Addresses the top recurring agent tool-call failures observed in telemetry:
- proxy: the shared Caido client had no locking or reconnect, so concurrent
agent calls raced ("Transport is already connected") and a dead transport
poisoned the rest of the run ("Connector is closed"/"Server disconnected").
Add an asyncio lock + bounded reconnect in caido_api.call_with_client (sandbox
path) and a scan-wide caido_lock in the run context that host-side proxy tools
hold around every call. Deterministic errors are not retried.
- proxy: list_requests now returns Caido's exact parser message, echoes the
offending query, and includes a corrected-syntax hint so agents self-correct
instead of retrying a broken HTTPQL filter.
- shell/prompt: document that write_stdin requires a process started with
tty=true; nudge toward writing Python to a file over deeply-nested one-liners;
note the venv pre-installs common libs.
- agent-browser: distinguish daemon/connection failures (run doctor, don't loop)
from malformed commands; invoke directly (no sh -c wrapper).
- containers: use POSIX '.' instead of the bashism 'source' in generated rc
files (fixes 'sh: source: not found'); add file + xxd and pre-install
requests/httpx/beautifulsoup4/lxml/pyjwt/cryptography in the sandbox venv.
- tests: cover proxy serialization/reconnect/no-retry and HTTPQL errors.
The sandbox never creates /workspace/scratch, so guidance pointing agents
there failed on first write. Make the Python/exec_command and recon
output-hygiene guidance path-agnostic (write to a file, relative to the
working dir) instead of naming a directory that may not exist.
Per projectdiscovery katana docs, add the flags that actually bound
crawl output size and a reduce-then-delete workflow:
- -mdp (max-domain-pages; default is unlimited), -fsu (filter-similar),
-fs scope, -f url (URL-only), -or/-ob (omit raw/body), -mrs.
- Baseline now includes -mdp 2000 -fsu; new 'Keeping output small'
section: bound scope/volume, shrink records, distil then delete raw
crawls.
Address Greptile review:
- system_prompt: only clean up your own task's files; don't delete
another agent's files in the shared workspace unless confirmed unused.
- katana.md: extract+dedupe URLs with jq before removing raw .jsonl
(sort -u on JSONL compares whole records, not URLs).
Add lightweight, always-on disk-hygiene guidance so agents keep recon
artifacts bounded on the shared /workspace instead of writing very large
uncapped crawl output.
- system_prompt.jinja: DISK & SCRATCH HYGIENE note in the shared-workspace
block; recon PHASE 1 crawl bullet asks to bound each crawl and tidy up.
- skills/tooling/katana.md: bound the baseline/deep examples with -ct,
add a Keeping-output-manageable note (bound by -ct/-d, reserve -jsl/-kf
all for narrowed targets, check du -sh, dedupe and remove raw .jsonl).
Apply cgroup caps (mem_limit, shm_size, nano_cpus, pids_limit) to the
sandbox container from STRIX_SANDBOX_* env vars. Unset values keep
docker's unbounded default, so behavior is unchanged unless opted in.
The sandbox SDK's LocalDir walker rejects any symlink outright
(LocalDirReadError, reason=symlink_not_supported), so uploading a cloned
repository that commits symlinks (common in JS/TS monorepos) aborts before
the agent starts. Stage such trees into a temp copy first: in-tree links
are dereferenced; out-of-tree, dangling, and cyclic links are dropped and
never followed, preserving the walker's path-escape safety. Symlink-free
trees are uploaded as-is.
* fix(deps): cap openai<2.45 and add litellm[proxy] so fresh installs can run
* chore(deps): sync uv.lock with openai cap and litellm[proxy]
Regenerate the lockfile so locked/frozen installs pick up the openai<2.45 cap and litellm[proxy] extras (fastapi, orjson, ...); remove inline dependency comments.
Co-Authored-By: Ahmed Allam <ahmed39652003@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Ahmed Allam <ahmed39652003@gmail.com>
feat(inputs): implement logic for required tool choice based on model
test(inputs): add tests for force_required_tool_choice behavior
test(runner): update tests to include force_required_tool_choice in settings
- Increased UI update interval from 350ms to 500ms
- Reduced dot animation frequency from 60ms to 250ms
- Reduced splash animation frequency from 50ms to 100ms
- Added content hash cache for rendered agent messages to avoid
re-parsing markdown and re-running Pygments on every tick
- Added guard to prevent redundant scroll_end callbacks from queuing
during rapid updates
Closes#581
StrixDockerSandboxClient.delete() best-effort-kills the sandbox container via
containers.get(id).kill() before delegating to the SDK's delete(), suppressing
docker NotFound/APIError. But when the docker daemon socket is already going
away — the normal case on a host/CI teardown — containers.get() ->
inspect_container raises requests' ConnectionError, which is a *sibling* of
docker.errors.APIError under requests.RequestException, not a subclass. So it
escapes the APIError-only suppress and surfaces a full traceback on teardown
even though the kill is meant to be best-effort.
Add RequestException to the suppress so the best-effort kill is genuinely
best-effort regardless of daemon reachability.
Test: tests/test_docker_client_delete.py — the kill raising ConnectionError
(and NotFound/APIError) is swallowed and delete() still delegates; unrelated
errors still propagate; no-container_id is a no-op. The ConnectionError case
fails against the pre-fix APIError-only suppress.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Alex Schapiro