Files
strix/tests/test_threat_model_tool.py
T
Alex Schapiro d91ac851cf coverage: make the negative space of a scan a first-class artifact
Promote the coverage ledger from runtime state to a deliverable:
coverage.json beside vulnerabilities.json, a Coverage section rendered
into the report from the ledger rather than transcribed by an agent, and
SARIF pass / notApplicable / open results so a consumer can tell 'tested
and clean' from 'never tested'.

Ground it in what the runtime observed rather than only what agents
claimed: a risk class an agent carried a skill for and never accounted
for is published as a gap (and surfaced back to the root agent from
finish_scan while it can still act), and a run cut short is stamped
incomplete on both the artifact and the SARIF invocation.

Also: make the ledger's duplicate check and insertion one critical
section and persist under the lock; key a checkout and the URL it was
cloned from onto one threat-model identity; render the calibration
metadata (counterevidence, confidence, severity change conditions, fix
verification) that was being stored and then dropped.
2026-08-07 00:51:26 +00:00

344 lines
11 KiB
Python

"""Tests for the target-scoped threat model cache."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import subprocess
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
import pytest
from strix.agents.factory import _BASE_TOOLS
from strix.tools.threat_model import tools as threat_model_tools
from strix.tools.threat_model.tools import (
_amend_impl,
_get_impl,
_save_impl,
amend_threat_model,
get_threat_model,
save_threat_model,
)
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from pathlib import Path
_MODEL = """# Threat Model
## Overview
A multi-tenant billing API. Product code lives in `api/`; `scripts/` is
developer-only tooling and is not deployed.
## Trust Boundaries and Assumptions
Requests arrive from untrusted tenants through `api/router.py`. The tenant id
is taken from the signed session, never from the request body. Operators
configure webhooks; developers control migrations.
## Attack Surface and Attacker Stories
The public REST surface and the webhook receiver are attacker-reachable. A
realistic story is a tenant reading another tenant's invoices. Local CLI
tooling is not a realistic surface.
## Severity Calibration
Critical: cross-tenant write. High: cross-tenant read. Medium: authenticated
self-scoped information leak. Low: verbose errors.
"""
def _git(repo: Path, *args: str) -> None:
subprocess.run(["/usr/bin/env", "git", *args], cwd=repo, check=True) # noqa: S603
def _make_repo(tmp_path: Path, name: str = "repo") -> Path:
repo = tmp_path / name
repo.mkdir(parents=True)
_git(repo, "init", "-q")
_git(repo, "config", "user.email", "t@example.com")
_git(repo, "config", "user.name", "t")
(repo / "README.md").write_text("hi\n", encoding="utf-8")
_git(repo, "add", "README.md")
_git(repo, "commit", "-qm", "init")
return repo
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _isolated_cache(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(threat_model_tools, "_CACHE_DIR", tmp_path / "cache")
def test_missing_model_reports_not_found(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
repo = _make_repo(tmp_path)
result = _get_impl(str(repo))
assert result["success"] is True
assert result["found"] is False
assert "save_threat_model" in result["message"]
def test_saved_model_round_trips(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
repo = _make_repo(tmp_path)
assert _save_impl(str(repo), _MODEL, "Strix")["success"] is True
result = _get_impl(str(repo))
assert result["found"] is True
assert result["stale"] is False
assert "multi-tenant billing API" in result["content"]
def test_model_is_stale_after_new_revision(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
repo = _make_repo(tmp_path)
_save_impl(str(repo), _MODEL, None)
(repo / "next.py").write_text("x = 1\n", encoding="utf-8")
_git(repo, "add", "next.py")
_git(repo, "commit", "-qm", "next")
result = _get_impl(str(repo))
assert result["found"] is True
assert result["stale"] is True
assert result["content"]
def test_cache_is_keyed_per_repository(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
first = _make_repo(tmp_path, "first")
second = _make_repo(tmp_path, "second")
_save_impl(str(first), _MODEL, None)
assert _get_impl(str(second))["found"] is False
def test_rejects_model_missing_required_sections(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
repo = _make_repo(tmp_path)
thin = _MODEL.replace("## Severity Calibration", "## Notes")
result = _save_impl(str(repo), thin, None)
assert result["success"] is False
assert "severity calibration" in result["error"]
def test_rejects_stub_model(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
repo = _make_repo(tmp_path)
result = _save_impl(str(repo), "overview trust boundaries attack surface", None)
assert result["success"] is False
assert "too thin" in result["error"]
def test_rejects_empty_target() -> None:
result = _get_impl(" ")
assert result["success"] is False
assert "target cannot be empty" in result["error"]
def test_tools_are_registered() -> None:
assert get_threat_model in _BASE_TOOLS
assert save_threat_model in _BASE_TOOLS
_ADDENDUM = (
"The base model calls the webhook receiver operator-controlled. It is "
"unauthenticated in `api/webhooks.py:31`, so treat its body as attacker-controlled."
)
def test_amendment_is_returned_with_the_model(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
repo = _make_repo(tmp_path)
_save_impl(str(repo), _MODEL, "root")
assert _amend_impl(str(repo), _ADDENDUM, "webhook-agent")["success"] is True
result = _get_impl(str(repo))
assert result["content"] == _MODEL.strip()
assert [a["content"] for a in result["amendments"]] == [_ADDENDUM]
assert result["amendments"][0]["by"] == "webhook-agent"
def test_amendments_accumulate_without_overwriting(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
repo = _make_repo(tmp_path)
_save_impl(str(repo), _MODEL, "root")
_amend_impl(str(repo), _ADDENDUM, "agent-a")
second = "The `scripts/` directory ships in the container image; it is not dev-only."
_amend_impl(str(repo), second + " See `Dockerfile:14`.", "agent-b")
amendments = _get_impl(str(repo))["amendments"]
assert len(amendments) == 2
assert [a["by"] for a in amendments] == ["agent-a", "agent-b"]
def test_amend_requires_an_existing_model(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
repo = _make_repo(tmp_path)
result = _amend_impl(str(repo), _ADDENDUM, None)
assert result["success"] is False
assert "save_threat_model" in result["error"]
def test_amend_rejects_a_stub(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
repo = _make_repo(tmp_path)
_save_impl(str(repo), _MODEL, "root")
assert _amend_impl(str(repo), "looks wrong", None)["success"] is False
def test_save_clears_amendments_and_says_so(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
repo = _make_repo(tmp_path)
_save_impl(str(repo), _MODEL, "root")
_amend_impl(str(repo), _ADDENDUM, "agent-a")
result = _save_impl(str(repo), _MODEL.replace("billing API", "billing service"), "root")
assert result["amendments_cleared"] == 1
assert "cleared" in result["message"]
assert "amendments" not in _get_impl(str(repo))
def test_amend_tool_is_registered() -> None:
assert amend_threat_model in _BASE_TOOLS
_BLACKBOX_MODEL = _MODEL.replace(
"Product code lives in `api/`; `scripts/` is\ndeveloper-only tooling and is not deployed.",
"Only the deployed surface is visible; no source. Inferred from recon.",
)
def test_blackbox_target_round_trips() -> None:
target = "https://app.example.com"
assert _save_impl(target, _BLACKBOX_MODEL, "recon")["success"] is True
result = _get_impl(target)
assert result["found"] is True
assert result["stale"] is False, "a fresh model with no revision is not stale"
assert result["revision"] == "unversioned"
assert "Inferred from recon" in result["content"]
def test_blackbox_target_spellings_share_one_model() -> None:
_save_impl("https://App.Example.com:443/", _BLACKBOX_MODEL, "recon")
for spelling in ("https://app.example.com", "app.example.com", "https://app.example.com/"):
assert _get_impl(spelling)["found"] is True, spelling
assert _get_impl("https://other.example.com")["found"] is False
def test_blackbox_model_goes_stale_with_age() -> None:
target = "https://app.example.com"
_save_impl(target, _BLACKBOX_MODEL, "recon")
aged = (datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(days=threat_model_tools._MAX_AGE_DAYS + 1)).isoformat()
path = threat_model_tools._cache_path("app.example.com:443")
payload = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
payload["created_at"] = aged
path.write_text(json.dumps(payload), encoding="utf-8")
result = _get_impl(target)
assert result["stale"] is True
assert "re-confirm" in result["message"]
def test_blackbox_target_can_be_amended() -> None:
target = "https://app.example.com"
_save_impl(target, _BLACKBOX_MODEL, "recon")
addendum = (
"The model infers /admin is IP-restricted. It is reachable with any "
"authenticated session; the restriction is only on /admin/settings."
)
assert _amend_impl(target, addendum, "authz-agent")["success"] is True
assert _get_impl(target)["amendments"][0]["content"] == addendum
def test_checkout_and_its_remote_are_the_same_target(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
repo = _make_repo(tmp_path)
_git(repo, "remote", "add", "origin", "https://github.com/acme/billing.git")
_save_impl(str(repo), _MODEL, "root")
clone = _make_repo(tmp_path, "clone")
_git(clone, "remote", "add", "origin", "https://github.com/acme/billing.git")
assert _get_impl(str(clone))["found"] is True
def test_path_on_a_known_host_resolves_to_the_scan_target() -> None:
scan_targets = ["https://app.example.com"]
_save_impl("https://app.example.com", _BLACKBOX_MODEL, "root", scan_targets)
# An agent testing one page names that page, not the scan's target string.
assert _get_impl("https://app.example.com/admin/login", scan_targets)["found"] is True
def test_two_scan_targets_on_one_host_stay_separate() -> None:
scan_targets = ["https://example.com/tenant-a", "https://example.com/tenant-b"]
_save_impl("https://example.com/tenant-a", _BLACKBOX_MODEL, "root", scan_targets)
assert _get_impl("https://example.com/tenant-b", scan_targets)["found"] is False
def test_unknown_host_is_not_snapped_onto_the_scan_target() -> None:
scan_targets = ["https://app.example.com"]
_save_impl("https://app.example.com", _BLACKBOX_MODEL, "root", scan_targets)
assert _get_impl("https://unrelated.test", scan_targets)["found"] is False
def test_empty_target_falls_back_to_a_single_scan_target() -> None:
scan_targets = ["https://app.example.com"]
_save_impl("", _BLACKBOX_MODEL, "root", scan_targets)
assert _get_impl("", scan_targets)["found"] is True
assert _get_impl("https://app.example.com")["found"] is True
def test_repository_subdirectory_shares_the_repository_model(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
repo = _make_repo(tmp_path)
(repo / "src").mkdir()
_save_impl(str(repo), _MODEL, "root")
assert _get_impl(str(repo / "src"))["found"] is True
def test_checkout_and_its_clone_url_are_one_identity(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
"""The model an agent saves inside the checkout must be visible to an agent
that names the same repository by the URL it was cloned from."""
repo = _make_repo(tmp_path)
_git(repo, "remote", "add", "origin", "https://github.com/acme/billing.git")
_save_impl(str(repo), _MODEL, "root")
assert _get_impl("https://github.com/acme/billing")["found"] is True
assert _get_impl("https://github.com/acme/billing.git")["found"] is True
def test_ssh_and_https_remotes_are_one_identity(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
"""One repository cloned over scp-style SSH and over HTTPS is one target."""
over_ssh = _make_repo(tmp_path, "ssh-clone")
_git(over_ssh, "remote", "add", "origin", "git@github.com:acme/billing.git")
_save_impl(str(over_ssh), _MODEL, "root")
over_https = _make_repo(tmp_path, "https-clone")
_git(over_https, "remote", "add", "origin", "https://github.com/acme/billing.git")
assert _get_impl(str(over_https))["found"] is True
def test_different_repositories_on_one_host_stay_separate(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
first = _make_repo(tmp_path, "billing")
_git(first, "remote", "add", "origin", "git@github.com:acme/billing.git")
_save_impl(str(first), _MODEL, "root")
second = _make_repo(tmp_path, "payments")
_git(second, "remote", "add", "origin", "git@github.com:acme/payments.git")
assert _get_impl(str(second))["found"] is False