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Expand Firebase Storage rules coverage and skill discovery
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@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ Third-party service and platform security.
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| Skill | Coverage |
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| -------------------- | ---------------------------------- |
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| `supabase` | Supabase RLS bypasses, auth issues |
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| `firebase_firestore` | Firestore rules, Firebase auth |
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| `firebase` | Firebase Firestore, Storage rules, Auth, and Functions |
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### Protocols
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@@ -490,8 +490,10 @@ Default user: pentester (sudo available)
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<available_skills>
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On-demand specialist skills. Spawn a specialist via `create_agent(skills=[...])`, or pull guidance inline for yourself via `load_skill(skills=[...])`. Anything wrapped in `<specialized_knowledge>` above is already loaded for you.
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{% for category, names in available_skills | dictsort -%}
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- {{ category }}: {{ names | join(', ') }}
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{% for category, skills in available_skills | dictsort -%}
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{% for skill in skills -%}
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- {{ category }}/{{ skill.name }}: {{ skill.description }}
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{% endfor -%}
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{% endfor -%}
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</available_skills>
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{% endif %}
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@@ -145,10 +145,25 @@ def _bare_skill_files(skill_name: str) -> list[Path]:
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return candidates
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def get_available_skills() -> dict[str, list[str]]:
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grouped: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
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def _skill_description(file_path: Path) -> str:
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try:
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content = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
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except (OSError, ValueError):
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return ""
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frontmatter = _FRONTMATTER_PATTERN.match(content)
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if frontmatter is None:
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return ""
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match = re.search(r"^description:\s*(.+?)\s*$", frontmatter.group(0), re.MULTILINE)
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return match.group(1).strip() if match else ""
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def get_available_skills() -> dict[str, list[dict[str, str]]]:
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grouped: dict[str, list[dict[str, str]]] = {}
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for category, name in _iter_user_skill_files():
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grouped.setdefault(category, []).append(name)
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path = _qualified_skill_files(f"{category}/{name}")
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grouped.setdefault(category, []).append(
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{"name": name, "description": _skill_description(path[0]) if path else ""}
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)
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return grouped
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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ GCP misconfigurations expose project data, service account keys, and lateral mov
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**Storage & Data**
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- Cloud Storage (GCS) buckets and objects
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- BigQuery datasets, Cloud SQL instances, Firestore (see `firebase_firestore` skill)
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- BigQuery datasets, Cloud SQL instances, Firestore (see `firebase` skill)
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- Secret Manager, Cloud KMS keys
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**Compute**
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+64
-11
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
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---
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name: firebase-firestore
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description: Firebase/Firestore security testing covering security rules, Cloud Functions, and client-side trust issues
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name: firebase
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description: Firebase security testing covering Firestore, Storage rules, Realtime Database, Auth, Functions, and client-side trust issues
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---
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# Firebase / Firestore
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# Firebase
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Security testing for Firebase applications. Focus on Firestore/Realtime Database rules, Cloud Storage exposure, callable/onRequest Functions trusting client input, and incorrect ID token validation.
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@@ -30,7 +30,17 @@ Security testing for Firebase applications. Focus on Firestore/Realtime Database
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**Endpoints**
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- Firestore REST: `https://firestore.googleapis.com/v1/projects/<project>/databases/(default)/documents/<path>`
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- Realtime DB: `https://<project>.firebaseio.com/.json`
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- Storage REST: `https://storage.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b/<bucket>`
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- GCS JSON API: `https://storage.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b/<bucket>`
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- Firebase Storage rules API: `https://firebasestorage.googleapis.com/v0/b/<bucket>/o`
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Cloud Storage has two front doors with different authorization engines:
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| Front door | Authorization engine |
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| --- | --- |
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| `storage.googleapis.com/<bucket>/<object>` and `/storage/v1/b/<bucket>` | GCS IAM and per-object ACLs |
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| `firebasestorage.googleapis.com/v0/b/<bucket>/o` | Firebase Storage Security Rules |
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A `403` from a GCS URL does not prove that Firebase Storage rules deny access. Always test both doors.
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**Auth**
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- Google-signed ID tokens (iss: `accounts.google.com` or `securetoken.google.com/<project>`)
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@@ -117,9 +127,44 @@ exists(/databases/(default)/documents/orgs/$(org)/members/$(request.auth.uid))
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- Public reads on sensitive buckets/paths
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- Signed URLs with long TTL, no content-disposition controls, replayable across tenants
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- List operations exposed: `/o?prefix=` enumerates object keys
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- Firebase Storage rules allowing unauthenticated or overly broad reads and writes
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**Firebase Storage rules checks**
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Probe the rules door separately from GCS IAM and ACLs:
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1. Unauthenticated list: `GET https://firebasestorage.googleapis.com/v0/b/<bucket>/o?prefix=<known-prefix>`
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2. Unauthenticated read of a known object path
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3. Unauthenticated write/upload to a uniquely named test object
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4. Repeat list, read, and write as an anonymous-auth principal when anonymous sign-in is enabled
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5. Repeat the same matrix as a low-privilege authenticated user
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Write access is as important as read access and is routinely missed. Record status, response body, and object existence after each attempt; clean up only test objects that the test principal created.
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Review rules source when present and flag:
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- `allow read, write: if request.time < timestamp.date(...)` — the common console test-mode time gate
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- `{allPaths=**}` catch-alls
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- `request.auth != null` as the sole authorization gate
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- Claim-presence checks such as `request.auth.token.roles.size() > 0` without role or tenant validation
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Storage rules use OR-across-matches semantics: a later permissive match can reopen a path that an earlier match denied. Review every matching path, not only the most specific-looking deny.
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**Bucket discovery**
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- Extract `storageBucket` from `firebase.apps[0].options` and `NEXT_PUBLIC_FIREBASE_*` values in JavaScript bundles and source.
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- Check `<project>.appspot.com` and `<project>.firebasestorage.app` bucket conventions.
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**ACL and IAM checks are separate**
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- Sweep object ACLs for `allUsers` and `allAuthenticatedUsers`, including objects made public by Admin SDK `makePublic()` or writers using `public: true`. Per-object public ACLs persist after Firebase rules are tightened and can remain on older prefixes.
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- Check bucket IAM for `allUsers` and `allAuthenticatedUsers`.
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- Check whether Uniform Bucket-Level Access is disabled; legacy object ACLs matter when it is off.
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- Account for CDN caching of previously public objects; cache-bust when verifying a revocation.
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**Tests**
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- GET gs:// paths via HTTPS without auth; verify Content-Type and `Content-Disposition: attachment`
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- GET GCS object paths via HTTPS without auth; verify Content-Type and `Content-Disposition: attachment`
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- Test the Firebase Storage list/read/write matrix above with each available principal
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- Generate and reuse signed URLs across accounts and paths; try case/URL-encoding variants
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- Upload HTML/SVG and verify `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`; check for script execution
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@@ -189,12 +234,19 @@ Apps often implement multi-tenant data models (`orgs/<orgId>/...`). Bind tenant
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## Testing Methodology
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1. **Extract config** - Get project config from client bundle
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2. **Obtain principals** - Collect tokens for unauth, anonymous, user A/B, admin
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1. **Extract config** - Get project and storage bucket config from client bundles and source
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2. **Obtain principals** - Collect tokens for unauth, anonymous, user A/B, and admin where authorized
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3. **Build matrix** - Resource × Action × Principal across Firestore/Realtime/Storage/Functions
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4. **SDK vs REST** - Exercise every action via both to detect parity gaps
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5. **Seed IDs** - Start from list/query paths to gather document IDs
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6. **Cross-principal** - Swap document paths, tenants, and user IDs across principals
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4. **Exercise both Storage doors** - Test Firebase Storage rules endpoints separately from GCS IAM/ACL URLs
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5. **SDK vs REST** - Exercise every action via both to detect parity gaps
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6. **Seed IDs** - Start from list/query paths to gather document and object paths
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7. **Cross-principal** - Swap document paths, tenants, and user IDs across principals
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## Whitebox Rules Review
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- Inspect `firebase.json`, `.firebaserc`, deployment scripts, CI configuration, and infrastructure code for `storage.rules` / `firestore.rules` declarations.
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- If `firebase.json` has no `storage` or `firestore` block, or the referenced rules file is absent from the tree, treat the live rules as unmanaged and force the live probe matrix. Absence of rules IaC is itself a finding; never conclude that there is nothing to review.
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- Correlate configured rule files with deployed project and bucket identifiers. A source rule file for a different project does not establish live protection.
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## Tooling
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@@ -206,6 +258,7 @@ Apps often implement multi-tenant data models (`orgs/<orgId>/...`). Bind tenant
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## Validation Requirements
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- Owner vs non-owner Firestore queries showing unauthorized access or metadata leak
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- Cloud Storage read/write beyond intended scope (public object, signed URL reuse, list exposure)
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- Firebase Storage unauthenticated, anonymous, or low-privilege read/list/write beyond intended scope, with minimal reproducible requests and observed deltas
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- GCS object ACL or bucket IAM access beyond intended scope, including public object persistence after rules changes
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- Function accepting forged/foreign identity (wrong `aud`/`iss`) or trusting client `uid`/`orgId`
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- Minimal reproducible requests with roles/tokens used and observed deltas
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@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
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from collections.abc import Iterator
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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import strix.skills as skills_mod
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from strix.agents.prompt import render_system_prompt
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from strix.skills import (
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get_all_skill_names,
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get_available_skills,
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@@ -12,10 +14,11 @@ from strix.skills import (
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skill_search_dirs,
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validate_requested_skills,
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)
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from strix.utils.resource_paths import get_strix_resource_path
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@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
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def _clear_extra_dirs() -> None:
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def _clear_extra_dirs() -> Iterator[None]:
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original = list(skills_mod._EXTRA_SKILL_DIRS)
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skills_mod._EXTRA_SKILL_DIRS.clear()
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try:
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@@ -37,9 +40,11 @@ def _write_root_skill(root: Path, name: str, body: str) -> None:
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def test_no_registration_leaves_builtin_only() -> None:
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assert registered_skill_dirs() == ()
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builtin = skills_mod.get_strix_resource_path("skills")
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builtin = get_strix_resource_path("skills")
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assert skill_search_dirs() == (builtin,)
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assert {"nmap", "subfinder"}.issubset(get_available_skills()["tooling"])
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assert {"nmap", "subfinder"}.issubset(
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{skill["name"] for skill in get_available_skills()["tooling"]}
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)
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def test_register_is_idempotent_and_ordered(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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@@ -61,16 +66,36 @@ def test_registered_dir_adds_new_skill(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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register_skill_dir(tmp_path)
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assert "widget" in get_all_skill_names()
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assert get_available_skills()["extra"] == ["widget"]
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assert get_available_skills()["extra"] == [{"name": "widget", "description": ""}]
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assert load_skills(["widget"]) == {"widget": "widget body"}
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def test_available_skill_includes_frontmatter_description(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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_write_skill(
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tmp_path,
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"extra",
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"widget",
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"---\nname: widget\ndescription: Useful widget guidance\n---\nwidget body",
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)
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register_skill_dir(tmp_path)
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assert get_available_skills()["extra"] == [
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{"name": "widget", "description": "Useful widget guidance"}
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]
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def test_system_prompt_renders_skill_descriptions() -> None:
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prompt = render_system_prompt(scan_mode="quick", is_root=True)
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assert "- technologies/firebase: Firebase security testing covering" in prompt
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def test_registered_root_skill_is_discoverable_and_valid(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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_write_root_skill(tmp_path, "widget", "widget body")
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register_skill_dir(tmp_path)
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assert "widget" in get_all_skill_names()
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assert get_available_skills()["root"] == ["widget"]
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assert get_available_skills()["root"] == [{"name": "widget", "description": ""}]
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assert validate_requested_skills(["widget"]) is None
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assert validate_requested_skills(["root/widget"]) is None
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assert load_skills(["widget"]) == {"widget": "widget body"}
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@@ -83,8 +108,8 @@ def test_ambiguous_bare_skill_requires_qualified_name(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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register_skill_dir(tmp_path)
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assert "widget" in get_all_skill_names()
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assert get_available_skills()["alpha"] == ["widget"]
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assert get_available_skills()["beta"] == ["widget"]
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assert get_available_skills()["alpha"] == [{"name": "widget", "description": ""}]
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assert get_available_skills()["beta"] == [{"name": "widget", "description": ""}]
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assert validate_requested_skills(["alpha/widget"]) is None
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assert validate_requested_skills(["beta/widget"]) is None
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