pass
read the origin from `source_path`, which the first pass had already rewritten
to the copy. With the completion marker absent it cleared the destination and
then copied from that same emptied directory, silently handing the agent an
empty workspace. The origin is now read back from `original_source_path`.
Each fix is covered by a test that fails when the fix is reverted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduce a pre-execution safety layer that reviews effectful agent actions
against compiled, frozen evidence before they run.
`--safety-mode guarded` allows non-destructive interaction after review;
`--safety-mode observe` permits passive target interaction only. `off` stays
the default, so existing runs are unchanged.
Deterministic rules decide what they can on their own: destructive commands,
code-loading environment overrides, blocked browser actions, and mutating
requests in observe mode are refused without a model call, and a small set of
read-only commands is allowed outright. Everything else compiles an evidence
packet — command, scope, script source and its local import closure, prior
tool-call evidence, and browser snapshot context — for a bounded reviewer that
may make one isolated inspection call. Incomplete evidence fails closed.
In safety modes, user-owned local directories are copied into the run
directory so the originals are never mounted writable, while `.git`,
`.agents`, and `.codex` inside the copy stay read-only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Exit Codes table in the CLI reference only listed 0 and 2, but the
CLI also exits with 1 on fatal errors (missing environment variables,
Docker unavailable, invalid config file, diff-scope resolution failure,
or an unhandled exception). It also implied exit 0 means no
vulnerabilities were found, which is only true in headless mode -
interactive runs always exit 0 regardless of findings.
Document exit code 1 and clarify the two cases for exit 0.
* fix: resolve pre-commit check failures
- Change RuntimeError to TypeError for type validation in report/writer.py
- Update pyupgrade to v3.21.2 for Python 3.14 compatibility
* chore: add pytest test infrastructure
Mirror the layout introduced on feature/438-token_budget: pytest +
pytest-asyncio dev deps, asyncio_mode auto, a tests.* mypy override, and
pytest in the mypy pre-commit hook deps so the tests/ package type-checks.
* feat: add --mount and large-target pre-flight for local repos (#492)
Large local targets were copied into the sandbox file-by-file via the SDK
LocalDir entry, which stalls on big repos and could leave /workspace empty.
- --mount <path> bind-mounts a host directory read-only at /workspace/<subdir>
instead of copying it, bypassing the per-file stream.
- A size pre-flight (STRIX_MAX_LOCAL_COPY_MB, default 1024) fails fast with a
clear message suggesting --mount when a non-mounted local target is too big.
* fix: reject empty --mount paths
An empty or whitespace-only --mount value resolves to the current working
directory and would silently bind-mount it into the sandbox. Reject it.
* fix: dedupe local targets so a dir is never both copied and mounted
If the same directory is passed via --target and --mount (or as duplicate
values), it previously produced two targets — copied AND bind-mounted, and
the copied one could trip the size pre-flight. Dedupe by resolved path,
preferring the bind mount.
* fix: treat non-positive STRIX_MAX_LOCAL_COPY_MB as disabled
Previously a value of 0 (or negative) made every local target count as
oversized, aborting all local scans. Now <= 0 disables the pre-flight.
* fix: log unreadable subtrees during size pre-flight
os.walk silently swallowed directory-listing errors, so a permission-denied
subtree could make a large repo under-count and slip past the pre-flight.
Surface such omissions via an onerror warning.
* docs: document --mount and STRIX_MAX_LOCAL_COPY_MB
Add CLI reference + example for --mount, document the size pre-flight env var,
note the read-only-is-not-a-hard-boundary caveat and that remote repos are not
size-checked, and clarify the backends docstring on when bind mounts apply.
* Update strix/interface/main.py
* Update strix/runtime/docker_client.py
---------
* fix: resolve pre-commit check failures
- Change RuntimeError to TypeError for type validation in report/writer.py
- Update pyupgrade to v3.21.2 for Python 3.14 compatibility
* feat(cli): add --max-budget-usd flag
Raises BudgetExceededError in ReportUsageHooks after each LLM call when
accumulated cost reaches the limit, with clean "stopped" status and
child-agent cancellation in non-interactive mode.
* test: add budget enforcement unit tests
7 tests covering no-budget, under-budget, at-limit, over-limit, error
message content, None report state, and exception hierarchy.
Also adds pytest/pytest-asyncio to dev deps and a mypy override for tests.
* fix(budget): validate positive budget and check the live cost ledger
Two hardening fixes for --max-budget-usd enforcement:
- Reject non-positive budgets. ReportUsageHooks now raises ValueError for
max_budget_usd <= 0, and the CLI validates the flag via a custom argparse
type so '--max-budget-usd 0' fails fast with a friendly message instead of
silently killing the scan on the first model response.
- Read the live cost. The budget check now reads ReportState.get_total_llm_cost()
(the live ledger) instead of the persisted run-record snapshot, so it stays
accurate even when a usage save fails after a model call.
* fix(budget): stop the entire scan deterministically when the limit is hit
Previously a BudgetExceededError was handled per-agent: it was swallowed in
interactive mode (the loop kept waiting), a child's error escaped its detached
task as an unretrieved-exception warning, the parent was never released from
wait_for_message, and the stop was logged at ERROR with a traceback as if the
agent had failed.
Replace that with a single scan-wide signal on the coordinator:
- AgentCoordinator.trigger_budget_stop() sets a flag and wakes every parked
agent; wait_for_message returns as soon as the flag is set.
- The run loops check coordinator.budget_stopped and raise to exit cleanly,
marking themselves 'stopped'. The root's exception reaches run_strix_scan's
handler, which cancels descendants and tears the scan down once; child
exceptions are swallowed in their detached task.
- The budget stop is logged at INFO, not as a failure.
This is deterministic regardless of tree depth or which agent first sees the
limit, fixing the interactive/TUI hang where a deep agent's stop never reached
a parked root. Also re-raises BudgetExceededError explicitly in the stream
handler so it can't be mistaken for the LiteLLM 'after shutdown' race.
* fix(budget): treat a budget stop as a clean stop in the TUI
Add an explicit BudgetExceededError handler in the TUI scan thread so that, if
the error ever reaches it, the budget stop is logged as a graceful stop rather
than surfaced as a red scan error by the broad 'except Exception'. The runner
normally absorbs the error and returns cleanly, so this is defensive depth for
a money-spending feature.
* docs(cli): document --max-budget-usd behavior and limitations
Clarify that the budget is cumulative across all agents, checked after each
model response, that the scan stops cleanly (not as a failure), that the value
must be > 0, and that spend can slightly overshoot due to in-flight calls and
best-effort cost estimation.
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
oyasumi