Commit Graph
5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
seanturner83andGitHub 89a707ff51 sandbox: shrink image 7.2GB → 3.8GB (cache cleanup, multi-stage Go build, drop ZAP) (#474) 2026-07-22 07:25:38 -07:00
0fb005c73f fix(runtime): swallow torn-down docker socket in sandbox delete() (#721)
StrixDockerSandboxClient.delete() best-effort-kills the sandbox container via
containers.get(id).kill() before delegating to the SDK's delete(), suppressing
docker NotFound/APIError. But when the docker daemon socket is already going
away — the normal case on a host/CI teardown — containers.get() ->
inspect_container raises requests' ConnectionError, which is a *sibling* of
docker.errors.APIError under requests.RequestException, not a subclass. So it
escapes the APIError-only suppress and surfaces a full traceback on teardown
even though the kill is meant to be best-effort.

Add RequestException to the suppress so the best-effort kill is genuinely
best-effort regardless of daemon reachability.

Test: tests/test_docker_client_delete.py — the kill raising ConnectionError
(and NotFound/APIError) is swallowed and delete() still delegates; unrelated
errors still propagate; no-container_id is a no-op. The ConnectionError case
fails against the pre-fix APIError-only suppress.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 00:13:35 -04:00
375fc9c3d0 feat(report): tag SARIF rules with STRIDE legs derived from CWE (#708)
Builds on the SARIF 2.1.0 emitter (#626): give each SARIF rule one or more
`stride:<leg>` tags (Spoofing / Tampering / Repudiation / Information
disclosure / Denial of service / Elevation of privilege) derived from the
finding's CWE, so consumers — the GitHub code-scanning Security tab, ASPM
dashboards, coverage reports — can group and filter findings by
threat-model leg. SARIF results inherit their rule's tags via ruleId, so
tagging the rule is sufficient.

- _CWE_TO_STRIDE maps common CWEs to legs (dominant leg first where a CWE
  spans several); unmapped / no-CWE findings fall back to a default
  (tampering + information-disclosure) so every finding carries >=1 leg
  and downstream reports have no coverage gaps.
- Includes mappings for CWEs surfaced by real scans: 798 (hardcoded
  creds), 862 (missing authz), 259 (hardcoded password), 1391 (weak
  credential).

Tests: tests/report/test_sarif_stride.py (14 cases — mapping, normalization
of CWE-306/306/"cwe: 306" forms, default fallback, rule-tag emission).

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 21:19:53 -04:00
302efedca6 feat(report): SARIF 2.1.0 emitter for CI / code-scanning integration (#626)
* feat(report): SARIF 2.1.0 emitter for CI / code-scanning integration

Strix emits CSV + markdown + JSON but no SARIF, so findings can't feed
GitHub code-scanning, an ASPM, or any SARIF-consuming CI gate. Add a
stdlib-only emitter (strix/report/sarif.py) and always write findings.sarif
from ReportState._save_artifacts, beside the existing artifacts.

Design invariants (learned from running this in production):
- Stable partialFingerprints.primaryLocationLineHash per finding, so a
  re-scan that re-words a title doesn't churn code-scanning alert IDs.
- Class/category hashing so the same vuln class maps to a stable ruleId
  across scans rather than drifting.
- Findings with no code location anchor to SECURITY.md with a synthetic
  location marker instead of being silently dropped.
- Always emit (even with zero findings) so a clean re-scan overwrites a
  stale findings.sarif and code-scanning auto-resolves fixed alerts.
- tool.driver.version reports the strix package version.
- Fully isolated in its own try/except: a SARIF build error must never
  break the CSV/MD/run-record path.

Verified end-to-end on v1.0.4 against a SQLi/cmd-inj/weak-hash fixture:
3 findings -> valid SARIF 2.1.0, 3 results, real code locations, distinct
per-finding fingerprints.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(report): complete SARIF code scanning metadata

---------
Co-authored-by: bearsyankees <bearsyankees@gmail.com>
2026-07-03 10:43:31 -04:00
60abc09ff9 fix: wrap acompletion in asyncio.wait_for to prevent indefinite hangs (#453)
* fix: wrap acompletion in asyncio.wait_for to prevent indefinite hangs

litellm's timeout parameter doesn't always propagate to the underlying
httpx transport for Bedrock converse streaming. When Bedrock accepts the
TCP connection but never starts streaming chunks, the acompletion call
hangs indefinitely with all connections in CLOSED state.

This wraps the acompletion call in asyncio.wait_for() using the
configured LLM_TIMEOUT (default 300s). TimeoutError is already retryable
via _should_retry (status_code=None), so the retry loop handles it.

Diagnosed via faulthandler thread dump showing the main asyncio event
loop blocked in selectors.select() with no pending callbacks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add per-chunk timeout to streaming loop

Addresses review feedback: the initial asyncio.wait_for only guards the
acompletion call. If Bedrock returns headers but stalls mid-stream, the
async for loop could still hang indefinitely.

Replaces async for with explicit __anext__ calls wrapped in
asyncio.wait_for, using the same configured timeout. Mid-stream stalls
now raise TimeoutError and trigger the existing retry logic.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Sean Turner <sean.turner@zerohash.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-22 16:26:47 -04:00