update readme

2026-08-16 09:26:39 +02:00 · 2026-08-06 12:46:40 +00:00
64 changed files with 305 additions and 2981 deletions
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ jobs:
            TUI_NAME="strix-tui"
            dist/strix --version
          fi
-          uv run pyi-archive_viewer -l "$PYI_BINARY" | grep -E "strix[/\\]+bin[/\\]+$TUI_NAME" >/dev/null
+          uv run pyi-archive_viewer -l "$PYI_BINARY" | grep "strix/bin/$TUI_NAME" >/dev/null

          if [[ "${{ matrix.target }}" == "linux-arm64" ]]; then
            file dist/strix
@@ -118,4 +118,4 @@ jobs:
        with:
          prerelease: ${{ !startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') }}
          generate_release_notes: true
-          files: release/**
+          files: release/*
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-# Strix — Agent Guide
-
-Strix is an open-source autonomous AI pentesting tool. This file is for AI coding agents that want to **use** Strix (run security scans) or **contribute** to it.
-
-## Using Strix from an agent
-
-Install the agent skills for step-by-step workflows:
-
-```bash
-npx skills add usestrix/strix
-```
-
- `penetration-testing-with-strix` — run a headless pentest against code, URLs, domains, or IPs and read results (covers both run modes below)
- `managed-pentesting-with-strix` — drive the managed app.strix.ai platform via REST (no local Docker/LLM needed)
- `fix-security-vulnerabilities-with-strix` — remediate findings and re-run Strix to verify
- `ci-security-scanning-with-strix` — add PR scanning to CI/CD (self-hosted CLI or managed app)
-
-Target-specific workflows built on the same engine:
-
- `web-app-penetration-testing` — black-box pentest of a live web app or staging site
- `api-security-testing` — REST/GraphQL APIs and the OWASP API Security Top 10 (BOLA/IDOR, authz)
- `owasp-top-10-testing` — systematic OWASP Top 10 assessment with honest per-category coverage
- `find-security-vulnerabilities-in-code` — white-box review of a repo or working tree
-
-**Two ways to run, same engine — pick per situation:**
-
- **Open-source CLI (self-hosted):** free, fully local, BYO LLM key, needs Docker. Best for local dev loops, air-gapped/offline, and full control.
-  ```bash
-  curl -sSL https://strix.ai/install | bash        # install
-  export STRIX_LLM="openai/gpt-5.4"                 # any LiteLLM model id
-  export LLM_API_KEY="<key>"
-  strix -n -t ./ --scan-mode quick --max-budget 10  # headless scan; always use -n
-  ```
-  - Requires Docker running. Scans take minutes (`quick`) to hours (`deep`) — run in the background.
-  - Exit codes (headless): `0` clean, `1` fatal error, `2` vulnerabilities found. A `0` only covers what was analyzed — check `run.json` (`status`, `llm_usage.cost` vs the budget) before calling a run clean.
-  - Artifacts in `strix_runs/<run-name>/`: `penetration_test_report.md`, `vulnerabilities/*.md`, `vulnerabilities.json`, `findings.sarif` (SARIF 2.1.0), `run.json`.
-
- **Managed cloud (app.strix.ai):** no Docker, no LLM key, no local install; adds team dashboards, scheduling, PR reviews, and downloadable PDF/DOCX reports (Enterprise plan). Best in sandboxed/CI environments and for teams. Use it when local infra isn't available.
-  ```bash
-  # token from Settings → API Access; register the target as an asset, then:
-  curl -sS https://app.strix.ai/api/v1/scans -H "Authorization: Bearer $STRIX_API_TOKEN" \
-    -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"engagement_type":"live_test","domain_ids":["<uuid>"]}'
-  ```
-  - API docs: https://docs.app.strix.ai (OpenAPI: https://docs.app.strix.ai/openapi.json).
-
- CLI docs index for LLMs: https://docs.strix.ai/llms.txt (full: https://docs.strix.ai/llms-full.txt).
- Only scan targets the user is authorized to test.
-
-## Contributing to this repo
-
- Python 3.12+, managed with `uv`. Install dev deps: `make dev-install`.
- Lint/format/type-check/security, all in one: `make check-all` (ruff, mypy, bandit).
- Tests: `uv run pytest`.
- Run from source: `uv run strix --target <target>`.
- Layout: `strix/agents` (agent graph + prompts), `strix/tools` (proxy, browser, terminal, scanners), `strix/runtime` (Docker sandbox), `strix/report` (findings, SARIF), `strix/skills` (internal knowledge packs the pentest agents load — different from the consumer skills in `skills/`), `strix/interface` (CLI/TUI), `containers/` (sandbox image).
- Pre-commit hooks: `make pre-commit` (or `uv run pre-commit install`).
@@ -108,18 +108,6 @@ Try the Strix full-stack penetration testing platform at **[app.strix.ai](https:

 ---

-## 🤖 Use Strix from Your Coding Agent
-
-Strix is agent-ready. Give Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, or any [SKILL.md-compatible](https://agentskills.io) agent the ability to run pentests, fix findings, and set up CI scanning:
-
-```bash
-npx skills add usestrix/strix
-```
-
-This installs eight skills: **penetration-testing-with-strix** (run headless scans and read results), **managed-pentesting-with-strix** (drive the managed [app.strix.ai](https://app.strix.ai) platform via REST — no local Docker or LLM key), **fix-security-vulnerabilities-with-strix** (remediate + re-scan to verify), **ci-security-scanning-with-strix** (PR scanning in CI), plus target-specific workflows: **web-app-penetration-testing**, **api-security-testing**, **owasp-top-10-testing**, and **find-security-vulnerabilities-in-code**. Agents can run Strix two ways with the same engine — the open-source CLI locally, or the managed cloud when there's no local infra — and read [`AGENTS.md`](AGENTS.md) for a quick reference, [docs.strix.ai/llms.txt](https://docs.strix.ai/llms.txt) for the CLI docs, and [docs.app.strix.ai](https://docs.app.strix.ai) for the API.
-
---
-
 ## ✨ Features

 ### Agentic Pentesting Tools
@@ -117,21 +117,6 @@ ENV AGENT_BROWSER_EXECUTABLE_PATH=/usr/bin/chromium
 ENV AGENT_BROWSER_USER_AGENT="Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.36"
 ENV AGENT_BROWSER_ARGS="--disable-blink-features=AutomationControlled,--no-first-run,--no-default-browser-check,--lang=en-US"
 ENV AGENT_BROWSER_SCREENSHOT_DIR=/workspace/.agent-browser-screenshots
-ENV AGENT_BROWSER_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS=180000
-USER root
-RUN set -eu; \
-    { \
-        for var in AGENT_BROWSER_EXECUTABLE_PATH AGENT_BROWSER_USER_AGENT \
-                   AGENT_BROWSER_ARGS AGENT_BROWSER_SCREENSHOT_DIR \
-                   AGENT_BROWSER_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS; do \
-            eval "value=\${$var}"; \
-            printf 'export %s="${%s:-%s}"\n' "$var" "$var" "$value"; \
-        done; \
-    } > /tmp/agent-browser.sh; \
-    install -m 0644 /tmp/agent-browser.sh /etc/profile.d/agent-browser.sh; \
-    rm /tmp/agent-browser.sh; \
-    env -i bash -lc 'test "${AGENT_BROWSER_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS}" = "180000"'
-USER pentester
 RUN /home/pentester/.npm-global/bin/agent-browser doctor --offline --quick

 RUN set -eux; \
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ When remote vars are set, Strix dual-writes telemetry to both local JSONL and th

 ## Docker Configuration

-<ParamField path="STRIX_IMAGE" default="ghcr.io/usestrix/strix-sandbox:1.3.0" type="string">
+<ParamField path="STRIX_IMAGE" default="ghcr.io/usestrix/strix-sandbox:1.2.0" type="string">
  Docker image to use for the sandbox container.
 </ParamField>

@@ -68,10 +68,10 @@ Framework-specific testing patterns.

 Third-party service and platform security.

-| Skill      | Coverage                                               |
-| ---------- | ------------------------------------------------------ |
-| `supabase` | Supabase RLS bypasses, auth issues                     |
-| `firebase` | Firebase Firestore, Storage rules, Auth, and Functions |
+| Skill                | Coverage                           |
+| -------------------- | ---------------------------------- |
+| `supabase`           | Supabase RLS bypasses, auth issues |
+| `firebase_firestore` | Firestore rules, Firebase auth     |

 ### Protocols

@@ -46,8 +46,7 @@
            "group": "Integrations",
            "pages": [
              "integrations/github-actions",
-              "integrations/ci-cd",
-              "integrations/coding-agents"
+              "integrations/ci-cd"
            ]
          },
          {
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
---
-title: "Coding Agents"
-description: "Use Strix from Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, and other AI agents"
---
-
-Strix is built to be driven by AI coding agents. Install the official agent skills and your agent knows how to run pentests, remediate findings, and wire Strix into CI.
-
-## Install the Skills
-
-Works with any agent that supports the open [SKILL.md standard](https://agentskills.io) — Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, and dozens more:
-
-```bash
-npx skills add usestrix/strix
-```
-
-| Skill | What your agent learns |
-|-------|------------------------|
-| `penetration-testing-with-strix` | Run headless scans against code, URLs, domains, or IPs — self-hosted CLI or managed cloud — with budget caps, and read the results |
-| `managed-pentesting-with-strix` | Drive the managed [app.strix.ai](https://app.strix.ai) platform over REST — no local Docker or LLM key needed |
-| `fix-security-vulnerabilities-with-strix` | Triage findings, fix root causes, and re-run Strix to verify each fix |
-| `ci-security-scanning-with-strix` | Add PR security scanning to GitHub Actions or any CI (self-hosted CLI or managed app) |
-| `web-app-penetration-testing` | Black-box pentest of a live web app or staging site — scope, credentials, and multi-account access-control testing |
-| `api-security-testing` | Test a REST/GraphQL API against the OWASP API Security Top 10 — schema-driven enumeration, BOLA/IDOR, authz |
-| `owasp-top-10-testing` | Systematic OWASP Top 10 assessment with honest per-category coverage |
-| `find-security-vulnerabilities-in-code` | White-box security review of a repo or working tree, with exploits to confirm findings |
-
-Install a single skill with `npx skills add usestrix/strix --skill penetration-testing-with-strix`, or use one without installing:
-
-```bash
-npx skills use usestrix/strix@penetration-testing-with-strix | claude
-```
-
-## Two ways to run — self-hosted or managed
-
-Both use the same engine and produce the same validated findings and SARIF, so agents can pick per situation or combine them:
-
- **Open-source CLI (self-hosted)** — runs locally in a Docker sandbox with your own LLM key. Free, fully local, air-gap capable. Best for local dev loops and full control.
- **Managed cloud** — runs on Strix's infrastructure via the [app.strix.ai REST API](https://docs.app.strix.ai). No Docker, no LLM key, no local install; adds team dashboards, scheduling, PR reviews, and downloadable PDF/DOCX reports (Enterprise plan). Best in sandboxed/CI environments and for teams. Create an API token under **Settings → API Access**; the `managed-pentesting-with-strix` skill has the full flow.
-
-## Agent-Friendly Interfaces
-
-Everything an agent needs is machine-readable:
-
- **Headless CLI** — `strix -n` runs without the TUI and exits with `0` (clean), `1` (error), or `2` (vulnerabilities found).
- **REST API** — the managed platform exposes a documented [OpenAPI](https://docs.app.strix.ai/openapi.json) at `https://app.strix.ai/api/v1` (scans, vulnerabilities, assets, PR reviews, schedules, webhooks) with bearer tokens and scopes.
- **Structured results** — every run writes `vulnerabilities.json`, `vulnerabilities.csv`, `findings.sarif` (SARIF 2.1.0), and per-finding Markdown under `strix_runs/<run-name>/`; the cloud exposes the same as JSON plus SARIF export.
- **Budget controls** — `--max-budget` and `--max-turns` give agents hard cost/time caps.
- **`AGENTS.md`** — the [repository's agent guide](https://github.com/usestrix/strix/blob/main/AGENTS.md) with a quick reference.
- **`llms.txt`** — this documentation is indexed at [docs.strix.ai/llms.txt](https://docs.strix.ai/llms.txt) and fully exported at [docs.strix.ai/llms-full.txt](https://docs.strix.ai/llms-full.txt); every page is also available as Markdown by appending `.md` to its URL.
-
-## Example Prompts
-
-Once the skills are installed, prompts like these just work:
-
-```text
-Pentest this repo with Strix (quick mode, $10 budget) and summarize the findings.
-```
-
-```text
-Fix all critical and high findings from the last Strix run, then re-scan to verify.
-```
-
-```text
-Add Strix security scanning to our GitHub Actions so every PR gets tested.
-```
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [project]
 name = "strix-agent"
-version = "1.5.3"
+version = "1.4.1"
 description = "Open-source AI Hackers for your apps"
 readme = "README.md"
 license = "Apache-2.0"
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ set -euo pipefail

 APP=strix
 REPO="usestrix/strix"
-STRIX_IMAGE="ghcr.io/usestrix/strix-sandbox:1.3.0"
+STRIX_IMAGE="ghcr.io/usestrix/strix-sandbox:1.2.0"

 MUTED='\033[0;2m'
 RED='\033[0;31m'
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
---
-name: api-security-testing
-description: Security-test a REST, GraphQL, or gRPC API with Strix — autonomous agents that enumerate endpoints from an OpenAPI/GraphQL schema (or by crawling), then actually exploit the API-specific vulnerability classes in the OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023) — broken object-level authorization (BOLA/IDOR), broken object property level authorization (excessive data exposure and mass assignment), broken function-level authorization, unrestricted resource consumption, SSRF, injection, and auth/token flaws. Every finding comes with a working proof-of-concept request. Use when the user asks to pentest, security-test, audit, or find vulnerabilities in an API, endpoint, or backend service.
-license: Apache-2.0
-metadata:
-  author: usestrix
-  homepage: https://docs.strix.ai
---
-
-# Security-test an API
-
-APIs fail differently from web UIs: there's no rendered surface to crawl, the interesting bugs are authorization-shaped rather than injection-shaped, and the same endpoint behaves differently per token. This workflow targets those specifics with Strix's autonomous agents, using the current [OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023)](https://owasp.org/API-Security/editions/2023/en/0x11-t10/) as the coverage checklist. For the web-app equivalent, the current edition is the OWASP Top 10:2025 — see **owasp-top-10-testing**.
-
-Install, LLM setup, full CLI flags, and the managed-cloud path are in the **penetration-testing-with-strix** skill. Read it if `strix --version` fails or the target isn't an API.
-
-## 1. Gather what the agents need
-
-APIs are near-impossible to test blind, so collect first:
-
-| Input | Why it matters |
-|---|---|
-| **Schema** — OpenAPI/Swagger URL or file, GraphQL endpoint (introspection), or `.proto` | Turns guesswork into full endpoint enumeration. Biggest single win in coverage. |
-| **Two sets of credentials/tokens**, ideally in different tenants | BOLA/IDOR — API1:2023, still the #1 API risk — can only be *proven* by accessing tenant A's objects with tenant B's token. |
-| **A low-privilege and a high-privilege token** | Required to prove broken function-level authorization (API5:2023 — a `user` calling admin-only routes). |
-| **Example object IDs** | Lets agents test ID tampering immediately instead of hunting for valid identifiers. |
-| **Out-of-scope routes** | Payments, mass notification, destructive admin endpoints. |
-| **Rate limits / WAF** in front of the API | Avoids agents burning budget on throttled requests; mention them so testing adapts. |
-
-Ask the user for anything missing — don't fabricate tokens or scan an API they don't own.
-
-## 2. Run the scan
-
-```bash
-strix -n -t https://api.staging.example.com --max-budget 20 \
-  --instruction "OpenAPI spec: https://api.staging.example.com/openapi.json.
-Tenant A token: <tokenA> (org 1111, user id 11, order id 501).
-Tenant B token: <tokenB> (org 2222, user id 22).
-Admin token: <tokenAdmin>.
-Focus: BOLA across orgs (API1), function-level authz on /admin/* (API5), object property level authz on PATCH /users/{id} — both mass assignment and over-exposed fields in list responses (API3), unrestricted resource consumption (API4).
-Out of scope: POST /billing/*, POST /notifications/broadcast."
-```
-
- **Add the backend source for depth:** `-t ./services/api -t https://api.staging.example.com`. With code access the agents can reason about authorization checks and object ownership rather than inferring them from responses.
- **GraphQL:** point at the GraphQL endpoint and say whether introspection is enabled; call out that you want batching/aliasing abuse, depth/complexity limits, and per-field authorization tested.
- **Internal/private APIs** unreachable from your machine: use the managed platform's network connector — see **managed-pentesting-with-strix**.
- Use `--instruction-file` when the credential/context block gets long, and keep tokens out of shell history and out of committed files.
-
-## 3. Verify findings
-
-`strix_runs/<run>/penetration_test_report.md` first, then `vulnerabilities/*.md` — each contains the exact request that proved the issue. Replay it (e.g. with `curl`) before reporting; for authorization findings, confirm the response really contains the other tenant's data rather than an empty 200.
-
-`findings.sarif` uploads to GitHub code scanning; `vulnerabilities.json` is the structured index for ticketing.
-
-## 4. Fix, re-test, and keep it tested
-
-Remediate with **fix-security-vulnerabilities-with-strix** (fix the authorization check, not the single endpoint), then re-run against the same target to prove the exploit is dead. Wire it into pull-request CI with **ci-security-scanning-with-strix** so new endpoints get tested as they ship.
@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
---
-name: ci-security-scanning-with-strix
-description: Add security scanning to CI/CD with Strix — GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or any pipeline — so every pull request gets a diff-scoped AI pentest that blocks vulnerable code before it merges, with results as PR comments and SARIF uploaded to code scanning. Covers both the self-hosted open-source CLI (runs in your runner) and the managed app.strix.ai platform (GitHub/GitLab app or API, no runner infra). Use when the user asks to add security scanning, SAST/DAST, pentesting, vulnerability checks, or automated security review to their CI pipeline, pre-merge gate, or PR workflow.
-license: Apache-2.0
-metadata:
-  author: usestrix
-  homepage: https://docs.strix.ai
---
-
-# Set up Strix in CI/CD
-
-You can gate PRs two ways — pick based on the environment, or combine them:
-
- **Managed platform (recommended for most teams)** — connect the GitHub/GitLab/Bitbucket app once and Strix reviews every PR with **no workflow file, no runner, no Docker, and no LLM key**. Results post as PR comments and land in the team dashboard. Best when you want zero CI maintenance, central tracking, or your runners lack Docker. See "Managed platform" below and the **managed-pentesting-with-strix** skill.
- **Self-hosted OSS CLI in your runner** — run a diff-scoped scan as a pipeline step. Fully in your infra, free (BYO LLM key), no external account. Requires Docker on the runner. Best for air-gapped/self-hosted CI or when you don't want scans leaving your environment.
-
-Both fail the build on validated findings and both emit SARIF 2.1.0, so you can start with one and add the other later.
-
---
-
-# Option A — Self-hosted OSS CLI in the runner
-
-Run a diff-scoped Strix scan on every PR: only changed files are tested, `quick` mode keeps it fast, and exit code `2` fails the build when validated vulnerabilities are found.
-
-## GitHub Actions
-
-Create `.github/workflows/security.yml`:
-
-```yaml
-name: Security Scan
-
-on:
-  pull_request:
-
-jobs:
-  strix-scan:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-        with:
-          fetch-depth: 0   # required for diff-scope resolution
-
-      - name: Install Strix
-        run: curl -sSL https://strix.ai/install | bash
-
-      - name: Run Security Scan
-        env:
-          STRIX_LLM: ${{ secrets.STRIX_LLM }}
-          LLM_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.LLM_API_KEY }}
-        run: strix -n -t ./ --scan-mode quick --max-budget 10
-
-      # Don't fail open: a run that hits the hard budget stop exits 0 but leaves
-      # run.json status "stopped", not "completed". Enforce completion explicitly.
-      # This does not catch an agent that wrapped up early on a budget *warning*
-      # (it still calls finish_scan and records "completed"), so size the budget.
-      - name: Fail unless the scan completed
-        run: |
-          run_json=$(ls -t strix_runs/*/run.json | head -1)
-          status=$(jq -r .status "$run_json")
-          if [ "$status" != "completed" ]; then
-            echo "Strix run status is '$status' — the scan did not complete (likely budget exhausted). Raise --max-budget." >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-```
-
-Then tell the user to add two repository secrets: `STRIX_LLM` (model id, e.g. `openai/gpt-5.4`) and `LLM_API_KEY` (the provider key). Do not create these values yourself.
-
-Notes:
- In CI/headless runs Strix automatically scopes to the PR's changed files (`--scope-mode auto`). If diff resolution fails, keep `fetch-depth: 0` or set `--diff-base` to the PR's actual base branch — use `origin/${{ github.base_ref }}` in GitHub Actions rather than a hard-coded `origin/main`, since repos use different default branches.
- Exit codes: `0` pass, `2` vulnerabilities found (fails the job), `1` setup error.
- The runner needs Docker (default GitHub-hosted Ubuntu runners have it).
- **Size the budget so the scan completes — don't let it fail open.** A `0` exit means "no validated vulnerabilities in what was analyzed"; if `--max-budget` is hit before the diff is fully covered, the scan wraps up early and can still exit `0`. The "Fail unless the scan completed" step above narrows the gap: `strix_runs/<run>/run.json` is `"stopped"` when the scan was cut off at the hard budget limit without a final report. It is not a complete guard — the agents get graduated wrap-up warnings before that limit, and a run that wraps up on a warning still calls `finish_scan` and records `"completed"` with partial coverage. So keep that step in any pipeline that gates merges **and** give the scan real headroom (compare `run.json`'s `llm_usage.cost` against `--max-budget`; if it ran right up to the cap, raise it). For a `quick` diff-scoped PR scan `--max-budget 10` is usually ample, raise it for large diffs.
-
-### Optional: upload findings to GitHub code scanning
-
-Strix writes SARIF 2.1.0 to `strix_runs/<run>/findings.sarif`:
-
-```yaml
-      - name: Upload SARIF
-        if: always()
-        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
-        with:
-          sarif_file: strix_runs
-```
-
-## Other CI systems
-
-Any pipeline works the same way — install, set the two env vars, run headless:
-
-```bash
-curl -sSL https://strix.ai/install | bash
-# Resolve the PR's base branch robustly (use your CI's base-branch variable if it
-# has one, e.g. GitHub Actions: origin/${{ github.base_ref }}). Avoid piping the
-# git lookup into another command — a failed lookup would otherwise be masked.
-BASE_BRANCH="${CI_MERGE_REQUEST_TARGET_BRANCH_NAME:-}"   # GitLab MR target
-if [ -z "$BASE_BRANCH" ]; then
-  BASE_BRANCH=$(git symbolic-ref --quiet --short refs/remotes/origin/HEAD 2>/dev/null)
-  BASE_BRANCH="${BASE_BRANCH#origin/}"
-fi
-DIFF_BASE="origin/${BASE_BRANCH:-main}"
-# Fail loudly rather than silently narrowing scope (e.g. to HEAD~1, which on a
-# multi-commit branch would scan only the last commit and let earlier ones pass).
-if ! git rev-parse --verify --quiet "$DIFF_BASE" >/dev/null; then
-  echo "Cannot resolve diff base '$DIFF_BASE'. Fetch the base branch (git fetch origin <base>) or set --diff-base explicitly." >&2
-  exit 1
-fi
-strix -n -t ./ --scan-mode quick --scope-mode diff --diff-base "$DIFF_BASE" --max-budget 10
-```
-
-Gate the pipeline on the exit code (see the budget/fail-open caveat above — give the scan enough budget to finish). Schedule `standard` scans nightly and `deep` scans for release candidates.
-
---
-
-# Option B — Managed platform (no runner infra)
-
-No workflow file, no Docker, no LLM key. Two ways to use it:
-
-1. **PR-review app (zero code):** the user installs the Strix GitHub/GitLab/Bitbucket app and enables PR reviews for the repo in the app.strix.ai dashboard. Every PR is then reviewed automatically, with findings posted as PR comments. Nothing to add to the repo. This is the lowest-effort path — recommend it first when the user just wants PR gating.
-
-2. **API-triggered from any pipeline:** if you want to trigger from an existing pipeline (or a system without the SCM app), call the API with a token that has `pr_reviews:write` (or `scans:write`). Store the token as a CI secret; ask the user to create it at **Settings → API Access**. Example GitHub Actions step:
-
-   ```yaml
-   - name: Strix PR review (managed)
-     if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
-     env:
-       STRIX_API_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.STRIX_API_TOKEN }}
-     run: |
-       curl -sS --fail https://app.strix.ai/api/v1/pr-reviews/start \
-         -H "Authorization: Bearer $STRIX_API_TOKEN" \
-         -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-         -d "{\"repository_full_name\":\"${{ github.repository }}\",\"pr_number\":${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}}"
-   ```
-
-   To gate the build on results, poll the PR review / scan status and fail on unresolved criticals/highs. Full endpoints (PR reviews, scans, SARIF export, schedules for scheduled deep scans) are in the **managed-pentesting-with-strix** skill.
-
-Recommend Option B for most teams (no maintenance, central dashboard); use Option A when scans must stay entirely within your own infrastructure.
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
---
-name: find-security-vulnerabilities-in-code
-description: Find security vulnerabilities in a codebase or repository with Strix — a white-box AI security review that reads your source, reasons about the actual data flow and authorization model, then exploits what it finds in a live sandbox so every reported issue has a working proof-of-concept instead of a noisy static-analysis alert. Covers injection, XSS, SSRF, broken access control and IDOR, insecure deserialization, secrets in code, unsafe dependencies, and business-logic flaws. Use when the user asks to security-scan, security-review, or audit their code, repo, or pull request for vulnerabilities.
-license: Apache-2.0
-metadata:
-  author: usestrix
-  homepage: https://docs.strix.ai
---
-
-# Find security vulnerabilities in code
-
-White-box security review with Strix: the agents read the source to build a model of routes, sinks, and authorization checks, then attempt real exploitation. Findings come with a proof-of-concept, so the output is a short list of proven issues rather than the hundreds of "potential" hits a pattern-matching scanner produces.
-
-Install, LLM setup, all flags, and the managed-cloud path are in the **penetration-testing-with-strix** skill.
-
-## Run it
-
-```bash
-# Local working tree
-strix -n -t ./ --scan-mode standard --max-budget 15
-
-# A GitHub repo directly
-strix -n -t https://github.com/org/app --max-budget 15
-
-# Large monorepo: bind-mount instead of copying in
-strix -n --mount ./huge-monorepo --max-budget 20
-```
-
-Two things sharply improve results:
-
-1. **Add a running instance of the app.** `-t ./ -t http://host.docker.internal:3000` lets the agents confirm exploitability against live behavior instead of reasoning about it statically — this is the difference between "this looks unsafe" and a validated finding. If nothing is running, static-only findings should be described as unconfirmed.
-2. **Scope the review.** Point at the risky subtree and say what matters:
-   ```bash
-   strix -n -t ./services/api --max-budget 15 \
-     --instruction "Focus on the authorization layer in src/auth and every route under src/routes/admin. Multi-tenant app: tenant id comes from the JWT. Flag any query that filters by object id without also filtering by tenant."
-   ```
-   Tenancy model, trust boundaries, and which inputs are attacker-controlled are things the agents can't infer reliably — tell them.
-
-## Reviewing a pull request instead of the whole repo
-
-For diff-scoped review of a branch or PR (and blocking merges on findings), use **ci-security-scanning-with-strix** — it covers diff scoping, PR comments, and SARIF upload to GitHub code scanning. The managed platform can also review PRs directly via API (**managed-pentesting-with-strix**).
-
-## Read the results
-
-In `strix_runs/<run>/`: `penetration_test_report.md` (start here), `vulnerabilities/*.md` (one per finding, with PoC and remediation), `vulnerabilities.json` / `.csv`, `findings.sarif` (upload to code scanning), `run.json`.
-
-Before reporting to the user, open each finding and check the PoC actually demonstrates impact. Report file and line alongside the exploit so the fix is obvious.
-
-Exit `0` means nothing exploitable was proven in what was analyzed — not that the codebase is clean. Check `run.json` status and cost against `--max-budget`, and note which paths went unreviewed if the run was capped.
-
-## Complementary tooling
-
-This is exploit-validated review, not an exhaustive inventory. Keep a dependency scanner (SCA) and secret scanning in place for complete coverage of known-CVE dependencies and committed credentials; use this for the logic, authorization, and injection bugs those tools structurally can't find.
-
-## Fix and verify
-
-Hand results to **fix-security-vulnerabilities-with-strix**: patch the root cause (the shared authorization helper, not the one route), then re-run Strix to prove the exploit no longer works.
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
---
-name: fix-security-vulnerabilities-with-strix
-description: Fix security vulnerabilities found by a Strix pentest (open-source CLI or app.strix.ai cloud) — triage by severity, patch the root cause rather than the symptom, and re-run Strix to prove each fix actually closes the exploit. Handles injection, XSS, SSRF, broken access control, IDOR, and other validated findings. Use after a Strix scan reports findings, or when the user asks to remediate, patch, or fix security issues from a strix_runs report, vulnerabilities.json, findings.sarif, or a cloud scan.
-license: Apache-2.0
-metadata:
-  author: usestrix
-  homepage: https://docs.strix.ai
---
-
-# Fix Strix findings and verify
-
-Turn validated Strix findings into minimal, correct fixes — and prove they work by re-scanning.
-
-## 1. Triage
-
-Get the findings from wherever the scan ran:
-
- **OSS CLI** — artifacts in `strix_runs/<run-name>/`:
-  - `vulnerabilities/*.md` — one finding per file: description, severity, PoC steps or script, affected code locations, remediation guidance.
-  - `vulnerabilities.json` — the same findings as JSON (ids, severity, CWE/CVE, `code_locations` with `fix_before`/`fix_after` suggestions when available).
- **Cloud (app.strix.ai)** — fetch the scan's `vulnerabilities[]` via `GET /api/v1/scans/{scanId}` (or `GET /api/v1/vulnerabilities` org-wide). Each carries `severity, cwe, endpoint, method, impact, technical_analysis, poc_description, poc_script_code` and, for code findings, `code_file`/`code_diff`/`code_before`/`code_after`. See the **managed-pentesting-with-strix** skill for auth.
-
-Order work by severity: critical → high → medium → low. Every Strix finding was validated with a working proof-of-concept, so do not dismiss findings as false positives without re-testing the PoC yourself.
-
-## 2. Fix
-
-For each finding:
-
-1. Reproduce it with the PoC from the finding file when feasible.
-2. Fix the root cause, not the specific payload (e.g. parameterize all queries, don't blocklist one string; enforce authorization in the handler, don't hide the endpoint).
-3. Prefer the framework's built-in defense (ORM parameterization, template auto-escaping, CSRF middleware, centralized authz) over ad-hoc sanitization.
-4. Keep the diff minimal and apply the repo's existing patterns. Finding files often include `fix_before`/`fix_after` snippets — use them as a starting point, not verbatim.
-
-Common finding classes and expected fixes: injection → parameterization/escaping at the sink; IDOR/broken access control → object-level authorization checks; SSRF → allowlist + block internal ranges; XSS → context-aware output encoding + CSP; secrets exposure → rotate the secret AND remove it from code/history; auth issues → fix the server-side check (never client-side).
-
-## 3. Verify by re-running Strix
-
-After fixing, re-scan scoped to the fixed area and confirm the finding is gone. Verify in whichever environment you scanned (or both):
-
-**OSS CLI:**
-```bash
-# Re-test just the changed files (fast). Resolve the repo's real default
-# branch instead of assuming origin/main (many repos use master/develop).
-# Avoid the current branch's own upstream as the base — its merge base with
-# HEAD would be HEAD, giving an empty diff and a falsely clean result.
-DIFF_BASE=$(git symbolic-ref --quiet --short refs/remotes/origin/HEAD 2>/dev/null)
-# origin/HEAD can be a dangling symbolic ref — keep it only if its target exists.
-git rev-parse --verify --quiet "$DIFF_BASE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || DIFF_BASE=""
-if [ -z "$DIFF_BASE" ]; then
-  for b in origin/main origin/master origin/develop; do
-    git rev-parse --verify --quiet "$b" >/dev/null && DIFF_BASE="$b" && break
-  done
-fi
-# No silent fallback: a guess like HEAD~1 would cover only the last commit of a
-# multi-commit fix branch. If no base resolves, ask the user for the base branch
-# (or use the focused --instruction verification below, which needs no diff base).
-[ -n "$DIFF_BASE" ] || { echo "Set DIFF_BASE to the branch your fix will merge into." >&2; exit 1; }
-strix -n -t ./ --scan-mode quick --scope-mode diff --diff-base "$DIFF_BASE" --max-budget 5
-
-# Or re-test with the original finding as focus (no diff base needed)
-strix -n -t ./ --instruction "Verify the SQL injection in app/api/search.py is fixed. Original PoC: <poc>" --max-budget 5
-```
-Exit codes: `2` = findings remain (read the new `strix_runs/<run>/vulnerabilities/` and iterate); `0` = clean **for what was analyzed**. Before trusting a `0`, confirm the run wasn't cut short — check `run.json` for a completed status and compare its `llm_usage.cost` with `--max-budget`: a hard budget stop leaves `status: "stopped"`, but a run that wrapped up on a budget warning records `"completed"` with partial coverage. Give verification enough budget to finish, and prefer re-running the specific PoC as the ground-truth signal.
-
-**Cloud:** rerun with the same config and re-poll, then confirm the finding no longer appears:
-```bash
-new_id=$(curl -sS "$BASE/scans/$scan_id/rerun" "${auth[@]}" -X POST | jq -r .scan_id)
-# poll GET /scans/$new_id until completed, then check its vulnerabilities[]
-```
-Or, if the cloud scan came from a repo/PR, trigger a fresh PR review on the fix branch (`POST /pr-reviews/start`). The platform also retests a single finding directly: `POST /api/v1/vulnerabilities/{vulnerabilityId}/retest`.
-
- Also re-run the PoC manually when it is a simple request/script — fastest signal.
- Run the project's own test suite to make sure the fix doesn't break behavior.
-
-## 4. Report
-
-Summarize per finding: severity, root cause, fix applied (file:line), verification result (re-scan clean / PoC no longer reproduces). Never include live secrets in the report; if a secret leaked, state that rotation is required.
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
---
-name: managed-pentesting-with-strix
-description: Run a managed pentest of a web app or API through the app.strix.ai REST API — no local Docker, LLM key, or install needed. Create an API token, register domain/repository assets, launch and poll scans, triage vulnerabilities, export SARIF, download PDF/DOCX pentest reports for SOC 2 and other compliance evidence (Enterprise plan), start PR reviews, and set up schedules and webhooks. Use when the user wants continuous or scheduled pentesting-as-a-service, an auditor-ready pentest report, scans tracked in a team dashboard, or security testing from a sandboxed agent/CI environment with no infrastructure.
-license: Apache-2.0
-metadata:
-  author: usestrix
-  homepage: https://docs.app.strix.ai
---
-
-# Strix Cloud API (managed, no local infra)
-
-Use this when you want Strix's autonomous pentesting **without running Docker or an LLM yourself** — the scan runs on Strix's infrastructure and results are tracked in a team dashboard. This is the right choice in sandboxed/hosted agent and CI environments, for teams, and for scheduled/continuous testing (downloadable PDF/DOCX reports are an Enterprise-plan feature). For fully local, free, air-gapped, or BYO-LLM runs, use the open-source CLI in the **penetration-testing-with-strix** skill instead — both share the same engine and SARIF output, so you can mix them.
-
-Full reference: **[docs.app.strix.ai](https://docs.app.strix.ai)** · OpenAPI: `https://docs.app.strix.ai/openapi.json`
-
-## Setup
-
- **Base URL:** `https://app.strix.ai/api/v1`
- **Auth:** every request sends `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. Tokens are **org-scoped**.
- **Get a token:** the user creates one in the dashboard at **Settings → API Access** (app.strix.ai). Ask them for it; never hardcode, log, or commit it. Store it in an env var or the CI secret store.
- **Scopes (least-privilege):** assign only what the integration needs and rotate regularly:
-
-  | Scope | Grants |
-  |---|---|
-  | `scans:read` / `scans:write` | list/read/report scans · create/rerun/cancel scans |
-  | `vulnerabilities:read` / `:write` | read findings · update status & notes |
-  | `assets:read` / `:write` | read domains/repos · register/update them |
-  | `schedules:read` / `:write` | read schedules · create/trigger recurring scans |
-  | `pr_reviews:write` | trigger PR security reviews |
-  | `webhooks:read` / `:write` | manage webhook subscriptions |
-  | `tokens:write` | create/revoke API tokens |
-
-```bash
-export STRIX_API_TOKEN="<token>"
-BASE=https://app.strix.ai/api/v1
-auth=(-H "Authorization: Bearer $STRIX_API_TOKEN")
-```
-
-All examples use `jq` to parse JSON. Handle HTTP errors: `401` bad/expired token, `402` out of credits, `403` scope/plan-tier limit, `422` validation error.
-
-## 1. Register the target as an asset
-
-Scans run against **registered assets**, not raw URLs. Register once, then reuse the returned UUID.
-
-```bash
-# Domain (black-box / live target). Requires domain verification before external scanning.
-# asset_type must be one of: web_app | api | attack_surface.
-curl -sS "$BASE/domains" "${auth[@]}" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-  -d '{"domain":"staging.example.com","asset_type":"web_app"}' | jq '{id:.domain.id, status, reachable, verification}'
-
-# Repository (white-box / code review). `full_name` is "owner/name".
-# Send one repository object, or a bare JSON array for several — not an object
-# wrapping a "repositories" key (that is rejected with 400).
-curl -sS "$BASE/repositories" "${auth[@]}" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-  -d '[{"full_name":"org/app","provider":"github"}]' | jq '.repositories[] | {id, full_name}'
-```
-
-Look up existing assets instead of re-adding: `GET /domains`, `GET /repositories` (both `assets:read`, paginated with `?page=&limit=`).
-
-## 2. Launch a scan
-
-`POST /scans` (`scans:write`). Provide at least one target via `domain_ids`, `repository_ids`, or `internal_targets` (internal infra needs a network connector — see docs).
-
-```bash
-scan_id=$(curl -sS "$BASE/scans" "${auth[@]}" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{
-  "engagement_type": "live_test",
-  "domain_ids": ["<domain-uuid>"],
-  "focus": "IDOR, auth bypass, SSRF",
-  "context": "Staging. Test account creds are configured as a test user.",
-  "notify_on_completion": true
-}' | jq -r .scan_id)
-echo "$scan_id"
-```
-
-Useful `CreateScanRequest` fields:
-
-| Field | Purpose |
-|---|---|
-| `engagement_type` | `live_test` (default), `code_review`, `internal_infra`, `compliance_pentest` |
-| `domain_ids` / `repository_ids` / `internal_targets` | targets (at least one) |
-| `domain_paths` / `repository_branches` | narrow to specific paths / branches |
-| `credentials` | authenticated scanning, incl. `mfa_method` (`totp`/`email_otp`/…) + `totp_secret` |
-| `headers` | extra HTTP headers (e.g. API keys) for the target |
-| `focus` / `concerns` / `context` | steer the agents |
-| `upload_ids` | attach uploaded source/docs archives for white-box context |
-| `notify_on_completion` / `notification_emails` | email when done |
-
-Response is `{ scan_id, title, status }` with `status` = `pending`.
-
-## 3. Poll to completion
-
-`GET /scans/{scanId}` (`scans:read`). Status flow: `pending → running → completed` (or `failed` / `cancelled`). Poll on an interval — scans take minutes to hours; don't block.
-
-```bash
-while :; do
-  s=$(curl -sS "$BASE/scans/$scan_id" "${auth[@]}" | jq -r .status)
-  echo "status=$s"; [[ "$s" =~ ^(completed|failed|cancelled)$ ]] && break
-  sleep 60
-done
-```
-
-## 4. Read findings
-
-The scan-detail response includes `executive_summary`, `methodology`, `recommendations`, a `findings` severity roll-up, and a `vulnerabilities[]` array. Each vulnerability carries `title, severity, status, cvss, cwe, endpoint, method, impact, technical_analysis, poc_description, poc_script_code`, and (for code findings) `code_file`/`code_diff`/`code_before`/`code_after`.
-
-```bash
-curl -sS "$BASE/scans/$scan_id" "${auth[@]}" \
-  | jq '["critical","high","medium","low","info"] as $order
-       | .vulnerabilities
-       | sort_by(.severity as $s | $order | index($s))
-       | .[] | {title, severity, endpoint, cwe}'
-```
-
-Cloud severities are `critical | high | medium | low` and statuses are `open | in_progress | fixed | ignored`. Sort by an explicit severity order rather than `sort_by(.severity)`, which sorts alphabetically (critical, high, low, medium).
-
-Org-wide triage across scans: `GET /vulnerabilities` (`vulnerabilities:read`; filter by severity/status). Update triage state with the vulnerabilities `:write` endpoints. To remediate, hand off to the **fix-security-vulnerabilities-with-strix** skill.
-
-## 5. Export & report
-
-```bash
-# SARIF 2.1.0 for GitHub code scanning / ASPM ingestion
-curl -sS "$BASE/scans/$scan_id/sarif" "${auth[@]}" -o findings.sarif
-
-# Report. The format and file type are query params (`Accept` is ignored):
-#   format=technical (default) | retest | attestation | executive_summary
-#   type=pdf (default) | docx
-# Any report download requires the Enterprise plan; formats beyond `technical`,
-# DOCX, and white-label branding are Enterprise-only too. Scan must be completed.
-curl -sS "$BASE/scans/$scan_id/report?format=technical&type=pdf" "${auth[@]}" -o strix-report.pdf
-```
-
-## 6. PR reviews
-
-Trigger an automated security review of a pull request (`pr_reviews:write`); results appear as PR comments and in the dashboard:
-
-```bash
-curl -sS "$BASE/pr-reviews/start" "${auth[@]}" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-  -d '{"repository_full_name":"org/app","pr_number":123}'
-```
-
-List/inspect via `GET /pr-reviews` and `GET /pr-reviews/{id}`. Repo-level PR-review behavior is configured with the repository-settings endpoint.
-
-## 7. Continuous testing (schedules & webhooks)
-
- **Schedules** (`schedules:write`, Pro plan): create recurring scans and trigger them on demand — the managed equivalent of a cron-driven CLI loop.
- **Webhooks** (`webhooks:write`): subscribe to pentest/vulnerability lifecycle events (e.g. `scan.completed`, `vulnerability.created`) to push results into Slack, ticketing, or your own pipeline instead of polling.
-
-See the schedules and webhooks sections at [docs.app.strix.ai](https://docs.app.strix.ai) for payloads.
-
-## Safety
-
-Only scan assets the user's organization owns or is authorized to test. External domain scans require verification (DNS/file/meta-tag) enforced by the platform — don't try to bypass it.
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
---
-name: owasp-top-10-testing
-description: Test an application against the OWASP Top 10 with Strix — autonomous AI agents that attempt real exploits for each category of the current OWASP Top 10:2025 (broken access control including SSRF, security misconfiguration, software supply chain failures, cryptographic failures, injection, insecure design, authentication failures, integrity failures, logging and alerting failures, mishandling of exceptional conditions) and report only what they could actually prove, mapped back to the category with a proof-of-concept. Also covers the OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023). Use when the user asks for an OWASP Top 10 assessment, OWASP compliance testing, or a security review mapped to OWASP categories.
-license: Apache-2.0
-metadata:
-  author: usestrix
-  homepage: https://docs.strix.ai
---
-
-# Test against the OWASP Top 10
-
-The OWASP Top 10 is a taxonomy of risk categories, not a test suite — "OWASP Top 10 testing" means exercising each category against the real application and reporting what's actually exploitable. Strix's agents do the exploitation; this skill covers running it category-by-category and reporting coverage honestly.
-
-**Use the current edition: [OWASP Top 10:2025](https://owasp.org/Top10/)** (8th installment, superseding 2021). Ask the user before targeting an older edition — some compliance checklists still reference 2021, and a report labelled with the wrong edition is misleading. Key differences from 2021: **SSRF is folded into A01**, **A03 Software Supply Chain Failures** expands the old "Vulnerable and Outdated Components", and **A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions** is new; A02 Security Misconfiguration moved 5→2.
-
-Install, LLM setup, and the managed-cloud alternative: **penetration-testing-with-strix**.
-
-## What is and isn't testable by an agent
-
-Be straight with the user about this — claiming a clean sweep of all ten is misleading.
-
-| Category (2025) | Coverage |
-|---|---|
-| A01 Broken Access Control (incl. SSRF) | **Strong** — cross-user/tenant access, privilege escalation, IDOR, and SSRF (including blind, via out-of-band callbacks) are all exploit-validated. Needs two accounts plus a privileged one to prove the authorization half. |
-| A02 Security Misconfiguration | **Strong** — debug endpoints, verbose errors, permissive CORS, missing hardening, default credentials, exposed admin surfaces. |
-| A03 Software Supply Chain Failures | **Partial** — version fingerprinting, and vulnerable/outdated dependency review when source is supplied. Build-system and distribution-infrastructure compromise (the broader half of this category) is out of scope for a runtime scan — pair with SCA plus build-provenance controls. |
-| A04 Cryptographic Failures | **Partial** — transport config, unencrypted data in transit, secrets and tokens leaked in responses. At-rest crypto and key management need source or infra review. |
-| A05 Injection | **Strong** — SQL/NoSQL/command/template injection and XSS, exploit-validated. |
-| A06 Insecure Design | **Partial** — business-logic abuse (price/quantity tampering, workflow skipping, race conditions) is found where reachable; design intent still needs human review and threat modelling. |
-| A07 Authentication Failures | **Strong** — auth bypass, weak session/token handling, password-reset and MFA flaws. |
-| A08 Software or Data Integrity Failures | **Partial** — insecure deserialization and unsigned-update paths where reachable; CI/CD trust boundaries are not runtime-testable. |
-| A09 Security Logging & Alerting Failures | **Not testable from outside** — requires reviewing the logging and alerting pipeline. State this rather than reporting it as passed. |
-| A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | **Partial** — agents actively probe error handling and fail-open behavior (malformed input, forced errors, race and timeout conditions) and report what leaks or bypasses a control; exhaustive coverage of internal error paths needs source review. |
-
-For APIs, run the same exercise against the **OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023)** — API1 BOLA, API3 Broken Object Property Level Authorization (2019's excessive data exposure + mass assignment merged), API5 broken function-level authorization — using the **api-security-testing** skill.
-
-## Run it
-
-Maximum category coverage comes from giving the agents both the source and a running instance, plus credentials at two privilege levels:
-
-```bash
-strix -n \
-  -t https://github.com/org/app \
-  -t https://staging.example.com \
-  --scan-mode deep --max-budget 30 \
-  --instruction "OWASP Top 10:2025 assessment. Cover every category systematically and map each finding to its 2025 category id.
-Accounts: userA@example.com/<pw> (org 1), userB@example.com/<pw> (org 2), admin@example.com/<pw>.
-Prioritise A01 (cross-org access, privilege escalation, SSRF), A02, A05, A07, A10.
-Out of scope: /billing/*, outbound email."
-```
-
- `--scan-mode deep` matters here: systematically walking ten categories is not a quick scan.
- Without a second account, A01 results are structurally incomplete — say so in the report rather than leaving it implied.
- Need an auditor-facing PDF? Run it through the managed platform and pull the technical report (**managed-pentesting-with-strix**).
-
-## Report honestly
-
-From `strix_runs/<run>/`, group `vulnerabilities/*.md` by category and state, per category: what was attempted, what was proven, and what couldn't be assessed (A09 always; A03/A04/A06/A08/A10 partially). Label the report with the edition used. Verify each PoC yourself before it goes in front of the user.
-
-A `0` exit code means nothing exploitable was proven **in what was analyzed** — check `run.json` status and cost against `--max-budget`; a budget-capped run is not a completed assessment.
-
-## Then fix and re-test
-
-Remediate with **fix-security-vulnerabilities-with-strix** and re-run to prove each exploit is closed. For ongoing coverage as the app changes, gate pull requests using **ci-security-scanning-with-strix**.
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
---
-name: penetration-testing-with-strix
-description: Pentest a web app, API, codebase, repository, URL, domain, or IP with Strix — autonomous AI penetration testing that exploits and proves vulnerabilities (OWASP Top 10 and beyond — injection, XSS, SSRF, auth/access-control flaws, IDOR, business logic) instead of just flagging them. Runs self-hosted with the open-source CLI or via the managed app.strix.ai cloud, and returns validated findings with proof-of-concept exploits (Markdown, JSON, CSV, SARIF). Use when the user asks to pentest, hack, security-scan, security-audit, or find vulnerabilities in an app, API, website, or repo.
-license: Apache-2.0
-metadata:
-  author: usestrix
-  homepage: https://docs.strix.ai
---
-
-# Run a Strix pentest
-
-Strix runs autonomous AI pentesting agents that dynamically exploit a target and only report findings validated with a working proof-of-concept. There are **two ways to run it, built on the same engine and producing the same findings** — pick per situation, and mix them freely:
-
- **Open-source CLI** (self-hosted) — runs on your machine in a Docker sandbox with your own LLM key. Free, fully local, BYO-LLM, air-gap capable. Docs: [docs.strix.ai](https://docs.strix.ai).
- **Cloud API** (managed) — runs on Strix's infrastructure via `https://app.strix.ai/api/v1`. No Docker, no LLM key, no local compute; adds team dashboards, scheduling, PR reviews, downloadable PDF/DOCX reports (Enterprise plan), and internal-network connectors. Docs: [docs.app.strix.ai](https://docs.app.strix.ai). Full workflow in the **managed-pentesting-with-strix** skill.
-
-## Which one? (decide, don't default)
-
-Choose honestly based on the situation — neither is "better":
-
-| Situation | Prefer |
-|---|---|
-| No Docker available, or a sandboxed/hosted agent/CI environment | **Cloud** |
-| User has no LLM key / doesn't want to pay per-token or manage models | **Cloud** |
-| Team visibility, shareable dashboard, scheduled/continuous scans, PR reviews, downloadable PDF/DOCX report (Enterprise) | **Cloud** |
-| Scanning internal/private infrastructure not reachable from your machine | **Cloud** (network connector) |
-| Source must never leave local infra (privacy/air-gap), or fully offline | **OSS CLI** |
-| Free / one-off / local dev-loop scan, Docker already present | **OSS CLI** |
-| BYO or self-hosted LLM, or a specific model not offered by the platform | **OSS CLI** |
-| CI: runner already has Docker and you want a self-contained gate | **OSS CLI** |
-| CI: no Docker, or you want results tracked centrally | **Cloud** |
-
-**Mix them:** e.g. use the OSS CLI for the fast local dev-loop while writing/fixing code, and the Cloud for the authoritative, team-visible scan + report + tracking; or gate PRs with the OSS CLI in CI while the Cloud runs scheduled deep scans and PR reviews across the org. Both emit the same SARIF 2.1.0, so findings line up across environments.
-
-If unsure and the user has (or will create) an app.strix.ai account, prefer **Cloud** — it avoids all local-infra friction. If they want zero signup / full local control, use the **OSS CLI**.
-
---
-
-# Option A — Open-source CLI (self-hosted)
-
-## Prerequisites
-
-1. **Docker running** — check with `docker info`. The first scan pulls the sandbox image automatically.
-2. **Strix installed** — check with `strix --version`. Install if missing:
-   ```bash
-   curl -sSL https://strix.ai/install | bash   # or: pipx install strix-agent
-   ```
-3. **LLM configured** — two environment variables:
-   ```bash
-   export STRIX_LLM="openai/gpt-5.4"      # any LiteLLM model id (openai/..., anthropic/..., openrouter/...)
-   export LLM_API_KEY="<provider api key>"
-   ```
-   Ask the user for these if unset. Never hardcode or commit keys.
-
-## Running a scan
-
-Always use `-n` (non-interactive/headless) — the default TUI blocks agents. Always set `--max-budget` unless the user says otherwise.
-
-```bash
-# Local code (white-box)
-strix -n -t ./ --scan-mode standard --max-budget 10
-
-# Deployed app / API (black-box)
-strix -n -t https://staging.example.com --max-budget 20
-
-# Repo + deployed app together (best coverage)
-strix -n -t https://github.com/org/app -t https://staging.example.com
-
-# Focused testing with credentials or scope hints
-strix -n -t https://app.example.com \
-  --instruction "Use credentials user@example.com:pass123. Focus on IDOR and auth bypass."
-
-# Large monorepo: bind-mount instead of copying
-strix -n --mount ./huge-monorepo
-```
-
-Key flags:
-
-| Flag | Meaning |
-|---|---|
-| `-t, --target` | URL, repo URL, local path, domain, or IP. Repeatable. |
-| `-n, --non-interactive` | Headless, exits on completion. Required for agents. |
-| `-m, --scan-mode` | `quick` (minutes) / `standard` (~30 min) / `deep` (hours, default). |
-| `--instruction` / `--instruction-file` | Credentials, focus areas, scope rules. |
-| `--max-budget USD` | Hard LLM spend cap; scan wraps up cleanly at the limit. |
-| `--max-turns N` | Per-agent turn cap (default 500). |
-| `--resume RUN_NAME` | Resume a prior run from `strix_runs/`. |
-
-Scans take minutes (`quick`) to hours (`deep`). Run them in the background and poll for completion rather than blocking.
-
-### Exit codes (headless)
-
- `0` — finished with no validated vulnerabilities **in what was analyzed**
- `1` — fatal error (missing env vars, Docker down, bad config)
- `2` — vulnerabilities found
-
-A `0` is not proof of full coverage: if `--max-budget`/`--max-turns` is reached before the scan completes, it wraps up early and still exits `0`. When you need assurance the scan finished, give it enough budget and check `strix_runs/<run>/run.json`: a hard budget stop leaves `status: "stopped"`, but an agent that wrapped up early on a budget *warning* still calls `finish_scan` and records `"completed"` — so also sanity-check the run's cost against `--max-budget` and the report's stated coverage before treating a clean result as full coverage.
-
-### Reading results
-
-Artifacts land in `strix_runs/<run-name>/`:
-
-| File | Contents |
-|---|---|
-| `penetration_test_report.md` | Executive report — read this first. |
-| `vulnerabilities/*.md` | One file per validated finding, with PoC and remediation. |
-| `vulnerabilities.json` / `vulnerabilities.csv` | All findings as structured JSON / CSV index. |
-| `findings.sarif` | SARIF 2.1.0 for GitHub code scanning / ASPM ingestion. |
-| `run.json` | Run metadata, status, targets, usage/cost. |
-
---
-
-# Option B — Cloud API (managed, no local infra)
-
-Full details, asset registration, polling, reports, PR reviews, schedules, and webhooks are in the **managed-pentesting-with-strix** skill. Minimal launch-and-poll:
-
-```bash
-export STRIX_API_TOKEN="<token>"   # org-scoped bearer, from Settings → API Access at app.strix.ai
-BASE=https://app.strix.ai/api/v1
-
-# 1. Launch a scan against an already-registered domain/repo asset
-scan_id=$(curl -sS "$BASE/scans" \
-  -H "Authorization: Bearer $STRIX_API_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-  -d '{"engagement_type":"live_test","domain_ids":["<domain-uuid>"]}' | jq -r .scan_id)
-
-# 2. Poll until terminal (pending → running → completed/failed/cancelled)
-curl -sS "$BASE/scans/$scan_id" -H "Authorization: Bearer $STRIX_API_TOKEN" | jq '.status'
-
-# 3. Read validated findings from the scan detail's `vulnerabilities[]`, or export SARIF
-curl -sS "$BASE/scans/$scan_id/sarif" -H "Authorization: Bearer $STRIX_API_TOKEN" -o findings.sarif
-```
-
-Ask the user to create the token (and register the target as a domain/repository asset) if they haven't. If Docker/local prerequisites aren't already satisfied, use this path instead of trying to install infra.
-
---
-
-## Reporting & next steps
-
-Summarize findings by severity (critical/high/medium/low/info) and include the PoC evidence. To remediate and verify fixes (via either path), use the **fix-security-vulnerabilities-with-strix** skill. To wire scanning into CI/CD, use the **ci-security-scanning-with-strix** skill.
-
-## Safety
-
-Only scan targets the user owns or is authorized to test. The Cloud platform enforces domain verification before external scans; for the OSS CLI, confirm authorization yourself if the target looks like third-party infrastructure.
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
---
-name: web-app-penetration-testing
-description: Pentest a web app or website end to end — black-box testing of a live URL, staging environment, or local dev server that finds and exploits real vulnerabilities (auth bypass, broken access control, IDOR, injection, XSS, SSRF, business logic) and proves each one with a working proof-of-concept instead of a signature match. Runs with Strix, either the self-hosted open-source CLI or the managed app.strix.ai cloud. Use when the user asks to pentest, hack, security-test, or audit their web app, website, web application, or staging site.
-license: Apache-2.0
-metadata:
-  author: usestrix
-  homepage: https://docs.strix.ai
---
-
-# Pentest a web application
-
-Black-box (and optionally source-assisted) penetration testing of a running web app with Strix's autonomous agents. Every reported finding is validated with a working exploit, so there are no signature-based false positives to triage.
-
-Install, LLM setup, all CLI flags, and the managed-cloud alternative are covered in the **penetration-testing-with-strix** skill — read it if the target isn't a running web app, or if `strix --version` fails. This skill is the web-app-specific workflow.
-
-## 1. Confirm authorization and scope
-
-Before running anything, establish:
-
- **The target is the user's** (or they're explicitly authorized to test it). Never pentest a third-party site on a hunch.
- **Which environment.** Prefer staging over production; agents send real exploit payloads and will create/modify data.
- **Out-of-scope paths** — payment flows, mass-email endpoints, admin destructive actions, third-party SSO providers.
- **Credentials.** Most real vulnerabilities live behind login. Without a test account, the agents only ever see the marketing surface.
-
-Ask for anything missing rather than guessing.
-
-## 2. Run the scan
-
-```bash
-strix -n -t https://staging.example.com --max-budget 20 \
-  --instruction "Test account: qa@example.com / <password>. In scope: /app/*, /api/*. Do not touch /billing or send email. Focus on access control between the two seeded orgs."
-```
-
-Notes that matter for web apps specifically:
-
- **Give it credentials via `--instruction`** (or `--instruction-file` for anything long), including how to log in if the flow is unusual (magic link, SSO, MFA-exempt test user).
- **Two accounts beat one.** Multi-tenant IDOR and broken-access-control bugs — consistently the highest-impact class in web apps — can only be proven when the agent can attempt cross-account access.
- **Add the repo for white-box depth** when you have the source: `-t https://github.com/org/app -t https://staging.example.com` (or a local path). Source access materially improves coverage of business-logic and authorization flaws.
- **Localhost works.** Point at `http://host.docker.internal:3000` (Docker Desktop) so the sandbox can reach a dev server on the host.
- `--scan-mode quick` for a fast dev-loop pass, `standard` (~30 min) for a normal review, `deep` for pre-release assurance. Always set `--max-budget`.
-
-For a hosted run with no Docker/LLM key, or when the user wants a shareable dashboard and an auditor-ready PDF, use the cloud path in **managed-pentesting-with-strix** instead — same engine, same findings.
-
-## 3. Review results
-
-Read `strix_runs/<run>/penetration_test_report.md` first, then per-finding files in `vulnerabilities/`. Each contains the PoC — re-run it yourself to confirm before reporting to the user.
-
-Exit codes: `0` no validated vulns in what was analyzed, `2` vulnerabilities found, `1` fatal error. A `0` is not proof of full coverage — if the budget or turn cap was hit the scan wraps up early, so check `run.json` status and cost against `--max-budget` before calling the app clean.
-
-## 4. Fix and verify
-
-Hand findings to the **fix-security-vulnerabilities-with-strix** skill: patch the root cause, then re-run Strix against the same target to prove the exploit no longer works. Re-testing is the only reliable confirmation a fix landed.
-
-To keep the app tested on every change rather than once, wire Strix into CI with **ci-security-scanning-with-strix**.
@@ -160,9 +160,7 @@ def _schema_types(spec: dict[str, Any]) -> set[str]:
 def _decode_structured(value: str, types: set[str]) -> Any:
    stripped = value.strip()
    if not stripped:
-        # An empty string is the model's "no value" for a list/dict param; give it
-        # the empty container so it validates instead of failing the type check.
-        return [] if "array" in types else {}
+        return value
    try:
        decoded = json.loads(stripped)
    except json.JSONDecodeError:
@@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ INTERACTIVE BEHAVIOR:
  - To end the whole engagement, call the lifecycle tool: finish_scan (root) or agent_finish (subagent).
  - A turn that ends with plain text and no tool call does NOT stop you: the system nudges you to continue and will re-run you. Do not rely on going silent to pause — it will not pause you.
 - Answering a user question: put the answer in respond_to_user's message. Do not write the answer as plain text and then fall silent — that does not reach a stopping point, it just triggers a continuation nudge.
- If all you want to do is reply and stop, that whole turn is ONE respond_to_user call carrying the answer. Do not write the answer as text and then call respond_to_user as well: the user reads it twice.
- If you do end a turn on plain text and the nudge arrives, your words already reached the user. Do not restate them: call respond_to_user with NO message to simply wait, or with only whatever you still need to add.
 - You may include brief explanatory text before a tool call, and you can narrate while you work — plain text is shown to the user as you go. Narrating is free; respond_to_user is specifically the act of WAITING for the user, so do not call it just to give a status update.
 - Respond naturally when the user asks questions or gives instructions.
 - While actively working on a task, every turn should carry exactly one tool call — use think to plan, the appropriate tool to act, and respond_to_user only when you genuinely need the user.
@@ -263,13 +261,7 @@ Remember: A single well-validated high-impact vulnerability is worth more than d
 <multi_agent_system>
 AGENT ISOLATION & SANDBOXING:
 - All agents run in the same shared Docker container for efficiency
- Each agent has its own terminal sessions
- Browsers are NOT per-agent by default: `agent-browser` with no `--session` is one
-  shared browser, so a concurrent agent's navigation invalidates your page and refs.
-  Pass `--session <your-agent-name>` for any browser work of your own — then it is
-  yours alone. Each session is a full Chromium (~340 MB) on this shared box, so keep
-  one, not several, and `agent-browser --session <name> close` when you're done with
-  the target; an idle browser is reclaimed automatically after 3 minutes
+- Each agent has its own: browser sessions, terminal sessions
 - All agents share the same /workspace directory and proxy history
 - Agents can see each other's files and proxy traffic for better collaboration

@@ -498,10 +490,8 @@ Default user: pentester (sudo available)
 <available_skills>
 On-demand specialist skills. Spawn a specialist via `create_agent(skills=[...])`, or pull guidance inline for yourself via `load_skill(skills=[...])`. Anything wrapped in `<specialized_knowledge>` above is already loaded for you.

-{% for category, skills in available_skills | dictsort -%}
-{% for skill in skills -%}
- {{ category }}/{{ skill.name }}{% if skill.description %}: {{ skill.description }}{% endif %}
-{% endfor -%}
+{% for category, names in available_skills | dictsort -%}
+- {{ category }}: {{ names | join(', ') }}
 {% endfor -%}
 </available_skills>
 {% endif %}
@@ -652,31 +652,27 @@ def _install_openrouter_stream_cost_capture() -> None:
    litellm.OpenrouterConfig = _StrixOpenrouterConfig  # type: ignore[misc]


-OPENROUTER_ATTRIBUTION_HEADERS = {
+_OPENROUTER_ATTRIBUTION_HEADERS = {
    "HTTP-Referer": "https://strix.ai",
    "X-Title": "Strix",
    "X-OpenRouter-Categories": "cli-agent",
 }


-def is_openrouter_model(model_name: str | None) -> bool:
-    return bool(model_name) and "openrouter/" in (model_name or "").strip().lower()
-
-
 def _configure_openrouter_attribution(model_name: str | None) -> None:
    import litellm

    current: object = litellm.headers
    existing: dict[str, str] = current if isinstance(current, dict) else {}
-    if not is_openrouter_model(model_name):
-        if any(key in existing for key in OPENROUTER_ATTRIBUTION_HEADERS):
+    if not model_name or "openrouter/" not in model_name.strip().lower():
+        if any(key in existing for key in _OPENROUTER_ATTRIBUTION_HEADERS):
            remaining = {
-                k: v for k, v in existing.items() if k not in OPENROUTER_ATTRIBUTION_HEADERS
+                k: v for k, v in existing.items() if k not in _OPENROUTER_ATTRIBUTION_HEADERS
            }
            litellm.headers = remaining or None  # type: ignore[assignment]
        return

-    litellm.headers = {**existing, **OPENROUTER_ATTRIBUTION_HEADERS}  # type: ignore[assignment]
+    litellm.headers = {**existing, **_OPENROUTER_ATTRIBUTION_HEADERS}  # type: ignore[assignment]


 def _configure_extra_headers(llm: LlmSettings) -> None:
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ class RuntimeSettings(BaseSettings):
    model_config = _BASE_CONFIG

    image: str = Field(
-        default="ghcr.io/usestrix/strix-sandbox:1.3.0",
+        default="ghcr.io/usestrix/strix-sandbox:1.2.0",
        alias="STRIX_IMAGE",
    )
    backend: str = Field(default="docker", alias="STRIX_RUNTIME_BACKEND")
@@ -830,7 +830,7 @@ async def _append_tool_required_message(
            "execution and never hands control to the user: it is shown to the user, and the "
            "run continues. Continue immediately and call exactly one tool. "
            "If you have something to tell the user and nothing to do until they reply, "
-            "call respond_to_user — with no message if you have already said it. "
+            "call respond_to_user. "
            "If you are blocked waiting for another agent, call wait_for_agents. "
            f"If the whole engagement is complete, call {finish_tool}. "
            "Otherwise use the appropriate execution or planning tool. "
@@ -10,12 +10,10 @@ from openai.types.shared import Reasoning

 from strix.config.models import (
    DEFAULT_MODEL_RETRY,
-    OPENROUTER_ATTRIBUTION_HEADERS,
    bedrock_route_supports_prompt_caching,
    is_bedrock_route,
    is_claude_model,
    is_known_openai_bare_model,
-    is_openrouter_model,
    model_supports_reasoning,
    request_timeout_extra_args,
 )
@@ -140,15 +138,6 @@ def build_root_task(scan_config: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
            "target to assess: the instructions below are the only source of "
            "truth for what to do."
        )
-    elif not parts and user_instructions:
-        # Neither a target nor a directory, but there is an instruction: the user
-        # declined the mount, so the instruction is all there is. Say so, or the
-        # agent goes looking for a scope that was never given.
-        parts.append(
-            "\n\nNo scan target and no working directory were provided. The "
-            "instructions below are the only source of truth for what to do; "
-            "work from them and from what you can reach yourself."
-        )

    parts.extend(_render_diff_scope(diff_scope))

@@ -203,15 +192,13 @@ def make_model_settings(
    request_timeout: float | None = None,
    prompt_cache: bool = True,
    extra_headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-    has_tools: bool = True,
 ) -> ModelSettings:
-    headers = _request_headers(model_name, extra_headers)
    model_settings = ModelSettings(
-        parallel_tool_calls=False if has_tools else None,
+        parallel_tool_calls=False,
        retry=DEFAULT_MODEL_RETRY,
        include_usage=True,
        extra_args=request_timeout_extra_args(request_timeout),
-        extra_headers=headers,
+        extra_headers=dict(extra_headers) if extra_headers else None,
    )
    if (
        reasoning_effort is not None
@@ -234,17 +221,6 @@ def make_model_settings(
    return model_settings


-def _request_headers(
-    model_name: str, extra_headers: dict[str, str] | None
-) -> dict[str, str] | None:
-    headers: dict[str, str] = {}
-    if is_openrouter_model(model_name):
-        headers.update(OPENROUTER_ATTRIBUTION_HEADERS)
-    if extra_headers:
-        headers.update(extra_headers)
-    return headers or None
-
-
 def _reasoning_settings(
    effort: ReasoningEffort,
    extra_args: dict[str, Any] | None,
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@

 from __future__ import annotations

-import asyncio
 import contextlib
 import io
 import json
@@ -430,6 +429,7 @@ async def run_strix_scan(
    except BudgetExceededError as exc:
        logger.info("Scan %s stopped: %s", scan_id, exc)
        if root_id is not None:
+            await coordinator.cancel_descendants(root_id)
            with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
                await coordinator.set_status(root_id, "stopped")
        return None
@@ -442,28 +442,19 @@ async def run_strix_scan(
            scan_id,
        )
        if root_id is not None:
+            await coordinator.cancel_descendants(root_id)
            with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
                await coordinator.set_status(root_id, "stopped")
        return None
-    except (asyncio.CancelledError, KeyboardInterrupt):
-        logger.info("Scan %s interrupted by the user", scan_id)
-        if root_id is not None:
-            with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
-                await coordinator.set_status(root_id, "running")
-        raise
    except BaseException:
        logger.exception("Strix scan %s failed", scan_id)
        if root_id is not None:
+            await coordinator.cancel_descendants(root_id)
            with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
                await coordinator.set_status(root_id, "failed")
        raise
    finally:
        configure_spill_writer(None)
-        # Settle descendants before closing sessions: on a clean finish a child
-        # can still be mid-turn, and closing its session underneath it crashes it.
-        if root_id is not None:
-            with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
-                await coordinator.cancel_descendants(root_id)
        for s in sessions_to_close:
            with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
                s.close()
@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations

 import asyncio
 import logging
-import sqlite3
-from contextlib import contextmanager
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, cast
 from weakref import WeakKeyDictionary

@@ -14,7 +12,7 @@ from agents.memory import SQLiteSession


 if TYPE_CHECKING:
-    from collections.abc import Callable, Iterator
+    from collections.abc import Callable
    from pathlib import Path

    from agents.items import TResponseInputItem
@@ -24,25 +22,9 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)


-class _PooledConnectionSession(SQLiteSession):
-    @contextmanager
-    def _locked_connection(self) -> Iterator[sqlite3.Connection]:
-        with self._lock:
-            if self._closed:
-                raise RuntimeError("SQLiteSession is closed")
-            if self._is_memory_db:
-                yield self._shared_connection
-                return
-            connection = sqlite3.connect(str(self.db_path), check_same_thread=False)
-            try:
-                yield connection
-            finally:
-                connection.close()
-
-
 def open_agent_session(agent_id: str, path: Path) -> SQLiteSession:
    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    return _PooledConnectionSession(session_id=agent_id, db_path=path)
+    return SQLiteSession(session_id=agent_id, db_path=path)


 async def seed_initial_input(session: Session, initial_input: Any) -> bool:
@@ -328,11 +328,10 @@ def _load_resume_state(args: argparse.Namespace, parser: argparse.ArgumentParser
        parser.error(f"--resume {args.resume}: run.json unreadable: {exc}")

    args.targets_info = state.get("targets_info") or []
-    # A target-less run has no targets_info at all. It is driven by its
-    # instruction, over a mounted working directory or over nothing when the
-    # mount was declined, so either of those is enough to resume it.
+    # A target-less run has no targets_info at all: it works in a mounted
+    # directory, driven by its instruction.
    workspace_mount = state.get("workspace_mount") or None
-    if not args.targets_info and not workspace_mount and not state.get("user_instruction"):
+    if not args.targets_info and not workspace_mount:
        parser.error(f"--resume {args.resume}: run.json has no targets_info")

    for target in args.targets_info:
@@ -224,7 +224,6 @@ async def warm_up_llm(show_model_warning: bool = True) -> None:
                request_timeout=llm.timeout,
                prompt_cache=False,
                extra_headers=settings.dedupe.extra_headers,
-                has_tools=False,
            )
            if deduper_extra:
                merged = {**(deduper_settings.extra_args or {}), **deduper_extra}
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ async def preflight_model_connection(
        request_timeout=resolved_settings.llm.timeout,
        prompt_cache=False,
        extra_headers=resolved_settings.llm.extra_headers,
-        has_tools=False,
    )
    await asyncio.wait_for(
        model.get_response(
@@ -138,6 +138,13 @@ class TuiController:
        self.error = detail
        self.notify_changed()

+    def enter_setup(self) -> None:
+        """Return a session to the start screen, e.g. on a declined mount."""
+        self.setup_mode = True
+        self.scan_started = False
+        self.scan_state = "setup"
+        self.notify_changed()
+
    def add_message(self, text: str, level: str = "info") -> None:
        self._append_message(text, level)
        self.notify_changed()
@@ -349,12 +356,14 @@ class TuiController:
        if not isinstance(approved, bool):
            raise TypeError("approved must be a boolean")
        self.pending_workspace_mount = None
-        # Declining skips the mount, it does not abandon the scan. The prompt is
-        # the whole of the input either way; the working directory is only an
-        # extra the agent may look at, so the run goes ahead without one.
-        self.workspace_mount = mount if approved else None
+        if not approved:
+            # Nothing was prepared, so return to the start screen untouched.
+            self.workspace_mount = None
+            self.enter_setup()
+            return {"approved": False}
+        self.workspace_mount = mount
        await self._begin_scan(self._pending_verify)
-        return {"approved": approved}
+        return {"approved": True}

    async def _send_message(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
        agent_id = self._required_string(payload, "agent_id")
@@ -1,299 +0,0 @@
-package app
-
-import (
-	"encoding/json"
-	"fmt"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	tea "github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea"
-	"github.com/charmbracelet/x/ansi"
-	"github.com/usestrix/strix/tui/internal/protocol"
-)
-
-func findingsModel(t *testing.T, titles ...string) Model {
-	t.Helper()
-	m := New(nil)
-	m.width, m.height = 130, 30
-	m.showSplash = false
-	m.handleEnvelope(stateEnvelope(t, 1, protocol.Snapshot{ScanState: "running"}))
-	items := make([]json.RawMessage, 0, len(titles))
-	for i, title := range titles {
-		items = append(items, rawJSON(t, map[string]any{
-			"id": string(rune('a' + i)), "title": title, "severity": "high",
-		}))
-	}
-	m.handleEnvelope(protocol.Envelope{Version: protocol.Version, Type: "collection_bootstrap",
-		Payload: rawJSON(t, protocol.CollectionBootstrap{
-			Collection: "vulnerabilities", Revision: 1, Cursor: 0,
-			NextCursor: len(items), Done: true, Items: items,
-		})})
-	m.resizeViewport()
-	return m
-}
-
-// The list scrolls by row, not by finding. Stepping a whole entry at a time is
-// what made a list of wrapped titles feel paginated.
-func TestFindingsScrollByRow(t *testing.T) {
-	long := "A deliberately long finding title that wraps across several rows in the sidebar"
-	m := findingsModel(t, long, long, long)
-
-	rows := m.vulnerabilityRows(m.vulnerabilityListWidth())
-	if len(rows) <= 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("titles did not wrap, so this proves nothing: %d rows", len(rows))
-	}
-	total, offset := m.vulnerabilityScrollRows()
-	if total != len(rows) || offset != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("scroll metrics are not in rows: total=%d offset=%d rows=%d", total, offset, len(rows))
-	}
-
-	// One step of the offset moves one row, and the first visible line follows it.
-	first := strings.Split(ansi.Strip(m.vulnerabilitiesView(40, 4)), "\n")[0]
-	m.vulnOffset = 1
-	second := strings.Split(ansi.Strip(m.vulnerabilitiesView(40, 4)), "\n")[0]
-	if first == second {
-		t.Fatalf("advancing one row did not move the list: %q", first)
-	}
-	// That row still belongs to the first finding, which an item-stepping list
-	// would have skipped past entirely.
-	if got := m.vulnerabilityIndexAtRow(0); got != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("one row in, the top line belongs to finding %d, want 0", got)
-	}
-}
-
-// Selecting a finding scrolls the least it can, and never past its own start.
-func TestSelectingAFindingBringsItIntoView(t *testing.T) {
-	long := "A deliberately long finding title that wraps across several rows in the sidebar"
-	m := findingsModel(t, long, long, long, long)
-
-	m.selectedVuln = 3
-	m.ensureVulnerabilityVisible()
-
-	rows := m.vulnerabilityRows(m.vulnerabilityListWidth())
-	height := m.vulnerabilityPageSize()
-	end := min(len(rows), m.vulnOffset+height)
-	found := false
-	for _, row := range rows[m.vulnOffset:end] {
-		if row.index == 3 {
-			found = true
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	if !found {
-		t.Fatalf("the selected finding is not on screen: offset=%d height=%d", m.vulnOffset, height)
-	}
-	if m.vulnOffset > len(rows)-height && len(rows) > height {
-		t.Fatalf("scrolled past the end: offset=%d rows=%d height=%d", m.vulnOffset, len(rows), height)
-	}
-}
-
-func reportModel(t *testing.T, count int) Model {
-	t.Helper()
-	titles := make([]string, 0, count)
-	for i := range count {
-		titles = append(titles, fmt.Sprintf("Finding number %d", i+1))
-	}
-	m := findingsModel(t, titles...)
-	m.openModal(modalVulnerability)
-	return m
-}
-
-// The open report can be stepped through the list without closing it.
-func TestReportStepsBetweenFindings(t *testing.T) {
-	m := reportModel(t, 3)
-
-	updated, _ := m.updateModal(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyRight})
-	m = updated.(Model)
-	if m.selectedVuln != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("right moved to %d, want 1", m.selectedVuln)
-	}
-	if m.modal != modalVulnerability {
-		t.Fatal("stepping closed the report")
-	}
-	updated, _ = m.updateModal(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyLeft})
-	m = updated.(Model)
-	if m.selectedVuln != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("left moved to %d, want 0", m.selectedVuln)
-	}
-}
-
-// The ends do not wrap: rolling from the last report to the first would hide
-// that you had reached the end.
-func TestReportStepsStopAtTheEnds(t *testing.T) {
-	m := reportModel(t, 3)
-
-	updated, _ := m.updateModal(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyLeft})
-	m = updated.(Model)
-	if m.selectedVuln != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("left from the first report moved to %d, want 0", m.selectedVuln)
-	}
-
-	m.selectedVuln = 2
-	updated, _ = m.updateModal(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyRight})
-	m = updated.(Model)
-	if m.selectedVuln != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("right from the last report moved to %d, want 2", m.selectedVuln)
-	}
-}
-
-// Each direction is offered only when there is a report that way, and a lone
-// finding is offered neither.
-func TestReportNavigationHintsFollowAvailability(t *testing.T) {
-	m := reportModel(t, 3)
-	for _, testCase := range []struct {
-		index              int
-		wantPrev, wantNext bool
-		position           string
-	}{
-		{index: 0, wantNext: true, position: "1/3"},
-		{index: 1, wantPrev: true, wantNext: true, position: "2/3"},
-		{index: 2, wantPrev: true, position: "3/3"},
-	} {
-		m.selectedVuln = testCase.index
-		view := ansi.Strip(m.modalView())
-		if !strings.Contains(view, testCase.position) {
-			t.Fatalf("report %d does not show %q", testCase.index, testCase.position)
-		}
-		if got := strings.Contains(view, reportPrev); got != testCase.wantPrev {
-			t.Fatalf("report %d prev hint = %v, want %v", testCase.index, got, testCase.wantPrev)
-		}
-		if got := strings.Contains(view, reportNext); got != testCase.wantNext {
-			t.Fatalf("report %d next hint = %v, want %v", testCase.index, got, testCase.wantNext)
-		}
-	}
-
-	lone := reportModel(t, 1)
-	view := ansi.Strip(lone.modalView())
-	if strings.Contains(view, reportPrev) || strings.Contains(view, reportNext) || strings.Contains(view, "1/1") {
-		t.Fatalf("a lone finding offered navigation:\n%s", view)
-	}
-}
-
-// A new report opens at its top, and the copy state does not carry over.
-func TestSteppingResetsTheReportView(t *testing.T) {
-	m := reportModel(t, 3)
-	m.vulnerabilityCopied = true
-	m.vulnViewport.SetYOffset(3)
-
-	m.showVulnerability(1)
-
-	if m.vulnViewport.YOffset != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("the next report opened scrolled to %d", m.vulnViewport.YOffset)
-	}
-	if m.vulnerabilityCopied {
-		t.Fatal("the copy state carried over to another report")
-	}
-}
-
-// Prev and Next are buttons, not just key hints: they can be clicked.
-func TestReportStepButtonsAreClickable(t *testing.T) {
-	m := reportModel(t, 3)
-	m.selectedVuln = 1
-
-	click := func(label string) Model {
-		t.Helper()
-		view := m.modalView()
-		left, top, _, _ := m.centeredViewBounds(view)
-		for row, line := range strings.Split(view, "\n") {
-			plain := ansi.Strip(line)
-			index := strings.Index(plain, label)
-			if index < 0 {
-				continue
-			}
-			updated, _ := m.updateModalMouse(tea.MouseMsg{
-				X: left + ansi.StringWidth(plain[:index]) + 1, Y: top + row,
-				Button: tea.MouseButtonLeft, Action: tea.MouseActionPress,
-			})
-			return updated.(Model)
-		}
-		t.Fatalf("%q was not rendered", label)
-		return m
-	}
-
-	if got := click(reportNext).selectedVuln; got != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("clicking Next selected %d, want 2", got)
-	}
-	if got := click(reportPrev).selectedVuln; got != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("clicking Prev selected %d, want 0", got)
-	}
-	if got := click(reportNext).modal; got != modalVulnerability {
-		t.Fatalf("clicking Next closed the report: modal=%v", got)
-	}
-}
-
-// Tab walks the whole row, so the step buttons are reachable from the keyboard
-// as well, and Enter presses whichever one is focused.
-func TestTabReachesTheStepButtons(t *testing.T) {
-	m := reportModel(t, 3)
-	m.selectedVuln = 1
-
-	if got := m.focusedReportButton(); got != reportDone {
-		t.Fatalf("the report opened focused on %q, want %q", got, reportDone)
-	}
-	seen := map[string]bool{}
-	for range len(m.reportButtons()) {
-		updated, _ := m.updateModal(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyTab})
-		m = updated.(Model)
-		seen[m.focusedReportButton()] = true
-	}
-	for _, want := range []string{reportPrev, reportNext, reportCopy, reportDone} {
-		if !seen[want] {
-			t.Fatalf("tab never reached %q: %v", want, seen)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Enter on a focused step button steps.
-	m.reportFocus = reportNext
-	updated, _ := m.updateModal(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyEnter})
-	if got := updated.(Model).selectedVuln; got != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("enter on Next selected %d, want 2", got)
-	}
-}
-
-// Stepping to an end drops that button from the row; focus must not be stranded
-// on it.
-func TestFocusFallsBackWhenAStepButtonDisappears(t *testing.T) {
-	m := reportModel(t, 2)
-	m.selectedVuln = 0
-	m.reportFocus = reportNext
-
-	updated, _ := m.updateModal(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyEnter})
-	m = updated.(Model)
-
-	if m.selectedVuln != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("enter on Next selected %d, want 1", m.selectedVuln)
-	}
-	// Next is gone at the last report, so the focus cannot still be on it.
-	if got := m.focusedReportButton(); got == reportNext {
-		t.Fatalf("focus stayed on a button that is no longer shown: %q", got)
-	}
-	if got := m.focusedReportButton(); got != reportDone {
-		t.Fatalf("focus fell back to %q, want %q", got, reportDone)
-	}
-}
-
-// The list must be laid out at one width. Rendering at one and hit-testing at
-// another gives two different row counts for the same title, and then a click
-// resolves to the wrong finding and the scrollbar reports the wrong length.
-func TestFindingsUseOneWidthForRenderAndInteraction(t *testing.T) {
-	// This title wraps to one row at 21 columns and two at 20, which is exactly
-	// the pair of widths the two paths used to disagree on.
-	m := findingsModel(t, "ffffff dddd a a a a", "eeeee eeeee a a a a", "header dddd a a a a")
-
-	width := m.vulnerabilityListWidth()
-	rows := m.vulnerabilityRows(width)
-	rendered := strings.Split(ansi.Strip(m.vulnerabilitiesView(width, len(rows))), "\n")
-
-	if len(rendered) != len(rows) {
-		t.Fatalf("rendered %d rows, interaction counts %d", len(rendered), len(rows))
-	}
-	for row := range rendered {
-		if got := m.vulnerabilityIndexAtRow(row); got != rows[row].index {
-			t.Fatalf("row %d shows finding %d but a click resolves to %d",
-				row, rows[row].index, got)
-		}
-	}
-	if total, _ := m.vulnerabilityScrollRows(); total != len(rendered) {
-		t.Fatalf("the scrollbar reports %d rows, %d are rendered", total, len(rendered))
-	}
-}
@@ -110,7 +110,6 @@ type Model struct {
 	agentOffset            int
 	vulnOffset             int
 	modalChoice            int
-	reportFocus            string
 	ready                  bool
 	quitting               bool
 	showSplash             bool
@@ -158,16 +157,12 @@ const (
 	treeCursorBg = lipgloss.Color("#0178d4")
 )

-// Scrollbar thumbs. The track stays blank so a scrollable panel does not gain a
-// visible rule down its edge, and the thumb brightens while it is dragged, which
-// is the feedback Textual gave through scrollbar-color-active.
-//
-// One resting color for every panel, rather than the three the stylesheet named.
-// The chat pane's was #1a1a1a on black, which is invisible - the bar could not be
-// found, let alone grabbed (#1005).
+// Scrollbar thumbs. Each panel keeps its own, and the track stays blank so a
+// scrollable panel does not gain a visible rule down its edge.
 const (
-	thumbResting = lipgloss.Color("#3f3f46")
-	thumbActive  = lipgloss.Color("#9ca3af")
+	thumbTrace    = lipgloss.Color("#1a1a1a")
+	thumbAgents   = lipgloss.Color("#404040")
+	thumbFindings = lipgloss.Color("#333333")
 )

 // Composer placeholders. The launch screen falls back to the short prompt when
@@ -527,8 +527,7 @@ func TestVulnerabilityCopySupportsKeyboardAndMouse(t *testing.T) {
 	}

 	model := newModel()
-	// Tab moves between the buttons; the arrows step between reports.
-	updated, _ := model.updateModal(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyTab})
+	updated, _ := model.updateModal(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyLeft})
 	model = updated.(Model)
 	updated, cmd := model.updateModal(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyEnter})
 	model = updated.(Model)
@@ -561,8 +560,8 @@ func TestVulnerabilityCopySupportsKeyboardAndMouse(t *testing.T) {
 		X: copyX, Y: copyY, Button: tea.MouseButtonLeft, Action: tea.MouseActionPress,
 	})
 	model = updated.(Model)
-	if cmd == nil || model.reportFocus != reportCopy {
-		t.Fatalf("mouse Copy was not activated: focus=%q cmd=%v", model.reportFocus, cmd)
+	if cmd == nil || model.modalChoice != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("mouse Copy was not activated: choice=%d cmd=%v", model.modalChoice, cmd)
 	}
 	cmd()
 	if len(copied) != 2 {
@@ -821,8 +820,8 @@ func TestRunningViewerShowsCompleteWrappedURL(t *testing.T) {
 }

 func TestVerticalScrollbarThumbTracksScrollOffset(t *testing.T) {
-	top := strings.Split(ansi.Strip(verticalScrollbar(6, 24, 6, 0, thumbResting)), "\n")
-	bottom := strings.Split(ansi.Strip(verticalScrollbar(6, 24, 6, 18, thumbResting)), "\n")
+	top := strings.Split(ansi.Strip(verticalScrollbar(6, 24, 6, 0, thumbAgents)), "\n")
+	bottom := strings.Split(ansi.Strip(verticalScrollbar(6, 24, 6, 18, thumbAgents)), "\n")

 	// The track is blank, so only the thumb is drawn.
 	if top[0] != "█" || top[5] != " " {
@@ -831,10 +830,10 @@ func TestVerticalScrollbarThumbTracksScrollOffset(t *testing.T) {
 	if bottom[0] != " " || bottom[5] != "█" {
 		t.Fatalf("bottom scrollbar is incorrect: %#v", bottom)
 	}
-	if full := verticalScrollbar(4, 4, 4, 0, thumbResting); full != "" {
+	if full := verticalScrollbar(4, 4, 4, 0, thumbAgents); full != "" {
 		t.Fatalf("non-overflowing scrollbar should be hidden: %q", full)
 	}
-	withoutBar := ansi.Strip(withVerticalScrollbar("content", 12, 2, 2, 2, 0, thumbResting))
+	withoutBar := ansi.Strip(withVerticalScrollbar("content", 12, 2, 2, 2, 0, thumbAgents))
 	if strings.ContainsAny(withoutBar, "█") {
 		t.Fatalf("non-overflowing panel rendered a scrollbar: %q", withoutBar)
 	}
@@ -842,7 +841,7 @@ func TestVerticalScrollbarThumbTracksScrollOffset(t *testing.T) {

 // The bar takes exactly one column, so a scrolling panel keeps the rest.
 func TestVerticalScrollbarOccupiesOneColumn(t *testing.T) {
-	rows := strings.Split(withVerticalScrollbar("content", 12, 2, 24, 2, 0, thumbResting), "\n")
+	rows := strings.Split(withVerticalScrollbar("content", 12, 2, 24, 2, 0, thumbTrace), "\n")
 	for _, row := range rows {
 		if width := ansi.StringWidth(row); width != 12 {
 			t.Fatalf("scrolling panel row width = %d, want 12", width)
@@ -66,10 +66,13 @@ func (m *Model) submitSetupPrompt(value string) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 }

 // answerMountConfirmation replies to the working-directory mount the backend is
-// waiting on. Either answer starts the scan - declining only means it runs
-// without the directory - so the prompt stays with the run rather than coming
-// back to the composer.
+// waiting on. Declining returns to the start screen, so the prompt goes back in
+// the composer to be edited or given a target instead.
 func (m *Model) answerMountConfirmation(approved bool) tea.Cmd {
+	if !approved && m.pendingPrompt != "" {
+		m.input.SetValue(m.pendingPrompt)
+		m.resizeViewport()
+	}
 	m.pendingPrompt = ""
 	return send(m.client, "setup.confirm_mount", map[string]any{"approved": approved})
 }
@@ -247,10 +247,13 @@ func TestMountConfirmationAnswers(t *testing.T) {
 		if payload.Approved != tc.approved {
 			t.Fatalf("%s: approved=%v, want %v", tc.name, payload.Approved, tc.approved)
 		}
-		// Either answer launches, so the prompt stays with the run rather than
-		// coming back to the composer.
-		if got := model.input.Value(); got != "" {
-			t.Fatalf("%s: composer = %q, want it cleared", tc.name, got)
+		// Declining returns to the start screen, so the prompt comes back.
+		want := ""
+		if !tc.approved {
+			want = "find auth bugs in the login flow"
+		}
+		if got := model.input.Value(); got != want {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: composer = %q, want %q", tc.name, got, want)
 		}
 		if model.pendingPrompt != "" {
 			t.Fatalf("%s: held prompt was not cleared: %q", tc.name, model.pendingPrompt)
@@ -287,101 +290,3 @@ func TestSetupPromptWithTargetLaunches(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("setup.start (%d) must come after setup.set_instruction (%d): %v", start, instr, types)
 	}
 }
-
-// The prompt's buttons are buttons: clicking Cancel has to answer the backend,
-// which it could not do while the mouse handler had no case for this modal.
-func TestMountPromptButtonsAreClickable(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, testCase := range []struct {
-		label    string
-		approved bool
-	}{
-		{mountConfirmLabel, true},
-		{mountCancelLabel, false},
-	} {
-		connection := &recordingConn{}
-		model := New(&Client{conn: connection})
-		model.width, model.height = 130, 40
-		model.snapshot = protocol.Snapshot{SetupMode: true, WorkingDir: "/Users/me/code/api"}
-		updated, _ := model.submit("find auth bugs in the login flow")
-		model = updated.(Model)
-		connection.Reset()
-		model.snapshot = protocol.Snapshot{
-			ScanStarted: true, ScanState: "preparing", PendingMount: "/Users/me/code/api",
-		}
-		model.syncMountPrompt()
-
-		left, top, panel := model.mountPromptBounds()
-		clicked := false
-		for row, line := range strings.Split(panel, "\n") {
-			plain := ansi.Strip(line)
-			index := strings.Index(plain, testCase.label)
-			if index < 0 {
-				continue
-			}
-			updated, cmd := model.updateModalMouse(tea.MouseMsg{
-				X: left + ansi.StringWidth(plain[:index]) + 1, Y: top + row,
-				Button: tea.MouseButtonLeft, Action: tea.MouseActionPress,
-			})
-			model = updated.(Model)
-			envelopes := drainCommands(t, cmd, connection)
-			if len(envelopes) != 1 || envelopes[0].Type != "setup.confirm_mount" {
-				t.Fatalf("clicking %s sent %v", testCase.label, commandTypes(envelopes))
-			}
-			var payload struct {
-				Approved bool `json:"approved"`
-			}
-			if err := json.Unmarshal(envelopes[0].Payload, &payload); err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-			if payload.Approved != testCase.approved {
-				t.Fatalf("clicking %s answered approved=%v", testCase.label, payload.Approved)
-			}
-			clicked = true
-			break
-		}
-		if !clicked {
-			t.Fatalf("%s was not found in the prompt", testCase.label)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// Skipping the mount runs the scan without a directory. It must not throw the
-// session back to the start screen, and it must not hand the prompt back: the
-// run has it.
-func TestSkippingTheMountKeepsTheScanRunning(t *testing.T) {
-	connection := &recordingConn{}
-	model := New(&Client{conn: connection})
-	model.width, model.height = 130, 40
-	model.snapshot = protocol.Snapshot{SetupMode: true, WorkingDir: "/Users/me/code/api"}
-	updated, _ := model.submit("find auth bugs in the login flow")
-	model = updated.(Model)
-	model.snapshot = protocol.Snapshot{
-		ScanStarted: true, ScanState: "preparing", PendingMount: "/Users/me/code/api",
-	}
-	model.syncMountPrompt()
-	if model.modal != modalConfirmMount {
-		t.Fatal("the prompt did not open")
-	}
-
-	model.modalChoice = 1
-	updated, _ = model.updateModal(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyEnter})
-	model = updated.(Model)
-
-	// The backend answers by starting the scan with no mount.
-	model.handleEnvelope(stateEnvelope(t, 2, protocol.Snapshot{
-		ScanStarted: true, ScanState: "running",
-	}))
-
-	if model.modal != modalNone {
-		t.Fatalf("the prompt is still open: %v", model.modal)
-	}
-	if model.snapshot.SetupMode {
-		t.Fatal("skipping the mount fell back to the start screen")
-	}
-	if got := model.input.Value(); got != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("the prompt came back to the composer: %q", got)
-	}
-	if model.pendingPrompt != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("the held prompt was not released: %q", model.pendingPrompt)
-	}
-}
@@ -219,8 +219,7 @@ func (m Model) updateMouse(msg tea.MouseMsg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 			case vulnHeight > 0 && y < viewerHeight+agentHeight+vulnHeight:
 				m.focus = focusVulnerabilities
 				m.input.Blur()
-				totalRows, _ := m.vulnerabilityScrollRows()
-				m.vulnOffset = min(max(0, totalRows-m.vulnerabilityPageSize()), m.vulnOffset+3)
+				m.vulnOffset = min(max(0, len(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities)-1), m.vulnOffset+3)
 				m.keepVulnerabilitySelectionInWindow()
 			}
 			return m, nil
@@ -319,7 +318,24 @@ func (m *Model) updateMainScrollbarMouse(
 	if msg.Action != tea.MouseActionPress || msg.Button != tea.MouseButtonLeft {
 		return false
 	}
-	target := m.scrollbarAt(msg, showSidebar, chatWidth, chatHeight, viewerHeight, agentHeight, vulnHeight)
+
+	target := scrollbarNone
+	switch {
+	case msg.X == chatWidth-2 && msg.Y >= 1 && msg.Y < chatHeight-1 &&
+		m.viewport.TotalLineCount() > m.viewport.VisibleLineCount():
+		target = scrollbarTrace
+	case showSidebar && msg.X == m.width-3 && msg.Y >= viewerHeight+2 &&
+		msg.Y < viewerHeight+agentHeight-2 &&
+		len(agentTreeEntries(m.snapshot.Agents, m.collapsedAgents)) > m.agentPageSize():
+		target = scrollbarAgents
+	case showSidebar && vulnHeight > 0 && msg.X == m.width-3 &&
+		msg.Y >= viewerHeight+agentHeight+1 &&
+		msg.Y < viewerHeight+agentHeight+vulnHeight-1:
+		totalRows, _ := m.vulnerabilityScrollRows()
+		if totalRows > m.vulnerabilityPageSize() {
+			target = scrollbarFindings
+		}
+	}
 	if target == scrollbarNone {
 		return false
 	}
@@ -328,40 +344,6 @@ func (m *Model) updateMainScrollbarMouse(
 	return true
 }

-// scrollbarGrab is how far either side of the bar still counts as grabbing it. A
-// one column target is unreasonable to hit with a mouse, and nothing else lives
-// in the column beside it.
-const scrollbarGrab = 1
-
-func nearColumn(x, column int) bool {
-	return x >= column-scrollbarGrab && x <= column+scrollbarGrab
-}
-
-// scrollbarAt reports which scrollbar, if any, the pointer is over.
-func (m Model) scrollbarAt(
-	msg tea.MouseMsg,
-	showSidebar bool,
-	chatWidth, chatHeight, viewerHeight, agentHeight, vulnHeight int,
-) scrollbarTarget {
-	switch {
-	case nearColumn(msg.X, chatWidth-2) && msg.Y >= 1 && msg.Y < chatHeight-1 &&
-		m.viewport.TotalLineCount() > m.viewport.VisibleLineCount():
-		return scrollbarTrace
-	case showSidebar && nearColumn(msg.X, m.width-3) && msg.Y >= viewerHeight+2 &&
-		msg.Y < viewerHeight+agentHeight-2 &&
-		len(agentTreeEntries(m.snapshot.Agents, m.collapsedAgents)) > m.agentPageSize():
-		return scrollbarAgents
-	case showSidebar && vulnHeight > 0 && nearColumn(msg.X, m.width-3) &&
-		msg.Y >= viewerHeight+agentHeight+1 &&
-		msg.Y < viewerHeight+agentHeight+vulnHeight-1:
-		totalRows, _ := m.vulnerabilityScrollRows()
-		if totalRows > m.vulnerabilityPageSize() {
-			return scrollbarFindings
-		}
-	}
-	return scrollbarNone
-}
-
 func (m *Model) scrollFromMouse(
 	target scrollbarTarget,
 	y, chatHeight, viewerHeight, agentHeight int,
@@ -385,10 +367,10 @@ func (m *Model) scrollFromMouse(
 	case scrollbarFindings:
 		height := m.vulnerabilityPageSize()
 		totalRows, _ := m.vulnerabilityScrollRows()
+		rowOffset := scrollbarOffset(y-viewerHeight-agentHeight-1, height, totalRows, height)
 		m.focus = focusVulnerabilities
 		m.input.Blur()
-		// The offset is a row, so dragging moves the list continuously.
-		m.vulnOffset = scrollbarOffset(y-viewerHeight-agentHeight-1, height, totalRows, height)
+		m.vulnOffset = m.vulnerabilityOffsetAtRow(rowOffset)
 		m.keepVulnerabilitySelectionInWindow()
 	}
 }
@@ -423,22 +405,6 @@ func (m Model) updateSetupMouse(msg tea.MouseMsg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 	return m, nil
 }

-// pressReportButton performs a button of the report row, however it was reached.
-func (m Model) pressReportButton(button string) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
-	switch button {
-	case reportPrev:
-		m.showVulnerability(m.selectedVuln - 1)
-	case reportNext:
-		m.showVulnerability(m.selectedVuln + 1)
-	case reportCopy:
-		m.reportFocus = reportCopy
-		return m, m.startVulnerabilityCopy()
-	default:
-		m.closeModal()
-	}
-	return m, nil
-}
-
 func (m Model) updateModalMouse(msg tea.MouseMsg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 	if m.modal == modalVulnerability {
 		view := m.modalView()
@@ -474,35 +440,14 @@ func (m Model) updateModalMouse(msg tea.MouseMsg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 			m.modalChoice = 1
 			return m.updateModal(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyEnter})
 		}
-	case modalConfirmMount:
-		left, top, panel := m.mountPromptBounds()
-		if labelHitAt(panel, mountConfirmLabel, left, top, msg.X, msg.Y) {
-			m.modalChoice = 0
-			cmd := m.answerMountConfirmation(true)
-			return m, cmd
-		}
-		if labelHitAt(panel, mountCancelLabel, left, top, msg.X, msg.Y) {
-			m.modalChoice = 1
-			cmd := m.answerMountConfirmation(false)
-			return m, cmd
-		}
 	case modalVulnerability:
-		for _, button := range m.reportButtons() {
-			if button == reportCopy || button == reportDone {
-				continue
-			}
-			if m.centeredLabelHit(view, button, msg.X, msg.Y) {
-				m.reportFocus = button
-				return m.pressReportButton(button)
-			}
-		}
 		if m.centeredLabelHit(view, "Copy", msg.X, msg.Y) {
-			m.reportFocus = reportCopy
+			m.modalChoice = 0
 			cmd := m.startVulnerabilityCopy()
 			return m, cmd
 		}
 		if m.centeredLabelHit(view, "Done", msg.X, msg.Y) {
-			m.reportFocus = reportDone
+			m.modalChoice = 1
 			m.closeModal()
 		}
 	}
@@ -519,14 +464,7 @@ func (m Model) centeredViewBounds(view string) (left, top, width, height int) {

 func (m Model) centeredLabelHit(view, label string, x, y int) bool {
 	left, top, _, _ := m.centeredViewBounds(view)
-	return labelHitAt(view, label, left, top, x, y)
-}
-
-// labelHitAt reports whether a click landed on a label drawn in a panel whose
-// top-left corner is at (left, top). The mount prompt is docked in a corner
-// rather than centered, so it cannot use the centered bounds.
-func labelHitAt(panel, label string, left, top, x, y int) bool {
-	for row, line := range strings.Split(panel, "\n") {
+	for row, line := range strings.Split(view, "\n") {
 		plain := ansi.Strip(line)
 		index := strings.Index(plain, label)
 		if index < 0 || y != top+row {
@@ -578,19 +516,16 @@ func (m Model) updateModal(key tea.KeyMsg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 		switch key.String() {
 		case "esc":
 			m.closeModal()
-		// The arrows step between reports directly; tab walks the button row.
-		case "left":
-			m.showVulnerability(m.selectedVuln - 1)
-		case "right":
-			m.showVulnerability(m.selectedVuln + 1)
-		case "tab":
-			m.stepReportFocus(1)
-		case "shift+tab":
-			m.stepReportFocus(-1)
+		case "left", "right", "tab", "shift+tab":
+			m.modalChoice = 1 - m.modalChoice
 		case "enter":
-			return m.pressReportButton(m.focusedReportButton())
+			if m.modalChoice == 0 {
+				cmd := m.startVulnerabilityCopy()
+				return m, cmd
+			}
+			m.closeModal()
 		case "c":
-			m.reportFocus = reportCopy
+			m.modalChoice = 0
 			cmd := m.startVulnerabilityCopy()
 			return m, cmd
 		case "up":
@@ -612,8 +547,7 @@ func (m Model) updateModal(key tea.KeyMsg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 	case "esc":
 		if m.modal == modalConfirmMount {
 			// The backend is waiting on an answer; escape declines it.
-			cmd := m.answerMountConfirmation(false)
-			return m, cmd
+			return m, m.answerMountConfirmation(false)
 		}
 		m.closeModal()
 		return m, nil
@@ -624,10 +558,7 @@ func (m Model) updateModal(key tea.KeyMsg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 		modal, choice := m.modal, m.modalChoice
 		if modal == modalConfirmMount {
 			// The snapshot closes this prompt once the backend has the answer.
-			// Bound to a variable first: the call restores the held prompt into
-			// the composer, and that has to be in the model being returned.
-			cmd := m.answerMountConfirmation(choice == 0)
-			return m, cmd
+			return m, m.answerMountConfirmation(choice == 0)
 		}
 		m.closeModal()
 		if choice == 1 {
@@ -653,7 +584,6 @@ func (m *Model) openModal(mode modalMode) {
 		m.modalChoice = 1
 	}
 	if mode == modalVulnerability {
-		m.reportFocus = reportDone
 		m.modalChoice = 1
 		m.vulnerabilityCopied = false
 		m.vulnerabilityCopyError = ""
@@ -164,15 +164,6 @@ func wrapBlock(value string, width int) string {
 	return strings.Join(out, "\n")
 }

-// scrollbarThumb brightens the bar being dragged so the grab reads as taking
-// hold of it.
-func (m Model) scrollbarThumb(target scrollbarTarget) lipgloss.Color {
-	if m.draggingScrollbar == target {
-		return thumbActive
-	}
-	return thumbResting
-}
-
 func verticalScrollbar(height, total, visible, offset int, thumb lipgloss.Color) string {
 	if height <= 0 || total <= visible {
 		return ""
@@ -271,23 +262,6 @@ func (m Model) viewInner() string {
 	return m.toastOverlay(main)
 }

-// mountPromptBounds is where the working-directory prompt is drawn. It is placed
-// by cornerOverlay rather than centered, so a click has to be tested against
-// these bounds and not the ones the other modals use.
-func (m Model) mountPromptBounds() (left, top int, panel string) {
-	panel = m.modalView()
-	if panel == "" {
-		return 0, 0, ""
-	}
-	_, _, chatWidth, _ := m.layout()
-	left = max(0, min(chatWidth, m.width)-lipgloss.Width(panel))
-	statusH := 0
-	if m.statusVisible() {
-		statusH = 1
-	}
-	return left, max(0, m.inputTop()-statusH-lipgloss.Height(panel)), panel
-}
-
 // cornerOverlay splices a panel in directly above the composer, right-aligned
 // with it, leaving the rest of the view visible behind it.
 func (m Model) cornerOverlay(view, panel string) string {
@@ -450,7 +424,7 @@ func (m Model) renderChatPane(width, height int, border lipgloss.Color) string {
 		m.viewport.TotalLineCount(),
 		m.viewport.VisibleLineCount(),
 		m.viewport.YOffset,
-		m.scrollbarThumb(scrollbarTrace),
+		thumbTrace,
 	)
 	out := lipgloss.NewStyle().Width(width).Height(height).
 		Border(lipgloss.RoundedBorder()).BorderForeground(border).Render(trace)
@@ -515,7 +489,7 @@ func (m Model) sidebarView(width, height int) string {
 		len(agentEntries),
 		agentRows,
 		m.agentOffset,
-		m.scrollbarThumb(scrollbarAgents),
+		thumbAgents,
 	)
 	parts := []string{
 		lipgloss.NewStyle().Width(width-2).Height(m.viewerHeight()-2).Border(lipgloss.RoundedBorder()).BorderForeground(dark).Padding(0, 1).Render(m.viewerView(width - 4)),
@@ -529,13 +503,13 @@ func (m Model) sidebarView(width, height int) string {
 		vulnRows := max(1, vulnHeight-2)
 		totalRows, offsetRows := m.vulnerabilityScrollRows()
 		findings := withVerticalScrollbar(
-			m.vulnerabilitiesView(m.vulnerabilityListWidth(), vulnRows),
+			m.vulnerabilitiesView(max(1, width-5), vulnRows),
 			width-4,
 			vulnRows,
 			totalRows,
 			vulnRows,
 			offsetRows,
-			m.scrollbarThumb(scrollbarFindings),
+			thumbFindings,
 		)
 		parts = append(parts, lipgloss.NewStyle().Width(width-2).Height(vulnRows).Border(lipgloss.RoundedBorder()).BorderForeground(vulnBorder).Padding(0, 1).Render(findings))
 	}
@@ -550,7 +524,12 @@ func (m Model) sidebarHeights() (statsHeight, vulnHeight, agentHeight int) {
 	statsRows := lipgloss.Height(lipgloss.NewStyle().Width(m.viewerContentWidth()).Render(m.statsView()))
 	statsHeight = min(15, statsRows+2)
 	if len(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities) > 0 {
-		vulnHeight = min(12, len(m.vulnerabilityRows(m.vulnerabilityListWidth()))+2)
+		rows := 0
+		width := m.vulnerabilityListWidth()
+		for i := range m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities {
+			rows += len(m.vulnerabilityTitleLines(i, width))
+		}
+		vulnHeight = min(12, rows+2)
 	}
 	agentHeight = max(3, m.height-m.viewerHeight()-statsHeight-vulnHeight)
 	return
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 package app

 import (
-	"fmt"
 	"strings"

 	tea "github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea"
@@ -14,123 +13,115 @@ var panelSeverityColors = map[string]lipgloss.Color{
 	"critical": render.SevCrit, "high": render.SevHigh, "medium": render.SevMed, "low": green, "info": blue,
 }

-// vulnerabilityRow is one rendered line of the findings list. The list scrolls by
-// row rather than by finding, so a long title does not make the panel jump a
-// whole entry at a time.
-type vulnerabilityRow struct {
-	index int    // the finding this line belongs to
-	text  string // one wrapped line of its title
-	first bool   // the line that carries the number and the severity dot
-}
-
-// vulnerabilityRows lays every finding out as the lines it will occupy.
-func (m Model) vulnerabilityRows(width int) []vulnerabilityRow {
-	// Wrapped lines sit under the title rather than under the severity dot.
-	body := max(1, width-2)
-	rows := make([]vulnerabilityRow, 0, len(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities))
-	for i := range m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities {
-		for line, text := range strings.Split(wrapBlock(m.vulnerabilityTitle(i), body), "\n") {
-			rows = append(rows, vulnerabilityRow{index: i, text: text, first: line == 0})
-		}
-	}
-	return rows
-}
-
 func (m Model) vulnerabilitiesView(width, height int) string {
-	rows := m.vulnerabilityRows(width)
-	start := min(max(0, m.vulnOffset), max(0, len(rows)-1))
-	end := min(len(rows), start+height)
-	lines := make([]string, 0, max(0, end-start))
-	for _, row := range rows[start:end] {
+	var lines []string
+	start := min(max(0, m.vulnOffset), max(0, len(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities)-1))
+	for i := start; i < len(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities) && len(lines) < height; i++ {
+		vuln := m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities[i]
+		severity := strings.ToLower(render.StringValue(vuln["severity"]))
+		color, ok := panelSeverityColors[severity]
+		if !ok {
+			color = blue // matches SEVERITY_COLORS.get(severity, "#3b82f6")
+		}
+		marker := lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(color).Render("● ")
 		style := lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(textColor)
-		if row.index == m.selectedVuln {
+		if i == m.selectedVuln {
 			style = style.Bold(true).Foreground(white)
 		}
-		prefix := "  "
-		if row.first {
-			severity := strings.ToLower(render.StringValue(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities[row.index]["severity"]))
-			color, ok := panelSeverityColors[severity]
-			if !ok {
-				color = blue // matches SEVERITY_COLORS.get(severity, "#3b82f6")
+		for row, titleLine := range m.vulnerabilityTitleLines(i, width) {
+			if len(lines) >= height {
+				break
 			}
-			prefix = lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(color).Render("● ")
+			prefix := "  "
+			if row == 0 {
+				prefix = marker
+			}
+			lines = append(lines, prefix+style.Render(titleLine))
 		}
-		lines = append(lines, prefix+style.Render(row.text))
 	}
 	return strings.Join(lines, "\n")
 }

-// vulnerabilityListWidth is the one width the findings list is laid out at, for
-// rendering and for every interaction alike. Wrapping a title at two widths a
-// column apart gives two different row counts, and then a click resolves to the
-// wrong finding and the scrollbar reports the wrong length.
-//
-// The panel is sidebarWidth-2 wide with a column of padding either side, and the
-// scrollbar takes one more. That last column is reserved whether or not the bar
-// is showing, so the layout does not shift as the list grows past the panel.
 func (m Model) vulnerabilityListWidth() int {
 	_, sidebarWidth, _, _ := m.layout()
-	return max(1, sidebarWidth-5)
+	return max(1, sidebarWidth-6)
 }

-func (m Model) vulnerabilityTitle(index int) string {
+func (m Model) vulnerabilityTitleLines(index, width int) []string {
 	title := render.StringValue(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities[index]["title"])
 	if title == "" {
 		title = "Unknown Vulnerability"
 	}
-	return title
+	return strings.Split(wrapBlock(title, max(1, width-2)), "\n")
 }

-// vulnerabilityScrollRows reports the list length and position in rows, which is
-// what the scrollbar needs to move continuously.
 func (m Model) vulnerabilityScrollRows() (total, offset int) {
-	return len(m.vulnerabilityRows(m.vulnerabilityListWidth())), m.vulnOffset
-}
-
-// vulnerabilityIndexAtRow maps a click on a visible row back to its finding.
-func (m Model) vulnerabilityIndexAtRow(row int) int {
-	rows := m.vulnerabilityRows(m.vulnerabilityListWidth())
-	target := m.vulnOffset + row
-	if target < 0 || target >= len(rows) {
-		return -1
+	width := m.vulnerabilityListWidth()
+	for i := range m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities {
+		rows := len(m.vulnerabilityTitleLines(i, width))
+		total += rows
+		if i < m.vulnOffset {
+			offset += rows
+		}
 	}
-	return rows[target].index
+	return total, offset
+}
+
+func (m Model) vulnerabilityOffsetAtRow(targetRow int) int {
+	width := m.vulnerabilityListWidth()
+	row := 0
+	for i := range m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities {
+		row += len(m.vulnerabilityTitleLines(i, width))
+		if targetRow < row {
+			return i
+		}
+	}
+	return max(0, len(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities)-1)
+}
+
+func (m Model) vulnerabilityVisibleEnd(start int) int {
+	height := m.vulnerabilityPageSize()
+	width := m.vulnerabilityListWidth()
+	rows := 0
+	end := min(max(0, start), len(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities))
+	for end < len(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities) {
+		itemRows := len(m.vulnerabilityTitleLines(end, width))
+		if rows > 0 && rows+itemRows > height {
+			break
+		}
+		rows += itemRows
+		end++
+		if rows >= height {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	return end
+}
+
+func (m Model) vulnerabilityIndexAtRow(row int) int {
+	width := m.vulnerabilityListWidth()
+	currentRow := 0
+	for i := m.vulnOffset; i < m.vulnerabilityVisibleEnd(m.vulnOffset); i++ {
+		currentRow += len(m.vulnerabilityTitleLines(i, width))
+		if row < currentRow {
+			return i
+		}
+	}
+	return -1
 }

-// ensureVulnerabilityVisible scrolls the least it can to bring the selected
-// finding into view, keeping the whole entry visible where it fits.
 func (m *Model) ensureVulnerabilityVisible() {
-	rows := m.vulnerabilityRows(m.vulnerabilityListWidth())
-	if len(rows) == 0 {
+	if len(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities) == 0 {
 		m.vulnOffset = 0
 		return
 	}
-	height := m.vulnerabilityPageSize()
-	firstRow, lastRow := -1, -1
-	for row, entry := range rows {
-		if entry.index != m.selectedVuln {
-			continue
-		}
-		if firstRow < 0 {
-			firstRow = row
-		}
-		lastRow = row
+	if m.selectedVuln < m.vulnOffset {
+		m.vulnOffset = m.selectedVuln
 	}
-	if firstRow < 0 {
-		m.vulnOffset = clampVulnerabilityOffset(m.vulnOffset, len(rows), height)
-		return
+	for m.selectedVuln >= m.vulnerabilityVisibleEnd(m.vulnOffset) && m.vulnOffset < m.selectedVuln {
+		m.vulnOffset++
 	}
-	if firstRow < m.vulnOffset {
-		m.vulnOffset = firstRow
-	} else if lastRow >= m.vulnOffset+height {
-		// Prefer showing the whole entry, but never scroll its start out of view.
-		m.vulnOffset = min(firstRow, lastRow-height+1)
-	}
-	m.vulnOffset = clampVulnerabilityOffset(m.vulnOffset, len(rows), height)
-}
-
-func clampVulnerabilityOffset(offset, total, height int) int {
-	return min(max(0, offset), max(0, total-height))
+	m.vulnOffset = min(m.vulnOffset, len(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities)-1)
 }

 func (m Model) vulnerabilityPageSize() int {
@@ -138,52 +129,23 @@ func (m Model) vulnerabilityPageSize() int {
 	return max(1, vulnHeight-2)
 }

-// vulnerabilityPageItems is how many findings a page step should move by: the
-// number of distinct entries currently on screen.
 func (m Model) vulnerabilityPageItems() int {
-	rows := m.vulnerabilityRows(m.vulnerabilityListWidth())
-	height := m.vulnerabilityPageSize()
-	start := min(max(0, m.vulnOffset), max(0, len(rows)))
-	end := min(len(rows), start+height)
-	seen := 0
-	previous := -1
-	for _, row := range rows[start:end] {
-		if row.index != previous {
-			seen++
-			previous = row.index
-		}
-	}
-	return max(1, seen)
+	return max(1, m.vulnerabilityVisibleEnd(m.vulnOffset)-m.vulnOffset)
 }

 func (m *Model) moveVulnerabilitySelection(delta int) {
 	m.selectedVuln = max(0, min(len(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities)-1, m.selectedVuln+delta))
 }

-// keepVulnerabilitySelectionInWindow pulls the selection to the nearest finding
-// still on screen after the list has been scrolled directly.
 func (m *Model) keepVulnerabilitySelectionInWindow() {
-	rows := m.vulnerabilityRows(m.vulnerabilityListWidth())
-	if len(rows) == 0 {
+	if len(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities) == 0 {
 		return
 	}
-	height := m.vulnerabilityPageSize()
-	start := min(max(0, m.vulnOffset), max(0, len(rows)-1))
-	end := min(len(rows), start+height)
-	visible := rows[start:end]
-	if len(visible) == 0 {
-		return
+	if m.selectedVuln < m.vulnOffset {
+		m.selectedVuln = m.vulnOffset
+	} else if end := m.vulnerabilityVisibleEnd(m.vulnOffset); m.selectedVuln >= end {
+		m.selectedVuln = max(m.vulnOffset, end-1)
 	}
-	for _, row := range visible {
-		if row.index == m.selectedVuln {
-			return
-		}
-	}
-	if m.selectedVuln < visible[0].index {
-		m.selectedVuln = visible[0].index
-		return
-	}
-	m.selectedVuln = visible[len(visible)-1].index
 }

 // statsView ports build_tui_stats_text + the version line appended in
@@ -220,13 +182,6 @@ func (m Model) confirmView(title string, width int, border, titleColor lipgloss.
 	return m.confirmDialog(title, "", width, border, titleColor, red, "Yes", "No")
 }

-// The mount prompt's buttons, named so the renderer and the click test cannot
-// drift apart.
-const (
-	mountConfirmLabel = "Mount"
-	mountCancelLabel  = "Skip"
-)
-
 // mountConfirmView asks before a target-less scan mounts the working directory.
 // It is a compact prompt docked in the corner of the live view: nothing is
 // prepared until it is answered, and the directory is a workspace rather than a
@@ -239,8 +194,8 @@ func (m Model) mountConfirmView() string {
 	}
 	title := render.Bold(amber).Render("△ Mount working directory?")
 	body := render.Col(white).Render(truncatePath(dir, width-4)) + "\n" +
-		render.Dim().Render("writable in the sandbox · skip to run without it")
-	return m.cornerPrompt(title, body, width, mountConfirmLabel, mountCancelLabel)
+		render.Dim().Render("writable in the sandbox")
+	return m.cornerPrompt(title, body, width, "Confirm", "Cancel")
 }

 // truncatePath keeps the tail of a path visible, which is the part that
@@ -418,116 +373,25 @@ func (m Model) vulnerabilityDetail() string {
 	inner := max(1, width-8)
 	// Button row: right-aligned Copy / Done above a top rule (#vuln_detail_buttons).
 	rule := lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#1a1a1a")).Render(strings.Repeat("─", max(1, inner)))
-	focused := m.focusedReportButton()
-	var stepping, acting []string
-	for _, button := range m.reportButtons() {
-		rendered := m.reportButton(button, button == focused)
-		if button == reportPrev || button == reportNext {
-			stepping = append(stepping, rendered)
-			continue
-		}
-		acting = append(acting, rendered)
+	copyLabel := "Copy"
+	if m.vulnerabilityCopied {
+		copyLabel = "Copied!"
+	} else if m.vulnerabilityCopyError != "" {
+		copyLabel = "Copy failed"
 	}
-	// Stepping sits on the left behind the position, acting on the right.
-	right := strings.Join(acting, "  ")
-	left := strings.Join(stepping, "  ")
-	if total := len(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities); total > 1 {
-		left = render.Dim().Render(fmt.Sprintf("%d/%d", m.selectedVuln+1, total)) + "  " + left
+	copyButton := lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#525252"))
+	doneButton := lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(mid)
+	if m.modalChoice == 0 {
+		copyButton = copyButton.Background(lipgloss.Color("#363636")).Foreground(brightWhite).Bold(true).Padding(0, 1)
+	} else {
+		doneButton = doneButton.Background(lipgloss.Color("#363636")).Foreground(brightWhite).Bold(true).Padding(0, 1)
 	}
-	room := max(0, inner-lipgloss.Width(right))
-	buttonRow := rule + "\n" +
-		lipgloss.NewStyle().Width(room).Render(truncate(left, room)) + right
+	buttons := copyButton.Render(copyLabel) + "  " + doneButton.Render("Done")
+	buttonRow := rule + "\n" + lipgloss.NewStyle().Width(inner).Align(lipgloss.Right).Render(buttons)
 	content := m.vulnerabilityScrollView() + "\n" + buttonRow
 	return lipgloss.NewStyle().Width(width-2).Height(height-2).Border(lipgloss.NormalBorder()).BorderForeground(lipgloss.Color("#262626")).Background(lipgloss.Color("#0a0a0a")).Padding(2, 3).Render(content)
 }

-// showVulnerability moves the open report to another finding, keeping the list
-// behind it in step and starting the new report at its top.
-func (m *Model) showVulnerability(index int) {
-	if index < 0 || index >= len(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities) || index == m.selectedVuln {
-		return
-	}
-	m.selectedVuln = index
-	m.ensureVulnerabilityVisible()
-	// The copy state belongs to the report that was on screen, not this one.
-	m.vulnerabilityCopied = false
-	m.vulnerabilityCopyError = ""
-	m.resizeVulnerabilityViewport()
-	m.vulnViewport.GotoTop()
-}
-
-// The report's buttons. Prev and Next carry their arrows so a click test cannot
-// be fooled by the same word appearing in the body of a finding.
-const (
-	reportPrev = "‹ Prev"
-	reportNext = "Next ›"
-	reportCopy = "Copy"
-	reportDone = "Done"
-)
-
-// reportButtons is the row as it stands, left to right. Stepping is offered only
-// in the directions that have a report.
-func (m Model) reportButtons() []string {
-	previous, next := m.vulnerabilityNeighbors()
-	buttons := make([]string, 0, 4)
-	if previous {
-		buttons = append(buttons, reportPrev)
-	}
-	if next {
-		buttons = append(buttons, reportNext)
-	}
-	return append(buttons, reportCopy, reportDone)
-}
-
-// focusedReportButton is the button Enter would press. It falls back to Done when
-// the focused one has gone, which happens when stepping to either end drops a
-// direction from the row.
-func (m Model) focusedReportButton() string {
-	for _, button := range m.reportButtons() {
-		if button == m.reportFocus {
-			return button
-		}
-	}
-	return reportDone
-}
-
-// stepReportFocus moves along the row, wrapping at its ends.
-func (m *Model) stepReportFocus(delta int) {
-	buttons := m.reportButtons()
-	current := 0
-	for i, button := range buttons {
-		if button == m.focusedReportButton() {
-			current = i
-		}
-	}
-	m.reportFocus = buttons[clampCycle(current+delta, len(buttons))]
-}
-
-// vulnerabilityNeighbors reports which way the open report can be stepped. The
-// ends are not wrapped: a report is one of an ordered list, and rolling from the
-// last to the first hides that you reached the end.
-func (m Model) vulnerabilityNeighbors() (previous, next bool) {
-	return m.selectedVuln > 0, m.selectedVuln < len(m.snapshot.Vulnerabilities)-1
-}
-
-// reportButton renders one button of the report row. Copy reports the outcome of
-// the last attempt in its own label.
-func (m Model) reportButton(label string, focused bool) string {
-	if label == reportCopy {
-		switch {
-		case m.vulnerabilityCopied:
-			label = "Copied!"
-		case m.vulnerabilityCopyError != "":
-			label = "Copy failed"
-		}
-	}
-	if focused {
-		return lipgloss.NewStyle().Background(lipgloss.Color("#363636")).
-			Foreground(brightWhite).Bold(true).Padding(0, 1).Render(label)
-	}
-	return lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#525252")).Render(label)
-}
-
 func (m *Model) startVulnerabilityCopy() tea.Cmd {
 	m.vulnerabilityCopied = false
 	m.vulnerabilityCopyError = ""
@@ -294,7 +294,6 @@ async def _summarize(model: str, prompt: str, max_tokens: int) -> str | None:
        request_timeout=llm.timeout,
        prompt_cache=False,
        extra_headers=llm.extra_headers,
-        has_tools=False,
    ).resolve(ModelSettings(max_tokens=max_tokens))
    try:
        response = (
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ def _dedupe_model_settings(
        # must never receive the main endpoint's credentials. A dedicated model
        # gets its own DEDUPE_LLM_EXTRA_HEADERS instead.
        extra_headers=dedupe.extra_headers if dedupe.model else llm.extra_headers,
-        has_tools=False,
    )
    extra = _dedupe_extra_args(dedupe)
    if extra:
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-"""LiteLLM model-name resolution for local cost estimates."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from functools import lru_cache
-from typing import Any, cast
-
-
-@lru_cache(maxsize=512)
-def resolve_litellm_model(model: str) -> str | None:
-    """Return a provider-qualified model name that LiteLLM can price."""
-    try:
-        import litellm
-
-        normalized = model.strip()
-        for prefix in ("litellm/", "any-llm/", "openai/"):
-            if normalized.startswith(prefix):
-                normalized = normalized.removeprefix(prefix)
-                break
-        if not normalized:
-            return None
-
-        model_cost = cast(
-            "dict[str, dict[str, Any]]",
-            getattr(litellm, "model_cost"),  # noqa: B009
-        )
-        bare_entry = model_cost.get(normalized)
-        if "/" not in normalized and isinstance(bare_entry, dict):
-            provider = bare_entry.get("litellm_provider")
-            if isinstance(provider, str) and provider:
-                return f"{provider}/{normalized}"
-        if "/" in normalized and isinstance(bare_entry, dict):
-            return normalized
-
-        names = [normalized]
-        if "/" in normalized:
-            names.append(normalized.rsplit("/", 1)[-1])
-        for name in names:
-            matches = sorted(key for key in model_cost if key.endswith(f"/{name}"))
-            if not matches:
-                continue
-            prices = {
-                (
-                    model_cost[key].get("input_cost_per_token"),
-                    model_cost[key].get("output_cost_per_token"),
-                )
-                for key in matches
-                if isinstance(model_cost.get(key), dict)
-            }
-            if len(matches) == 1 or len(prices) == 1:
-                return matches[0]
-        return None  # noqa: TRY300
-    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001
-        return None
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ from agents.usage import Usage
 from strix.config import codex
 from strix.config.loader import load_settings
 from strix.core.paths import run_dir_for
-from strix.report.pricing import resolve_litellm_model
 from strix.report.sarif import write_sarif
 from strix.report.usage import LLMUsageLedger
 from strix.report.writer import (
@@ -697,13 +696,10 @@ def _estimate_response_cost(kwargs: Any, completion_response: Any) -> float | No
        candidates.append(model.rsplit("/", 1)[-1])

    for candidate in candidates:
-        resolved = resolve_litellm_model(candidate)
-        if not resolved:
-            continue
        try:
            value = completion_cost(
-                completion_response={"model": resolved, "usage": usage_payload},
-                model=resolved,
+                completion_response={"model": candidate, "usage": usage_payload},
+                model=candidate,
            )
        except Exception:  # nosec B112  # noqa: BLE001, S112
            continue
@@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ from typing import Any

 from agents.usage import Usage, deserialize_usage, serialize_usage

-from strix.report.pricing import resolve_litellm_model
-

 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

@@ -20,9 +18,7 @@ class LLMUsageLedger:
        self._total_usage = Usage()
        self._agent_usage: dict[str, Usage] = {}
        self._agent_metadata: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {}
-        self._observed_cost = 0.0
-        self._estimated_cost = 0.0
-        self._has_observed_cost = False
+        self._total_cost = 0.0
        # When True, tokens are still tracked but cost stays $0 — the run is on a
        # model subscription, so there is no metered per-token charge to report.
        self.zero_cost = False
@@ -48,10 +44,10 @@ class LLMUsageLedger:
        if model:
            metadata["model"] = model

-        if not self.zero_cost:
+        if not self.zero_cost and not _is_litellm_routed(model):
            estimated = _estimate_litellm_cost(usage, model)
            if estimated:
-                self._estimated_cost += estimated
+                self._total_cost += estimated

        return True

@@ -59,18 +55,15 @@ class LLMUsageLedger:
        if self.zero_cost:
            return
        if isinstance(cost, int | float) and cost > 0:
-            self._observed_cost += float(cost)
-            self._has_observed_cost = True
+            self._total_cost += float(cost)

    @property
    def total_cost(self) -> float:
-        if self.zero_cost:
-            return 0.0
-        return _round_cost(self._observed_cost if self._has_observed_cost else self._estimated_cost)
+        return _round_cost(self._total_cost)

    def to_record(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
        record = serialize_usage(self._total_usage)
-        record["cost"] = self.total_cost
+        record["cost"] = _round_cost(self._total_cost)
        record["agents"] = []

        agent_tokens = {aid: _resolve_total_tokens(u) for aid, u in self._agent_usage.items()}
@@ -79,7 +72,7 @@ class LLMUsageLedger:
            usage = self._agent_usage[agent_id]
            metadata = self._agent_metadata.get(agent_id, {})
            agent_cost = (
-                self.total_cost * (agent_tokens[agent_id] / total_tokens) if total_tokens else 0.0
+                self._total_cost * (agent_tokens[agent_id] / total_tokens) if total_tokens else 0.0
            )

            agent_record = serialize_usage(usage)
@@ -99,9 +92,7 @@ class LLMUsageLedger:
        self._total_usage = Usage()
        self._agent_usage.clear()
        self._agent_metadata.clear()
-        self._observed_cost = 0.0
-        self._estimated_cost = 0.0
-        self._has_observed_cost = False
+        self._total_cost = 0.0

        if not isinstance(raw_usage, dict):
            return
@@ -112,9 +103,7 @@ class LLMUsageLedger:
            logger.exception("Failed to hydrate aggregate llm_usage from run.json")
            self._total_usage = Usage()

-        persisted_cost = _float_or_zero(raw_usage.get("cost"))
-        self._observed_cost = persisted_cost
-        self._estimated_cost = persisted_cost
+        self._total_cost = _float_or_zero(raw_usage.get("cost"))

        for raw_agent in raw_usage.get("agents") or []:
            if not isinstance(raw_agent, dict):
@@ -147,6 +136,15 @@ def _resolve_total_tokens(usage: Usage) -> int:
    return prompt + completion


+def _is_litellm_routed(model: str | None) -> bool:
+    if not model:
+        return False
+    name = model.strip().lower()
+    if "/" not in name:
+        return False
+    return not name.startswith("openai/")
+
+
 def _usage_has_activity(usage: Usage) -> bool:
    return bool(
        usage.requests
@@ -203,23 +201,24 @@ def _estimate_litellm_entry_cost(entry: Any, model: str) -> float | None:

    candidates = [model]
    if "/" in model:
-        candidates.append(model.rsplit("/", 1)[-1])
+        candidates.append(model.split("/", 1)[-1])

+    cost: Any = None
    for candidate in candidates:
-        resolved = resolve_litellm_model(candidate)
-        if not resolved:
-            continue
        try:
            cost = completion_cost(
-                completion_response={"model": resolved, "usage": usage_payload},
-                model=resolved,
+                completion_response={"model": candidate, "usage": usage_payload},
+                model=model,
            )
+            break
        except Exception:  # nosec B112  # noqa: BLE001, S112
            continue
-        if cost > 0:
-            return float(cost)
-    logger.debug("LiteLLM cost estimate unavailable for model %s", model)
-    return None
+
+    if cost is None:
+        logger.debug("LiteLLM cost estimate unavailable for model %s", model)
+        return None
+
+    return cost if isinstance(cost, int | float) and cost >= 0 else None


 def _litellm_model_name(model: str | None) -> str | None:
@@ -4,9 +4,6 @@ import threading
 from collections import Counter
 from collections.abc import Iterator
 from pathlib import Path
-from typing import TypeGuard
-
-import yaml

 from strix.telemetry import posthog, scarf
 from strix.utils.resource_paths import get_strix_resource_path
@@ -14,17 +11,12 @@ from strix.utils.resource_paths import get_strix_resource_path

 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

-_FRONTMATTER_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^---\s*\n(?P<body>.*?)\n---\s*\n", re.DOTALL)
+_FRONTMATTER_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^---\s*\n.*?\n---\s*\n", re.DOTALL)

 _INTERNAL_SKILL_CATEGORIES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"scan_modes", "coordination"})
 _ROOT_SKILL_CATEGORY = "root"

 _EXTRA_SKILL_DIRS: list[Path] = []
-_SKILL_METADATA_CACHE: dict[tuple[Path, int, int], dict[str, str]] = {}
-
-
-def _is_frontmatter_mapping(value: object) -> TypeGuard[dict[object, object]]:
-    return isinstance(value, dict)


 def register_skill_dir(path: str | Path) -> None:
@@ -117,18 +109,13 @@ def _get_ambiguous_skill_names() -> set[str]:
    return {name for name, count in counts.items() if count > 1}


-def _qualified_skill_file_for_name(skill_name: str) -> Path | None:
+def _qualified_skill_files(skill_name: str) -> list[Path]:
    category, _, name = skill_name.partition("/")
    for skills_dir in skill_search_dirs():
        candidate = _qualified_skill_file(skills_dir, category, name)
        if candidate is not None:
-            return candidate
-    return None
-
-
-def _qualified_skill_files(skill_name: str) -> list[Path]:
-    candidate = _qualified_skill_file_for_name(skill_name)
-    return [candidate] if candidate is not None else []
+            return [candidate]
+    return []


 def _bare_skill_files(skill_name: str) -> list[Path]:
@@ -158,59 +145,10 @@ def _bare_skill_files(skill_name: str) -> list[Path]:
    return candidates


-def _parse_skill_content(content: str, source: Path | None = None) -> tuple[dict[str, str], str]:
-    """Parse skill frontmatter once and return metadata plus markdown body."""
-    frontmatter = _FRONTMATTER_PATTERN.match(content)
-    if frontmatter is None:
-        return {}, content.lstrip()
-
-    try:
-        parsed: object = yaml.safe_load(frontmatter.group("body"))
-    except yaml.YAMLError as error:
-        logger.warning("Failed to parse skill frontmatter %s: %s", source or "<content>", error)
-        parsed = None
-    if not _is_frontmatter_mapping(parsed):
-        logger.warning("Skill frontmatter is not a mapping: %s", source or "<content>")
-        return {}, content[frontmatter.end() :].lstrip()
-
-    metadata = {str(key): "" if value is None else str(value) for key, value in parsed.items()}
-    return metadata, content[frontmatter.end() :].lstrip()
-
-
-def _read_skill_metadata(file_path: Path) -> dict[str, str]:
-    try:
-        stat = file_path.stat()
-    except OSError:
-        logger.warning("Skill file disappeared while reading metadata: %s", file_path)
-        return {}
-    cache_key = (file_path, stat.st_mtime_ns, stat.st_size)
-    cached = _SKILL_METADATA_CACHE.get(cache_key)
-    if cached is not None:
-        return cached
-    try:
-        content = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    except (OSError, ValueError):
-        logger.warning("Failed to read skill metadata: %s", file_path)
-        return {}
-    metadata, _ = _parse_skill_content(content, file_path)
-    _SKILL_METADATA_CACHE[cache_key] = metadata
-    return metadata
-
-
-def get_available_skills() -> dict[str, list[dict[str, str]]]:
-    grouped: dict[str, list[dict[str, str]]] = {}
+def get_available_skills() -> dict[str, list[str]]:
+    grouped: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
    for category, name in _iter_user_skill_files():
-        file_path = _qualified_skill_file_for_name(f"{category}/{name}")
-        if file_path is None:
-            logger.warning(
-                "Skill disappeared while gathering available skills: %s/%s",
-                category,
-                name,
-            )
-            continue
-        metadata = _read_skill_metadata(file_path)
-        description = " ".join(metadata.get("description", "").split())
-        grouped.setdefault(category, []).append({"name": name, "description": description})
+        grouped.setdefault(category, []).append(name)
    return grouped


@@ -290,8 +228,7 @@ def load_skills(skill_names: list[str]) -> dict[str, str]:
            continue

        var_name = skill_name.split("/")[-1]
-        _, skill_body = _parse_skill_content(content, file_path)
-        skill_content[var_name] = skill_body
+        skill_content[var_name] = _FRONTMATTER_PATTERN.sub("", content).lstrip()
        logger.debug("Loaded skill: %s -> %s", skill_name, var_name)
        _track_skill_loaded(var_name, file_path)

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ GCP misconfigurations expose project data, service account keys, and lateral mov

 **Storage & Data**
 - Cloud Storage (GCS) buckets and objects
- BigQuery datasets, Cloud SQL instances, Firestore (see `firebase` skill)
+- BigQuery datasets, Cloud SQL instances, Firestore (see `firebase_firestore` skill)
 - Secret Manager, Cloud KMS keys

 **Compute**
@@ -149,31 +149,20 @@ fi
   whether application code imports it directly; if not, it is reachable only
   through the direct dependency — check whether the direct dep's usage can
   hit it (if unclear, use `imported` when the direct dep is used at all).
-2. **Symbol match — per CVE, not per package.** Read each CVE's own advisory
-   (GHSA/NVD/OSV `affected[].ecosystem_specific.imports` or the advisory
-   text) for the affected functions/classes/APIs. Search application code for
-   those symbols (`ast-grep` pattern or `rg -n`). Hits ⇒
+2. **Symbol match.** Read the advisory (GHSA/NVD/OSV `affected[].ecosystem_specific.imports` or the
+   advisory text) for the affected functions/classes/APIs. Search application
+   code for those symbols (`ast-grep` pattern or `rg -n`). Hits ⇒
   `vulnerable_symbol_used`, with repo-relative `file:line` of each hit (up
   to a handful) in `reachability_evidence`. Imported but no affected-symbol
   usage found (or the advisory names no symbols) ⇒ `imported`.
-   Different CVEs on the same package usually affect **different** symbols
-   (one hits a parser, another a header check) — never copy one CVE's
-   verdict/evidence onto its siblings; run the symbol search against each
-   CVE's own affected-symbol list. The import check (step 1) is the only
-   part shared across a package's CVEs.
 3. If the analysis was not performed or is inconclusive (obfuscated code,
   dynamic loading, unparsable sources) ⇒ `unknown` and say why in
   `assumptions`.

 Cheap-first budgeting: the import check is one search per package — always do
-it. Do the per-CVE symbol match for every CVE whose advisory names affected
-symbols (they can be batched into one multi-pattern search per package);
-prioritize `critical`/`high`/KEV when the budget is tight; a CVE whose symbol
-search was skipped may still be reported as `imported` (the import check is
-real evidence), but its `reachability_evidence` must state that the
-affected-symbol check was not performed, so a skipped search is never
-mistaken for a completed one with no hits. Never let this analysis stall
-reporting — `unknown` with a reason beats an unverified claim.
+it. Do the symbol match at least for every `critical`/`high`/KEV CVE; batch
+the searches. Never let this analysis stall reporting — `unknown` with a
+reason beats an unverified claim.

 Anti-overclaim rules:

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 ---
-name: firebase
-description: Firebase security testing covering Firestore, Storage rules, Realtime Database, Auth, Functions, and client-side trust issues
+name: firebase-firestore
+description: Firebase/Firestore security testing covering security rules, Cloud Functions, and client-side trust issues
 ---

-# Firebase
+# Firebase / Firestore

 Security testing for Firebase applications. Focus on Firestore/Realtime Database rules, Cloud Storage exposure, callable/onRequest Functions trusting client input, and incorrect ID token validation.

@@ -30,17 +30,7 @@ Security testing for Firebase applications. Focus on Firestore/Realtime Database
 **Endpoints**
 - Firestore REST: `https://firestore.googleapis.com/v1/projects/<project>/databases/(default)/documents/<path>`
 - Realtime DB: `https://<project>.firebaseio.com/.json`
- GCS JSON API: `https://storage.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b/<bucket>`
- Firebase Storage rules API: `https://firebasestorage.googleapis.com/v0/b/<bucket>/o`
-
-Cloud Storage has two front doors with different authorization engines:
-
-| Front door | Authorization engine |
-| --- | --- |
-| `storage.googleapis.com/<bucket>/<object>` and `/storage/v1/b/<bucket>` | GCS IAM and per-object ACLs |
-| `firebasestorage.googleapis.com/v0/b/<bucket>/o` | Firebase Storage Security Rules |
-
-A `403` from a GCS URL does not prove that Firebase Storage rules deny access. Always test both doors.
+- Storage REST: `https://storage.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b/<bucket>`

 **Auth**
 - Google-signed ID tokens (iss: `accounts.google.com` or `securetoken.google.com/<project>`)
@@ -127,43 +117,9 @@ exists(/databases/(default)/documents/orgs/$(org)/members/$(request.auth.uid))
 - Public reads on sensitive buckets/paths
 - Signed URLs with long TTL, no content-disposition controls, replayable across tenants
 - List operations exposed: `/o?prefix=` enumerates object keys
- Firebase Storage rules allowing unauthenticated or overly broad reads and writes
-
-**Firebase Storage rules checks**
-
-Probe the rules door separately from GCS IAM and ACLs:
-
-1. Unauthenticated list: `GET https://firebasestorage.googleapis.com/v0/b/<bucket>/o?prefix=<known-prefix>`
-2. Unauthenticated read of a known object path
-3. Unauthenticated write/upload to a uniquely named test object
-4. Repeat list, read, and write as an anonymous-auth principal when anonymous sign-in is enabled
-5. Repeat the same matrix as a low-privilege authenticated user
-
-Write access is as important as read access and is routinely missed. Record status, response body, and object existence after each attempt; clean up only test objects that the test principal created.
-
-Review rules source when present and flag:
-
- `allow read, write: if request.time < timestamp.date(...)` — the common console test-mode time gate
- `{allPaths=**}` catch-alls
- `request.auth != null` as the sole authorization gate
- Claim-presence checks such as `request.auth.token.roles.size() > 0` without role or tenant validation
-
-Storage rules use OR-across-matches semantics: a later permissive match can reopen a path that an earlier match denied. Review every matching path, not only the most specific-looking deny.
-
-**Bucket discovery**
-
- Extract `storageBucket` from `firebase.apps[0].options` and `NEXT_PUBLIC_FIREBASE_*` values in JavaScript bundles and source.
- Check `<project>.appspot.com` and `<project>.firebasestorage.app` bucket conventions.
-
-**ACL and IAM checks are separate**
-
- Sweep object ACLs for `allUsers` and `allAuthenticatedUsers`, including objects made public by Admin SDK `makePublic()` or writers using `public: true`. Per-object public ACLs persist after Firebase rules are tightened and can remain on older prefixes.
- Check bucket IAM for `allUsers` and `allAuthenticatedUsers`.
- Check whether Uniform Bucket-Level Access is disabled; legacy object ACLs matter when it is off.
- Account for CDN caching of previously public objects; cache-bust when verifying a revocation.

 **Tests**
- GET GCS object paths via HTTPS without auth; verify Content-Type and `Content-Disposition: attachment`
+- GET gs:// paths via HTTPS without auth; verify Content-Type and `Content-Disposition: attachment`
 - Generate and reuse signed URLs across accounts and paths; try case/URL-encoding variants
 - Upload HTML/SVG and verify `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`; check for script execution

@@ -233,19 +189,12 @@ Apps often implement multi-tenant data models (`orgs/<orgId>/...`). Bind tenant

 ## Testing Methodology

-1. **Extract config** - Get project and storage bucket config from client bundles and source
-2. **Obtain principals** - Collect tokens for unauth, anonymous, user A/B, and admin where authorized
+1. **Extract config** - Get project config from client bundle
+2. **Obtain principals** - Collect tokens for unauth, anonymous, user A/B, admin
 3. **Build matrix** - Resource × Action × Principal across Firestore/Realtime/Storage/Functions
-4. **Exercise both Storage doors** - Test Firebase Storage rules endpoints separately from GCS IAM/ACL URLs
-5. **SDK vs REST** - Exercise every action via both to detect parity gaps
-6. **Seed IDs** - Start from list/query paths to gather document and object paths
-7. **Cross-principal** - Swap document paths, tenants, and user IDs across principals
-
-## Whitebox Rules Review
-
- Inspect `firebase.json`, `.firebaserc`, deployment scripts, CI configuration, and infrastructure code for `storage.rules` / `firestore.rules` declarations.
- If `firebase.json` has no `storage` or `firestore` block, or the referenced rules file is absent from the tree, treat the live rules as unmanaged and force the live probe matrix. Absence of rules IaC is itself a finding; never conclude that there is nothing to review.
- Correlate configured rule files with deployed project and bucket identifiers. A source rule file for a different project does not establish live protection.
+4. **SDK vs REST** - Exercise every action via both to detect parity gaps
+5. **Seed IDs** - Start from list/query paths to gather document IDs
+6. **Cross-principal** - Swap document paths, tenants, and user IDs across principals

 ## Tooling

@@ -257,7 +206,6 @@ Apps often implement multi-tenant data models (`orgs/<orgId>/...`). Bind tenant
 ## Validation Requirements

 - Owner vs non-owner Firestore queries showing unauthorized access or metadata leak
- Firebase Storage unauthenticated, anonymous, or low-privilege read/list/write beyond intended scope, with minimal reproducible requests and observed deltas
- GCS object ACL or bucket IAM access beyond intended scope, including public object persistence after rules changes
+- Cloud Storage read/write beyond intended scope (public object, signed URL reuse, list exposure)
 - Function accepting forged/foreign identity (wrong `aud`/`iss`) or trusting client `uid`/`orgId`
 - Minimal reproducible requests with roles/tokens used and observed deltas
@@ -58,26 +58,6 @@ agent-browser screenshot
 The browser stays running across commands so these feel like a single
 session. Use `agent-browser close` (or `close --all`) when you're done.

-The default session is **shared with every other agent in the sandbox** — if
-another agent navigates it, your page and your refs are gone from under you. So
-claim your own by passing `--session <your-agent-name>` on **every** command:
-
-```bash
-agent-browser --session recon-3 open https://example.com
-agent-browser --session recon-3 snapshot -i
-agent-browser --session recon-3 close        # when done with the target
-```
-
-The examples in the rest of this skill omit `--session` to keep them readable;
-keep passing yours. Each session is a separate Chromium (~340 MB) on a shared
-box, so hold one rather than several, and close it when you're finished.
-
-A browser left idle for 3 minutes is reclaimed automatically to free memory for
-the other agents; the next command relaunches it, but the page, tabs, refs and
-cookies are gone. If you're authenticated and about to go do something else for a
-while, save the state first (see
-[Persist session across runs](#persist-session-across-runs)).
-
 ## Reading a page

 ```bash
@@ -327,16 +307,6 @@ agent-browser --session b fill @e1 "bob@test.com"
 `AGENT_BROWSER_SESSION=myapp` sets the default session for the current
 shell.

-Use a session named after yourself for your own work — that's what keeps a
-concurrent agent from navigating the page out from under you. Every session is a
-separate Chromium though, so hold one at a time rather than a collection, and
-close each one when its flow is finished:
-
-```bash
-agent-browser --session a close
-agent-browser --session b close
-```
-
 ### Mock network requests

 ```bash
@@ -398,11 +368,8 @@ agent-browser dialog dismiss          # cancel
 ## Readiness & recovery

 The first `agent-browser open` in a session launches the headless-Chrome
-daemon; later commands reuse it. A daemon left idle for 3 minutes shuts itself
-down to free memory for the other agents, so an `open` after a long gap is a
-fresh browser rather than a resumed one — expect to re-navigate, and re-`state
-load` if you were logged in. Distinguish the failure modes and react differently
-— do **not** blindly re-run the same failing command in a loop:
+daemon; later commands reuse it. Distinguish the two failure modes and react
+differently — do **not** blindly re-run the same failing command in a loop:

 - **Daemon / connection failure** (`Failed to connect`, `connection refused`,
  socket missing, `browser not running`): the daemon isn't up or has died. Run
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ def _ctx(ctx: RunContextWrapper) -> dict[str, Any]:


@function_tool
-async def respond_to_user(ctx: RunContextWrapper, message: str = "") -> str:
+async def respond_to_user(ctx: RunContextWrapper, message: str) -> str:
    """Answer the user and hand control back to them.

    This is the ONLY way to yield to the user. Delivering the message and
@@ -45,10 +45,6 @@ async def respond_to_user(ctx: RunContextWrapper, message: str = "") -> str:
            have followed the tool calls that led here. Lead with the
            answer or the decision you need, and if you are blocked, say
            exactly what you need from them.
-
-            Omit it when you have just said your piece as plain text and
-            only need to wait: that text has already reached them, and
-            repeating it makes them read the same answer twice.
    """
    inner = _ctx(ctx)
    coordinator = coordinator_from_context(inner)
@@ -110,19 +110,12 @@ def _get_agent_todos(agent_id: str) -> dict[str, dict[str, Any]]:


 def _normalize_priority(priority: str | None, default: str = "normal") -> str:
-    candidate = str(priority or default or "normal").strip().lower()
+    candidate = (priority or default or "normal").lower()
    if candidate not in VALID_PRIORITIES:
        raise ValueError(f"Invalid priority. Must be one of: {', '.join(VALID_PRIORITIES)}")
    return candidate


-def _coerce_priority(priority: str | None, default: str = "normal") -> str:
-    try:
-        return _normalize_priority(priority, default)
-    except ValueError:
-        return default
-
-
 def _sorted_todos(agent_id: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
    todos_list = [
        {**todo, "todo_id": todo_id} for todo_id, todo in _get_agent_todos(agent_id).items()
@@ -292,16 +285,11 @@ async def create_todo(ctx: RunContextWrapper, todos: str) -> str:
            - ``description`` (str, optional): extra context or
              acceptance criteria.
            - ``priority`` (str, optional): one of ``"low"`` /
-              ``"normal"`` / ``"high"`` / ``"critical"``. Anything else,
-              including omitting it, falls back to ``"normal"`` rather
-              than failing.
+              ``"normal"`` / ``"high"`` / ``"critical"``. Defaults to
+              ``"normal"``.

            Example: ``[{"title": "Probe /admin", "priority": "high"},
            {"title": "Check JWT alg=none"}]``.
-
-        A title already on the list, or repeated within this call, is
-        skipped rather than duplicated; skipped titles come back under
-        ``skipped``.
    """
    agent_id = _agent_id_from(ctx)
    try:
@@ -314,21 +302,13 @@ async def create_todo(ctx: RunContextWrapper, todos: str) -> str:
            )

        agent_todos = _get_agent_todos(agent_id)
-        seen = {todo["title"].strip().lower() for todo in agent_todos.values()}
        created: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-        skipped: list[dict[str, str]] = []
        for task in tasks:
-            title = task["title"]
-            key = title.lower()
-            if key in seen:
-                skipped.append({"title": title, "reason": "duplicate title"})
-                continue
-            seen.add(key)
-            task_priority = _coerce_priority(task.get("priority"))
+            task_priority = _normalize_priority(task.get("priority"))
            todo_id = str(uuid.uuid4())[:6]
            timestamp = datetime.now(UTC).isoformat()
            agent_todos[todo_id] = {
-                "title": title,
+                "title": task["title"],
                "description": task.get("description"),
                "priority": task_priority,
                "status": "pending",
@@ -336,7 +316,7 @@ async def create_todo(ctx: RunContextWrapper, todos: str) -> str:
                "updated_at": timestamp,
                "completed_at": None,
            }
-            created.append({"todo_id": todo_id, "title": title, "priority": task_priority})
+            created.append({"todo_id": todo_id, "title": task["title"], "priority": task_priority})
    except (ValueError, TypeError) as e:
        return json.dumps(
            {"success": False, "error": f"Failed to create todo: {e}"},
@@ -350,7 +330,6 @@ async def create_todo(ctx: RunContextWrapper, todos: str) -> str:
            "success": True,
            "created": created,
            "created_count": len(created),
-            "skipped": skipped,
            "todos": _sorted_todos(agent_id),
            "total_count": len(_get_agent_todos(agent_id)),
        },
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ async def test_encoded_list_is_decoded_for_an_array_parameter(schema: dict[str,
        "auth",
        "Endpoint /admin leaks user data, and session tokens never expire",
        '"auth"',
+        "",
    ],
 )
 async def test_free_form_strings_are_never_split_into_an_array(value: str) -> None:
@@ -78,29 +79,6 @@ async def test_free_form_strings_are_never_split_into_an_array(value: str) -> No
    assert parsed["tags"] == value


-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-@pytest.mark.parametrize("schema", [_ARRAY, _NULLABLE_ARRAY])
-@pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["", "   "])
-async def test_empty_string_becomes_an_empty_array(schema: dict[str, Any], value: str) -> None:
-    parsed = await _roundtrip(schema, {"tags": value})
-
-    assert parsed["tags"] == []
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_empty_string_becomes_an_empty_object() -> None:
-    parsed = await _roundtrip(_OBJECT, {"modifications": ""})
-
-    assert parsed["modifications"] == {}
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_empty_string_for_a_string_parameter_is_untouched() -> None:
-    parsed = await _roundtrip(_STRING, {"todos": ""})
-
-    assert parsed["todos"] == ""
-
-
@pytest.mark.asyncio
 async def test_encoded_mapping_is_decoded_for_an_object_parameter() -> None:
    parsed = await _roundtrip(_OBJECT, {"modifications": '{"method": "POST"}'})
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ def test_cost_callback_estimates_cost_with_bare_model_fallback() -> None:
    }

    def fake_completion_cost(**kwargs: object) -> float:
-        if kwargs["model"] == "openai/gpt-4o-mini":
+        if kwargs["model"] == "gpt-4o-mini":
            return 0.025
        raise ValueError(kwargs["model"])

@@ -1228,40 +1228,3 @@ async def test_wait_kind_survives_a_snapshot_round_trip() -> None:
    assert restored.wait_kinds["root"] == "user"
    assert restored.idle_resume_counts["root"] == 1
    assert await execution._plain_waiting_timeout(restored, "root") is None
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_interactive_nudge_offers_waiting_without_repeating() -> None:
-    """The nudge is the instruction an agent reads when it is stranded here.
-
-    It is where the option to wait on what was already said has to be, not only
-    in the system prompt: an agent that ended a turn on plain text reasons off
-    this text, and without the clause it restates its answer to reach a tool
-    call, so the user reads it twice.
-
-    The clause holds whatever the turn did, because the agent is the one who
-    knows whether it spoke — this fires for a turn that produced no text at all.
-    """
-    items = await execution._append_tool_required_message(
-        session=None,
-        context={"parent_id": None},
-        attempt=1,
-        limit=3,
-        interactive=True,
-    )
-
-    assert "with no message if you have already said it" in items[0]["content"]
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_autonomous_nudge_does_not_offer_the_user() -> None:
-    """There is nobody attached to an autonomous run to wait for."""
-    items = await execution._append_tool_required_message(
-        session=None,
-        context={"parent_id": None},
-        attempt=1,
-        limit=3,
-        interactive=False,
-    )
-
-    assert "respond_to_user" not in items[0]["content"]
@@ -299,16 +299,6 @@ def test_make_model_settings_forces_required_for_anyllm_routed_openai_model() ->
    assert settings.tool_choice == "required"


-def test_make_model_settings_disables_parallel_tool_calls_by_default() -> None:
-    assert make_model_settings("none", model_name="gpt-4o").parallel_tool_calls is False
-
-
-def test_make_model_settings_omits_parallel_tool_calls_without_tools() -> None:
-    settings = make_model_settings("none", model_name="gpt-4o", has_tools=False)
-
-    assert settings.parallel_tool_calls is None
-
-
 def test_make_model_settings_sets_request_timeout() -> None:
    settings = make_model_settings(
        "none",
@@ -361,32 +351,3 @@ def test_make_model_settings_timeout_survives_reasoning_resolve() -> None:

    assert settings.extra_args is not None
    assert settings.extra_args["timeout"] == 120.0
-
-
-def test_openrouter_attribution_rides_on_the_request_headers() -> None:
-    # litellm.headers is ignored once a request carries any header of its own,
-    # so the attribution must be part of the per-request headers.
-    headers = make_model_settings(
-        None, model_name="openrouter/anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5"
-    ).extra_headers
-    assert headers == {
-        "HTTP-Referer": "https://strix.ai",
-        "X-Title": "Strix",
-        "X-OpenRouter-Categories": "cli-agent",
-    }
-
-
-def test_openrouter_attribution_absent_for_other_providers() -> None:
-    assert make_model_settings(None, model_name="anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5").extra_headers is None
-
-
-def test_user_headers_override_openrouter_attribution() -> None:
-    headers = make_model_settings(
-        None,
-        model_name="openrouter/anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5",
-        extra_headers={"X-Title": "Custom", "X-Tenant": "acme"},
-    ).extra_headers
-    assert headers is not None
-    assert headers["X-Title"] == "Custom"
-    assert headers["X-Tenant"] == "acme"
-    assert headers["HTTP-Referer"] == "https://strix.ai"
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from unittest.mock import patch
-
-import litellm
-from agents.usage import Usage
-
-from strix.report.pricing import resolve_litellm_model
-from strix.report.usage import LLMUsageLedger
-
-
-def test_resolves_common_bare_model_names() -> None:
-    resolve_litellm_model.cache_clear()
-    assert resolve_litellm_model("deepseek-v4-flash") == "deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash"
-    assert resolve_litellm_model("openai/deepseek-v4-flash") == "deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash"
-    assert resolve_litellm_model("grok-4.5") == "xai/grok-4.5"
-    assert resolve_litellm_model("MiniMax-M3") == "minimax/MiniMax-M3"
-
-
-def test_resolver_returns_none_for_unresolvable_model() -> None:
-    resolve_litellm_model.cache_clear()
-    assert resolve_litellm_model("provider/not-a-real-model") is None
-
-
-def test_ledger_uses_estimate_when_routed_provider_reports_no_cost() -> None:
-    usage = Usage()
-    usage.requests = 1
-    usage.input_tokens = 1000
-    usage.output_tokens = 200
-    usage.total_tokens = 1200
-    ledger = LLMUsageLedger()
-
-    with patch("litellm.completion_cost", return_value=0.42):
-        ledger.record(agent_id="a", usage=usage, model="openai/deepseek-v4-flash")
-
-    assert ledger.total_cost == 0.42
-
-
-def test_ledger_prefers_observed_cost_over_estimate() -> None:
-    usage = Usage()
-    usage.requests = 1
-    usage.input_tokens = 1000
-    usage.output_tokens = 200
-    usage.total_tokens = 1200
-    ledger = LLMUsageLedger()
-
-    with patch("litellm.completion_cost", return_value=0.42):
-        ledger.record(agent_id="a", usage=usage, model="openai/deepseek-v4-flash")
-    ledger.record_observed_cost(0.17)
-
-    assert ledger.total_cost == 0.17
-
-
-def test_hydrated_estimate_continues_accumulating_new_estimates() -> None:
-    usage = Usage()
-    usage.requests = 1
-    usage.input_tokens = 1000
-    usage.output_tokens = 200
-    usage.total_tokens = 1200
-    ledger = LLMUsageLedger()
-    ledger.hydrate({"cost": 0.42})
-
-    with patch("litellm.completion_cost", return_value=0.17):
-        ledger.record(agent_id="a", usage=usage, model="openai/deepseek-v4-flash")
-
-    assert ledger.total_cost == 0.59
-
-
-def test_zero_cost_disables_both_observed_and_estimated_costs() -> None:
-    usage = Usage()
-    usage.requests = 1
-    usage.input_tokens = 1000
-    usage.output_tokens = 200
-    usage.total_tokens = 1200
-    ledger = LLMUsageLedger()
-    ledger.zero_cost = True
-
-    with patch("litellm.completion_cost", return_value=0.42) as estimate:
-        ledger.record(agent_id="a", usage=usage, model="deepseek-v4-flash")
-        ledger.record_observed_cost(1.0)
-
-    estimate.assert_not_called()
-    assert ledger.total_cost == 0.0
-
-
-def test_resolver_uses_provider_when_bare_entry_has_one() -> None:
-    original = litellm.model_cost
-    litellm.model_cost = {
-        "example": {
-            "litellm_provider": "example-provider",
-            "input_cost_per_token": 1.0,
-            "output_cost_per_token": 2.0,
-        }
-    }
-    try:
-        resolve_litellm_model.cache_clear()
-        assert resolve_litellm_model("example") == "example-provider/example"
-    finally:
-        litellm.model_cost = original
-        resolve_litellm_model.cache_clear()
-
-
-def test_resolver_does_not_guess_between_differently_priced_providers() -> None:
-    original = litellm.model_cost
-    litellm.model_cost = {
-        "provider-a/example": {
-            "input_cost_per_token": 1.0,
-            "output_cost_per_token": 2.0,
-        },
-        "provider-b/example": {
-            "input_cost_per_token": 3.0,
-            "output_cost_per_token": 4.0,
-        },
-    }
-    try:
-        resolve_litellm_model.cache_clear()
-        assert resolve_litellm_model("example") is None
-    finally:
-        litellm.model_cost = original
-        resolve_litellm_model.cache_clear()
@@ -64,31 +64,3 @@ async def test_a_message_that_already_arrived_is_taken_instead_of_parking() -> N
    assert result["wait_outcome"] == "message_arrived"
    assert result["pending_messages"] == 1
    assert coordinator.statuses["root"] == "running"
-
-
-async def _call_without_message(context: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    ctx = ToolContext(
-        context=context,
-        tool_name="respond_to_user",
-        tool_call_id="call-1",
-        tool_arguments="{}",
-    )
-    raw = await respond_to_user.on_invoke_tool(ctx, "{}")
-    return json.loads(raw)  # type: ignore[no-any-return]
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_parks_without_a_message() -> None:
-    """An agent that has already said its piece as plain text can just wait.
-
-    The nudge is what leaves it here, and while a message was required the only
-    way to stop was to send the same answer a second time.
-    """
-    context = await _context(interactive=True)
-
-    result = await _call_without_message(context)
-
-    assert result["success"] is True
-    assert result["wait_outcome"] == "waiting"
-    assert result["message"] == ""
-    assert context["coordinator"].statuses["root"] == "waiting"
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import asyncio
-import types
-from typing import Any
-
-import pytest
-from agents import ModelSettings
-
-import strix.tools.notes.tools as notes_tools
-import strix.tools.todo.tools as todo_tools
-from strix.core import runner
-from strix.core.agents import AgentCoordinator
-from strix.runtime import session_manager
-
-
-def _wire_runner(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, tmp_path: Any) -> None:
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "run_dir_for", lambda _scan_id: tmp_path)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "runtime_state_dir", lambda _run_dir: tmp_path)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "setup_scan_logging", lambda _run_dir: lambda: None)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "set_scan_id", lambda _scan_id: None)
-
-    settings = types.SimpleNamespace(
-        llm=types.SimpleNamespace(
-            model="openai/gpt-4o",
-            reasoning_effort="high",
-            force_required_tool_choice=False,
-            timeout=300,
-            prompt_cache=True,
-            extra_headers=None,
-        ),
-        runtime=types.SimpleNamespace(max_context_images=3),
-    )
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "load_settings", lambda: settings)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "configure_sdk_model_defaults", lambda _settings: None)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(
-        runner, "uses_chat_completions_tool_schema", lambda _model, _settings: False
-    )
-    monkeypatch.setattr(todo_tools, "hydrate_todos_from_disk", lambda _state_dir: None)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(notes_tools, "hydrate_notes_from_disk", lambda _state_dir: None)
-
-    async def _create_or_reuse(*_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {"client": object(), "session": object(), "caido_client": None}
-
-    async def _cleanup(*_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any) -> None:
-        return None
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(session_manager, "create_or_reuse", _create_or_reuse)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(session_manager, "cleanup", _cleanup)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "build_root_task", lambda _scan_config: "task")
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "build_scope_context", lambda _scan_config: "")
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "make_model_settings", lambda *_a, **_k: ModelSettings())
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "build_strix_agent", lambda **_kwargs: object())
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "make_child_factory", lambda **_kwargs: lambda **_k: object())
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "open_agent_session", lambda _root_id, _db: object())
-
-
-def _root_status(coordinator: AgentCoordinator) -> str:
-    roots = [aid for aid, parent in coordinator.parent_of.items() if parent is None]
-    assert len(roots) == 1
-    return coordinator.statuses[roots[0]]
-
-
-@pytest.mark.parametrize("interrupt", [KeyboardInterrupt, asyncio.CancelledError])
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_user_interrupt_leaves_the_root_running_for_resume(
-    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, tmp_path: Any, interrupt: type[BaseException]
-) -> None:
-    _wire_runner(monkeypatch, tmp_path)
-
-    async def _interrupt(*_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any) -> None:
-        raise interrupt()
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "run_agent_loop", _interrupt)
-    coordinator = AgentCoordinator()
-
-    with pytest.raises(interrupt):
-        await runner.run_strix_scan(
-            scan_config={"targets": [], "scan_mode": "deep"},
-            scan_id="scan-test",
-            image="img",
-            coordinator=coordinator,
-        )
-
-    assert _root_status(coordinator) == "running"
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_a_real_crash_still_marks_root_failed(
-    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, tmp_path: Any
-) -> None:
-    _wire_runner(monkeypatch, tmp_path)
-
-    async def _boom(*_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any) -> None:
-        raise RuntimeError("boom")
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "run_agent_loop", _boom)
-    coordinator = AgentCoordinator()
-
-    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="boom"):
-        await runner.run_strix_scan(
-            scan_config={"targets": [], "scan_mode": "deep"},
-            scan_id="scan-test",
-            image="img",
-            coordinator=coordinator,
-        )
-
-    assert _root_status(coordinator) == "failed"
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import asyncio
-import types
-from typing import Any
-
-import pytest
-from agents import ModelSettings
-
-import strix.tools.notes.tools as notes_tools
-import strix.tools.todo.tools as todo_tools
-from strix.core import runner
-from strix.core.agents import AgentCoordinator
-from strix.runtime import session_manager
-
-
-def _wire_runner(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, tmp_path: Any) -> None:
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "run_dir_for", lambda _scan_id: tmp_path)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "runtime_state_dir", lambda _run_dir: tmp_path)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "setup_scan_logging", lambda _run_dir: lambda: None)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "set_scan_id", lambda _scan_id: None)
-
-    settings = _settings()
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "load_settings", lambda: settings)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "configure_sdk_model_defaults", lambda _s: None)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "uses_chat_completions_tool_schema", lambda _m, _s: False)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(todo_tools, "hydrate_todos_from_disk", lambda _d: None)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(notes_tools, "hydrate_notes_from_disk", lambda _d: None)
-
-    async def _create_or_reuse(*_a: Any, **_k: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {"client": object(), "session": object(), "caido_client": None}
-
-    async def _cleanup(*_a: Any, **_k: Any) -> None:
-        return None
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(session_manager, "create_or_reuse", _create_or_reuse)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(session_manager, "cleanup", _cleanup)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "build_root_task", lambda _c: "task")
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "build_scope_context", lambda _c: "")
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "make_model_settings", lambda *_a, **_k: ModelSettings())
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "build_strix_agent", lambda **_k: object())
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "make_child_factory", lambda **_k: lambda **_kk: object())
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "open_agent_session", lambda _root_id, _db: object())
-
-
-def _settings() -> Any:
-    return types.SimpleNamespace(
-        llm=types.SimpleNamespace(
-            model="openai/gpt-4o",
-            reasoning_effort="high",
-            force_required_tool_choice=False,
-            timeout=300,
-            prompt_cache=True,
-            extra_headers=None,
-        ),
-        runtime=types.SimpleNamespace(max_context_images=3),
-    )
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_a_live_child_is_settled_before_sessions_close(
-    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, tmp_path: Any
-) -> None:
-    _wire_runner(monkeypatch, tmp_path)
-    coordinator = AgentCoordinator()
-    child_started = asyncio.Event()
-    child_task: dict[str, asyncio.Task[None]] = {}
-
-    async def _root_finishes(**kwargs: Any) -> None:
-        root_id = kwargs["agent_id"]
-
-        async def _child_mid_turn() -> None:
-            child_started.set()
-            await asyncio.sleep(3600)
-
-        await coordinator.register("child", "Child", parent_id=root_id)
-        task = asyncio.create_task(_child_mid_turn())
-        child_task["t"] = task
-        await coordinator.attach_runtime("child", task=task)
-        await child_started.wait()
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "run_agent_loop", _root_finishes)
-
-    await runner.run_strix_scan(
-        scan_config={"targets": [], "scan_mode": "deep"},
-        scan_id="scan-test",
-        image="img",
-        coordinator=coordinator,
-    )
-
-    task = child_task["t"]
-    assert task.done(), "the child task was left running past scan teardown"
-    assert task.cancelled(), "the child was not cancelled cleanly on a finish"
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import asyncio
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, cast
-
-import pytest
-
-from strix.core.sessions import open_agent_session
-
-
-def _count_open_fds() -> int | None:
-    for path in (Path("/proc/self/fd"), Path("/dev/fd")):
-        if path.is_dir():
-            return len(list(path.iterdir()))
-    return None
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_sessions_hold_no_descriptors_while_parked(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    """Descriptor use must track live operations, not the number of sessions.
-
-    The SDK keeps a connection per (session, pool thread) open for the session's
-    whole life. An agent parks rather than exits, so its session lives for the
-    scan, and fan-out multiplies those handles until the process runs out of file
-    descriptors (#1018). A session that is not mid-operation should hold none.
-    """
-    baseline = _count_open_fds()
-    if baseline is None:
-        pytest.skip("no /proc/self/fd or /dev/fd on this platform")
-
-    sessions = [open_agent_session(f"a{i}", tmp_path / f"s{i}.db") for i in range(60)]
-    try:
-        for _ in range(4):
-            await asyncio.gather(
-                *(s.add_items([{"role": "user", "content": "x"}]) for s in sessions)
-            )
-            await asyncio.gather(*(s.get_items() for s in sessions))
-        parked = _count_open_fds()
-        assert parked is not None
-        # 60 parked sessions, yet descriptors are back at the baseline.
-        assert parked - baseline <= 5, f"parked fds grew by {parked - baseline}"
-    finally:
-        for s in sessions:
-            s.close()
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_in_flight_descriptors_track_concurrency_not_session_count(
-    tmp_path: Path,
-) -> None:
-    baseline = _count_open_fds()
-    if baseline is None:
-        pytest.skip("no /proc/self/fd or /dev/fd on this platform")
-
-    sessions = [open_agent_session(f"a{i}", tmp_path / f"s{i}.db") for i in range(200)]
-    peak = baseline
-    try:
-
-        async def sample() -> None:
-            nonlocal peak
-            for _ in range(500):
-                current = _count_open_fds()
-                if current is not None:
-                    peak = max(peak, current)
-                await asyncio.sleep(0)
-
-        async def load() -> None:
-            for _ in range(4):
-                await asyncio.gather(
-                    *(s.add_items([{"role": "user", "content": "x"}]) for s in sessions)
-                )
-
-        await asyncio.gather(load(), sample())
-        # 200 sessions, but peak is bounded by the thread pool, well under 200.
-        assert peak - baseline < 100, f"in-flight fds peaked at +{peak - baseline}"
-    finally:
-        for s in sessions:
-            s.close()
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_history_survives_the_per_operation_connection(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    session = open_agent_session("agent-1", tmp_path / "agents.db")
-    try:
-        for i in range(30):
-            await session.add_items([{"role": "user", "content": f"m{i}"}])
-        items = [cast("dict[str, Any]", i) for i in await session.get_items()]
-        assert [i["content"] for i in items] == [f"m{i}" for i in range(30)]
-    finally:
-        session.close()
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_concurrent_sessions_sharing_one_file_stay_consistent(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    db = tmp_path / "shared.db"
-    sessions = [open_agent_session(f"a{i}", db) for i in range(10)]
-    try:
-        await asyncio.gather(
-            *(s.add_items([{"role": "user", "content": s.session_id}]) for s in sessions)
-        )
-        # Each session sees only its own row despite sharing the file.
-        for s in sessions:
-            items = [cast("dict[str, Any]", i) for i in await s.get_items()]
-            assert [i["content"] for i in items] == [s.session_id]
-    finally:
-        for s in sessions:
-            s.close()
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_a_closed_session_refuses_operations(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    session = open_agent_session("agent-1", tmp_path / "agents.db")
-    await session.add_items([{"role": "user", "content": "x"}])
-    session.close()
-    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="closed"):
-        await session.add_items([{"role": "user", "content": "y"}])
@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
-from collections.abc import Iterator
 from pathlib import Path

 import pytest

 import strix.skills as skills_mod
-from strix.agents.prompt import render_system_prompt
 from strix.skills import (
    get_all_skill_names,
    get_available_skills,
@@ -14,11 +12,10 @@ from strix.skills import (
    skill_search_dirs,
    validate_requested_skills,
 )
-from strix.utils.resource_paths import get_strix_resource_path


@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
-def _clear_extra_dirs() -> Iterator[None]:
+def _clear_extra_dirs() -> None:
    original = list(skills_mod._EXTRA_SKILL_DIRS)
    skills_mod._EXTRA_SKILL_DIRS.clear()
    try:
@@ -40,11 +37,9 @@ def _write_root_skill(root: Path, name: str, body: str) -> None:

 def test_no_registration_leaves_builtin_only() -> None:
    assert registered_skill_dirs() == ()
-    builtin = get_strix_resource_path("skills")
+    builtin = skills_mod.get_strix_resource_path("skills")
    assert skill_search_dirs() == (builtin,)
-    assert {"nmap", "subfinder"}.issubset(
-        {skill["name"] for skill in get_available_skills()["tooling"]}
-    )
+    assert {"nmap", "subfinder"}.issubset(get_available_skills()["tooling"])


 def test_register_is_idempotent_and_ordered(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
@@ -66,125 +61,16 @@ def test_registered_dir_adds_new_skill(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
    register_skill_dir(tmp_path)

    assert "widget" in get_all_skill_names()
-    assert get_available_skills()["extra"] == [{"name": "widget", "description": ""}]
+    assert get_available_skills()["extra"] == ["widget"]
    assert load_skills(["widget"]) == {"widget": "widget body"}


-def test_available_skill_includes_frontmatter_description(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    _write_skill(
-        tmp_path,
-        "extra",
-        "widget",
-        "---\nname: widget\ndescription: Useful widget guidance\n---\nwidget body",
-    )
-    register_skill_dir(tmp_path)
-
-    assert get_available_skills()["extra"] == [
-        {"name": "widget", "description": "Useful widget guidance"}
-    ]
-
-
-def test_available_skill_supports_colon_in_description(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    _write_skill(
-        tmp_path,
-        "extra",
-        "widget",
-        '---\nname: widget\ndescription: "Useful widget: handles YAML"\n---\nwidget body',
-    )
-    register_skill_dir(tmp_path)
-
-    assert get_available_skills()["extra"] == [
-        {"name": "widget", "description": "Useful widget: handles YAML"}
-    ]
-
-
-def test_available_skill_normalizes_quoted_description(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    _write_skill(
-        tmp_path,
-        "extra",
-        "widget",
-        '---\nname: widget\ndescription: "Useful: widget guidance"\n---\nwidget body',
-    )
-    register_skill_dir(tmp_path)
-
-    assert get_available_skills()["extra"] == [
-        {"name": "widget", "description": "Useful: widget guidance"}
-    ]
-
-
-def test_available_skill_normalizes_multiline_descriptions(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    _write_skill(
-        tmp_path,
-        "extra",
-        "block",
-        "---\nname: block\n\ndescription: |\n"
-        "  First paragraph\n\n  Second paragraph\n\n---\nblock body",
-    )
-    _write_skill(
-        tmp_path,
-        "extra",
-        "plain",
-        "---\nname: plain\n\ndescription: First line\n  Second line\n\n---\nplain body",
-    )
-    register_skill_dir(tmp_path)
-
-    available = {skill["name"]: skill["description"] for skill in get_available_skills()["extra"]}
-    assert available == {
-        "block": "First paragraph Second paragraph",
-        "plain": "First line Second line",
-    }
-
-
-def test_available_skill_supports_block_scalar_trailing_comment(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    _write_skill(
-        tmp_path,
-        "extra",
-        "commented",
-        "---\nname: commented\ndescription: | # paragraph\n"
-        "  First line\n  Second line\n---\ncommented body",
-    )
-    register_skill_dir(tmp_path)
-
-    assert get_available_skills()["extra"] == [
-        {"name": "commented", "description": "First line Second line"}
-    ]
-
-
-def test_malformed_frontmatter_keeps_skill_body(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    _write_skill(
-        tmp_path,
-        "extra",
-        "broken",
-        "---\nname: [broken\ndescription: should be empty\n---\nbroken body",
-    )
-    register_skill_dir(tmp_path)
-
-    assert get_available_skills()["extra"] == [{"name": "broken", "description": ""}]
-    assert load_skills(["extra/broken"]) == {"broken": "broken body"}
-
-
-def test_system_prompt_renders_skill_descriptions() -> None:
-    prompt = render_system_prompt(scan_mode="quick", is_root=True)
-
-    assert "- technologies/firebase: Firebase security testing covering" in prompt
-
-
-def test_system_prompt_omits_empty_skill_description(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    _write_skill(tmp_path, "extra", "widget", "---\nname: widget\ndescription:\n---\nwidget body")
-    register_skill_dir(tmp_path)
-
-    prompt = render_system_prompt(scan_mode="quick", is_root=True)
-
-    assert "- extra/widget\n" in prompt
-    assert "- extra/widget: " not in prompt
-
-
 def test_registered_root_skill_is_discoverable_and_valid(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
    _write_root_skill(tmp_path, "widget", "widget body")
    register_skill_dir(tmp_path)

    assert "widget" in get_all_skill_names()
-    assert get_available_skills()["root"] == [{"name": "widget", "description": ""}]
+    assert get_available_skills()["root"] == ["widget"]
    assert validate_requested_skills(["widget"]) is None
    assert validate_requested_skills(["root/widget"]) is None
    assert load_skills(["widget"]) == {"widget": "widget body"}
@@ -197,8 +83,8 @@ def test_ambiguous_bare_skill_requires_qualified_name(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
    register_skill_dir(tmp_path)

    assert "widget" in get_all_skill_names()
-    assert get_available_skills()["alpha"] == [{"name": "widget", "description": ""}]
-    assert get_available_skills()["beta"] == [{"name": "widget", "description": ""}]
+    assert get_available_skills()["alpha"] == ["widget"]
+    assert get_available_skills()["beta"] == ["widget"]
    assert validate_requested_skills(["alpha/widget"]) is None
    assert validate_requested_skills(["beta/widget"]) is None

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-from typing import Any
-
-import pytest
-from agents.tool_context import ToolContext
-
-from strix.tools.todo import tools
-from strix.tools.todo.tools import _coerce_priority, create_todo
-
-
-@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
-def _isolate_store() -> Any:
-    tools._todos_storage.clear()
-    yield
-    tools._todos_storage.clear()
-
-
-async def _create(todos: list[Any], agent_id: str = "root") -> dict[str, Any]:
-    ctx = ToolContext(
-        context={"agent_id": agent_id},
-        tool_name="create_todo",
-        tool_call_id="call-1",
-        tool_arguments="{}",
-    )
-    raw = await create_todo.on_invoke_tool(ctx, json.dumps({"todos": json.dumps(todos)}))
-    return json.loads(raw)  # type: ignore[no-any-return]
-
-
-def test_unknown_priority_falls_back_to_normal() -> None:
-    assert _coerce_priority("medium") == "normal"
-    assert _coerce_priority("urgent") == "normal"
-    assert _coerce_priority("high") == "high"
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_one_bad_priority_no_longer_discards_the_batch() -> None:
-    result = await _create(
-        [
-            {"title": "Recon", "priority": "medium"},
-            {"title": "Probe /admin", "priority": "sky-high"},
-            {"title": "Report"},
-        ]
-    )
-
-    assert result["success"] is True
-    assert result["created_count"] == 3
-    by_title = {c["title"]: c["priority"] for c in result["created"]}
-    assert by_title["Recon"] == "normal"
-    assert by_title["Probe /admin"] == "normal"
-    assert by_title["Report"] == "normal"
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_duplicate_titles_within_a_batch_are_skipped() -> None:
-    result = await _create(
-        [
-            {"title": "Subdomain enumeration"},
-            {"title": "Content discovery"},
-            {"title": "Subdomain enumeration"},
-            {"title": "content discovery"},
-        ]
-    )
-
-    assert result["created_count"] == 2
-    assert {c["title"] for c in result["created"]} == {
-        "Subdomain enumeration",
-        "Content discovery",
-    }
-    assert len(result["skipped"]) == 2
-    assert all(s["reason"] == "duplicate title" for s in result["skipped"])
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_a_title_already_on_the_list_is_not_created_again() -> None:
-    await _create([{"title": "Crawl with katana"}])
-    result = await _create([{"title": "crawl with katana"}, {"title": "JS analysis"}])
-
-    assert [c["title"] for c in result["created"]] == ["JS analysis"]
-    assert [s["title"] for s in result["skipped"]] == ["crawl with katana"]
-    assert result["total_count"] == 2
-
-
-def test_coerce_never_raises() -> None:
-    assert _coerce_priority("nonsense") == "normal"
-    assert _coerce_priority(None) == "normal"
-    assert _coerce_priority("high") == "high"
-    for value in (2, ["high"], {"p": 1}, True):
-        assert _coerce_priority(value) == "normal"  # type: ignore[arg-type]
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_non_string_priority_does_not_fail_the_batch() -> None:
-    result = await _create(
-        [
-            {"title": "Recon", "priority": 2},
-            {"title": "Probe", "priority": ["high"]},
-            {"title": "Report"},
-        ]
-    )
-
-    assert result["success"] is True
-    assert result["created_count"] == 3
-    assert {c["priority"] for c in result["created"]} == {"normal"}
@@ -234,11 +234,12 @@ async def test_confirming_the_mount_starts_the_scan_without_a_target() -> None:


@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_declining_the_mount_runs_without_one() -> None:
-    started: list[bool] = []
+async def test_declining_the_mount_returns_to_the_start_screen() -> None:
+    started = False

-    async def start(verify: bool = True) -> None:
-        started.append(verify)
+    async def start(_verify: bool = True) -> None:
+        nonlocal started
+        started = True

    os.environ["STRIX_LLM"] = "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4"
    os.environ["ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"] = "test-key"
@@ -249,34 +250,14 @@ async def test_declining_the_mount_runs_without_one() -> None:
    result = await controller.handle("setup.confirm_mount", {"approved": False})

    assert result == {"approved": False}
-    # Declining skips the directory; it does not abandon the scan.
-    assert started == [False]
+    # Nothing was prepared, so the session goes back to the start screen and can
+    # be launched again.
+    assert started is False
    assert controller.workspace_mount is None
    assert controller.pending_workspace_mount is None
-    assert controller.setup_mode is False
-    assert controller.scan_started is True
-    assert controller.scan_state == "running"
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_approving_the_mount_runs_with_it() -> None:
-    started: list[bool] = []
-
-    async def start(verify: bool = True) -> None:
-        started.append(verify)
-
-    os.environ["STRIX_LLM"] = "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4"
-    os.environ["ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"] = "test-key"
-    loader._cached = None
-    controller = TuiController(args(), on_start=start)
-    await controller.handle("setup.start", {"verify": False, "mount_working_dir": True})
-
-    result = await controller.handle("setup.confirm_mount", {"approved": True})
-
-    assert result == {"approved": True}
-    assert started == [False]
-    assert controller.workspace_mount == str(Path.cwd())
-    assert controller.scan_state == "running"
+    assert controller.setup_mode is True
+    assert controller.scan_started is False
+    assert controller.scan_state == "setup"


@pytest.mark.asyncio
@@ -7,26 +7,19 @@ shows what the user actually typed; resuming has to match that.

 from __future__ import annotations

-import ast
 import json
 import sqlite3
-from pathlib import Path
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any

 import pytest

-from strix.core import execution
 from strix.core.paths import runtime_state_dir
 from strix.interface.tui.backend.live_view import TuiLiveView as GoTuiLiveView
-from strix.interface.tui.live_view import (
-    _INTERNAL_TURN_PREFIXES,
-    TuiLiveView,
-    _is_internal_agent_turn,
-)
+from strix.interface.tui.live_view import TuiLiveView, _is_internal_agent_turn


 if TYPE_CHECKING:
-    from types import ModuleType
+    from pathlib import Path


 def _write_run(run_dir: Path, items: list[dict[str, Any]], agent_id: str = "root") -> None:
@@ -183,60 +176,11 @@ def test_internal_turn_classifier_matches_every_injected_form() -> None:
        "[CRITICAL] Turn budget: 480/500 used (96%).",
        "== Inherited context from parent (background only) ==",
        "Your previous message ended a turn without a tool call.",
-        "Your previous response ended the autonomous run without a lifecycle tool call.",
+        "Your previous response ended the autonomous Strix run without a lifecycle tool call.",
    ):
        assert _is_internal_agent_turn(content), content


-def _injected_strings(module: ModuleType) -> list[str]:
-    """Every string a module can inject, and nothing it merely mentions.
-
-    Parsing rather than searching the text keeps comments out of it, so a stale
-    copy of a message left in a comment cannot pass for the message itself. It
-    also joins adjacent literals for free, which the line wrapping needs, and
-    docstrings are dropped because they describe the code rather than run in it.
-    """
-    tree = ast.parse(Path(module.__file__ or "").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    docstrings = set()
-    for node in ast.walk(tree):
-        if not isinstance(node, ast.Module | ast.ClassDef | ast.FunctionDef | ast.AsyncFunctionDef):
-            continue
-        first = node.body[0] if node.body else None
-        if isinstance(first, ast.Expr) and isinstance(first.value, ast.Constant):
-            docstrings.add(id(first.value))
-
-    literals: list[str] = []
-    for node in ast.walk(tree):
-        if isinstance(node, ast.Constant):
-            if isinstance(node.value, str) and id(node) not in docstrings:
-                literals.append(node.value)
-        elif isinstance(node, ast.JoinedStr):
-            literals.append(
-                "".join(
-                    part.value
-                    for part in node.values
-                    if isinstance(part, ast.Constant) and isinstance(part.value, str)
-                )
-            )
-    return literals
-
-
-def test_internal_turn_prefixes_still_match_what_is_injected() -> None:
-    """The classifier copies sentences out of another module, so they can drift.
-
-    Both nudges are written inline in strix.core.execution, so there is nothing to
-    import and compare against. Read them back out of what that module can inject.
-    """
-    injected = _injected_strings(execution)
-    nudges = [prefix for prefix in _INTERNAL_TURN_PREFIXES if prefix.startswith("Your previous")]
-    assert nudges, "the no-tool-call nudges are no longer in the classifier"
-    for nudge in nudges:
-        assert any(nudge in literal for literal in injected), (
-            f"the classifier expects {nudge!r}, which strix.core.execution no longer "
-            f"injects. A resumed scan would show that nudge as the user's own message."
-        )
-
-
 def test_internal_turn_classifier_keeps_bracketed_user_text() -> None:
    """A leading bracket is not enough: typed text often starts with one."""
    for content in (
@@ -2378,7 +2378,7 @@ wheels = [

 [[package]]
 name = "strix-agent"
-version = "1.5.3"
+version = "1.4.1"
 source = { editable = "." }
 dependencies = [
    { name = "caido-sdk-client" },