---
title: "Safety Modes"
description: "Control state-changing actions during a scan"
---

Safety mode is independent of scan depth. `quick`, `standard`, and `deep`
control coverage; safety mode controls which effects may be executed.

```bash
strix --target https://example.test --safety-mode guarded
```

## Modes

| Mode | Behavior |
| --- | --- |
| `off` | Current autonomous behavior. Local directories are mounted live and writable. |
| `guarded` | Allows non-destructive interaction after contextual review, including in-scope offensive testing — injection probes, recon, enumeration, fuzzing. Actions judged destructive or persistent (data or state change, account changes, file writes, stored payloads) are blocked. |
| `observe` | Passive target interaction only. Form submission, authentication, uploads, mutating requests, and state-changing controls are blocked. |

`off` is the default for backward compatibility. Configure a default with
`STRIX_SAFETY_MODE` or select a mode for one run with `--safety-mode`.

## Contextual Review

Before an ambiguous shell or browser action executes, Strix compiles a frozen
evidence packet containing the effective command, target scope, relevant script
source and imports, prior tool-call evidence, browser snapshot context, and
workspace persistence details.

The safety model may decide immediately or make exactly one `run_inspection`
tool call. That call runs a Python standard-library analysis script in a
separate networkless, read-only container over the frozen evidence. If the tool
is used, the model's next response must be the final decision.

The review is bounded to at most two model turns and one optional inspection
call. Timeouts, malformed decisions, a second tool call, incomplete evidence,
or low-confidence approval fail closed.

In guarded mode the reviewer judges an action by its effect on the target, not
by the technique it uses. Offensive testing against an in-scope target is the
authorized purpose of the tool, so a read-only injection probe (a boolean,
`UNION SELECT`, or time-based payload), a reflected-input test, or recon passes;
a payload that writes or destroys (`DROP`, `DELETE`, `INSERT`, `INTO OUTFILE`,
stacked statements, command execution), a mutating request, or any persistent
change is blocked. When complete evidence does not settle whether the effect is
destructive, persistent, or in scope, the action is blocked.

## Deterministic Rules

Some outcomes never reach the model. Destructive commands, environment
overrides that change which code an interpreter loads (`PYTHONPATH`,
`LD_PRELOAD`, `AGENT_BROWSER_SESSION`, and similar), blocked browser actions,
and mutating requests in `observe` mode are refused outright. A small set of
read-only commands is allowed outright, but only when its options are also
read-only: `rg --pre` and anything else that hands the command another program
to run goes to review instead.

Browser observation commands are allowed outright only in the form that just
reads: `tab` lists tabs, but `tab new <url>` navigates and `tab close` discards
page state, so a grouped verb with a subcommand goes to review and is blocked
in `observe`.

Commands that wrap another program (`sudo`, `timeout`, `xargs`, `nohup`, and
similar) and interactive `write_stdin` payloads cannot be resolved to a single
effective action before dispatch, so they are blocked. Issue the command as its
own `exec_command` call.

## Scripts

When a command executes a script, Strix reads the current entrypoint and local
Python imports without importing or running them. Inline `python -c` source is
analyzed the same way. Absolute imports resolve against the entrypoint's
directory and relative imports against the importing module's package, and an
imported name is followed as a submodule as well as an attribute, so the whole
local closure is inspected. Decisions bind to content hashes. Dynamic code
execution, import-path mutation, unresolved generated commands, oversized
dependency closures, entrypoints outside `/workspace`, and unsupported evidence
block the action.

A command that runs code Strix cannot resolve to an inspectable script — an
unrecognized interpreter, or an interpreter given no script — is blocked rather
than reviewed against an empty evidence packet.

When a command reads a workspace data file — through input redirection
(`while read … done < hosts.txt`) or a target-list flag (`ffuf -w words.txt`,
`httpx -l hosts.txt`) — that file's contents are attached to the packet so the
reviewer can check the entries, queried hosts or fuzz inputs, against scope
instead of blocking because it can't see them. Only workspace-resident files are
read; an oversize file is attached truncated. An authorized domain covers its
subdomains.

Browser automation inside scripts is blocked in safety modes. Issue browser
operations as individual raw `agent-browser` commands so each action can be
reviewed against the current snapshot and element references.

Commands that create and execute code in one shell expression should be split
into separate creation and execution calls.

## Browser Commands

Strix continues to use the raw `agent-browser` CLI. In safety modes it assigns
an isolated browser session per agent and rejects model-supplied session,
profile, or CDP overrides.

Interactions with element references require a prior recorded snapshot. A
snapshot taken before a navigation or any other page-changing action is stale:
the action is blocked and the agent must snapshot again.

Composite operations such as `auth login`, arbitrary `eval`, browser state
persistence, and uploads are blocked. Guarded login should use explicit fill
and submit steps with credentials supplied in the initial user instruction.

## Workspace Isolation

For `guarded` and `observe`, user-owned local directories are copied into:

```text
strix_runs/<run>/.state/workspaces/<name>
```

The copy is mounted writable, while the original source remains unchanged.
`.git`, `.agents`, and `.codex` inside the copy stay read-only: they carry
repository and agent-instruction state that survives `--resume`. Copies are
retained for resume. Repository targets are already cloned into a disposable
location and do not need another copy.

In-tree symlinks are materialized. Dangling, cyclic, device, and out-of-tree
symlinks are omitted. Files are copied rather than hard-linked.

## Limitations

Contextual review reduces accidental harmful actions; it is not a complete
network containment boundary. Arbitrary dynamic programs, raw sockets, or
processes that ignore proxy settings cannot always be predicted statically.
Unresolvable behavior blocks in safety modes.

Deterministic rules cover the cases listed above. Every other command is judged
by the safety model against compiled evidence, so a tool whose effects are not
statically recognizable — a scanner or exploit framework that mutates the
target through its own protocol, for example — rests on that judgment rather
than on a rule. Strong containment additionally requires externally enforced
egress policy and reduced sandbox privileges.