cli: render contextual CVSS vector, advisory score, and reasoning for dependency findings

strix/interface/utils.py

@@ -133,6 +133,27 @@ def format_vulnerability_report(report: dict[str, Any]) -> Text:  # noqa: PLR091
             text.append("CVSS Vector: ", style=field_style)
             text.append("/".join(cvss_parts), style="dim")
 
+    dependency_metadata = report.get("dependency_metadata") or {}
+    if dependency_metadata:
+        contextual_vector = dependency_metadata.get("contextual_cvss_vector")
+        if contextual_vector:
+            text.append("\n\n")
+            text.append("Contextual CVSS Vector: ", style=field_style)
+            text.append(contextual_vector, style="dim")
+
+        advisory_cvss = dependency_metadata.get("advisory_cvss")
+        if advisory_cvss is not None and advisory_cvss != report.get("cvss"):
+            text.append("\n\n")
+            text.append("Advisory CVSS: ", style=field_style)
+            text.append(f"{float(advisory_cvss):.1f}", style="dim")
+
+        contextual_reasoning = dependency_metadata.get("contextual_cvss_reasoning")
+        if contextual_reasoning:
+            text.append("\n\n")
+            text.append("Contextual CVSS Reasoning", style=field_style)
+            text.append("\n")
+            text.append(contextual_reasoning)
+
     description = report.get("description")
     if description:
         text.append("\n\n")

strix/report/writer.py

@@ -215,6 +215,11 @@ def render_vulnerability_md(report: dict[str, Any]) -> str:  # noqa: PLR0912, PL
     cvss = report.get("cvss")
     if cvss is not None:
         metadata.append(("CVSS", cvss))
+    advisory_cvss = dep_meta.get("advisory_cvss")
+    if advisory_cvss is not None and advisory_cvss != cvss:
+        metadata.append(("Advisory CVSS", advisory_cvss))
+    if dep_meta.get("contextual_cvss_vector"):
+        metadata.append(("Contextual CVSS Vector", dep_meta["contextual_cvss_vector"]))
     if report.get("fix_effort"):
         metadata.append(("Fix Effort", str(report["fix_effort"]).title()))
     for label, value in metadata:
@@ -241,6 +246,11 @@ def render_vulnerability_md(report: dict[str, Any]) -> str:  # noqa: PLR0912, PL
         lines.append(str(report["technical_analysis"]))
         lines.append("")
 
+    if dep_meta.get("contextual_cvss_reasoning"):
+        lines.append("## Contextual CVSS\n")
+        lines.append(str(dep_meta["contextual_cvss_reasoning"]))
+        lines.append("")
+
     if report.get("poc_description") or report.get("poc_script_code"):
         lines.append("## Proof of Concept\n")
         if report.get("poc_description"):

strix/skills/custom/dependency_cve_scanning.md

@@ -161,7 +161,23 @@ fi
    verdict/evidence onto its siblings; run the symbol search against each
    CVE's own affected-symbol list. The import check (step 1) is the only
    part shared across a package's CVEs.
-3. If the analysis was not performed or is inconclusive (obfuscated code,
+3. **Source-to-sink trace — do this whenever step 2 found a symbol hit.** A
+   symbol hit alone says the code calls the vulnerable API; it does not say
+   who can reach it. Start at the sink (the exact line that calls the
+   vulnerable function) and walk backwards hop by hop to the source: the
+   entry point that carries untrusted input (HTTP route, CLI argument, queue
+   or webhook payload, uploaded file, config value). Read each intermediate
+   function; when a hop is a thin wrapper, go one step deeper — never stop at
+   the first caller. Record what each hop enforces: authentication, a role
+   check, validation, a feature flag, a size or type limit, a default that is
+   off in production.
+   Write the chain into `reachability_evidence` as
+   `entry point -> intermediate call -> package call` with a
+   repository-relative `file:line` for every hop, and say who controls the
+   input. If no source reaches the sink, say that too — the level stays
+   `vulnerable_symbol_used` (the call is real), and the trace is what tells
+   the reader it is only reachable from, say, an operator CLI.
+4. If the analysis was not performed or is inconclusive (obfuscated code,
    dynamic loading, unparsable sources) ⇒ `unknown` and say why in
    `assumptions`.
 
@@ -225,15 +241,68 @@ findings and rejects empty PoC fields):
   installed/affected version, fixed version, lockfile path, and the relevant
   trivy output excerpt.
 - **Always set `advisory_cvss` to the published advisory base score (0.0–10.0).**
-  Severity is derived *solely* from this number: read it off the advisory (`CVSS`
-  in trivy output, or the NVD/GHSA page) and pass the real value. The tool rejects
-  a call that omits it, because guessing a score both inflates low CVEs and
-  deflates critical ones.
+  It is the published reference, and it rates the finding whenever you give no
+  contextual breakdown: read it off the advisory (`CVSS` in trivy output, or the
+  NVD/GHSA page) and pass the real value. The tool rejects a call that omits it,
+  because guessing a score both inflates low CVEs and deflates critical ones.
 - Set `cwe` to the most specific `CWE-NNN` when the advisory names one.
 - Do NOT cap severity at LOW just because there is no dynamic reproduction — use
   the advisory score.
 - Set `reachability` + `reachability_evidence` from the usage analysis above;
   use `assumptions` for anything softer (confidence, caveats, analysis limits).
+- Set `contextual_cvss_breakdown` + `contextual_cvss_reasoning` when this
+  codebase clearly changes the risk the published score describes (see below).
+
+### Contextual CVSS
+
+The published score rates the CVE in the abstract. `contextual_cvss_breakdown`
+rates it **here**, in this codebase — the same 8-metric CVSS v3.1 object as a
+normal finding's `cvss_breakdown` (`attack_vector`, `attack_complexity`,
+`privileges_required`, `user_interaction`, `scope`, `confidentiality`,
+`integrity`, `availability`). You never pass a score: the contextual score and
+vector are computed from the breakdown, and when you provide one it determines
+the finding's severity. `advisory_cvss` stays the published reference.
+
+Start from the advisory's own published metrics and change only what your
+evidence proves is different in this codebase:
+
+- `attack_vector` `N`/`A`/`L`/`P` — as deployed. A library reached only by a
+  local CLI is `L`, not `N`.
+- `attack_complexity` `L`/`H` — raise to `H` when the vulnerable path needs a
+  precondition the code enforces (input validation, a non-default flag, an
+  internal-only route).
+- `privileges_required` `N`/`L`/`H`, `user_interaction` `N`/`R` — what this
+  deployment requires before the path is reachable.
+- `scope` `U`/`C` — whether exploitation here escapes the component boundary.
+- `confidentiality`/`integrity`/`availability` `N`/`L`/`H` — the impact in this
+  codebase. `not_imported` code the build still ships is usually `N` across all
+  three.
+
+Ground every metric in the **source-to-sink trace** from the usage analysis
+(step 3 above), not in a general impression of the package. Derive the metrics
+from that chain: `attack_vector`, `privileges_required`, and `user_interaction`
+come from what the source requires; `attack_complexity` comes from the
+preconditions the hops enforce; `confidentiality`, `integrity`, and
+`availability` come from the data and privileges available at the sink.
+
+No trace, no contextual breakdown: if you did not reach a symbol hit, or you
+could not follow a hop, omit the contextual fields instead of guessing.
+
+`contextual_cvss_reasoning` is required with the breakdown. Write two to four
+sentences that another engineer can check without opening the repository. Name
+the chain hop by hop as `entry point -> intermediate call -> package call`, with
+a repository-relative `file:line` for each hop, say who controls the input, and
+say what the contextual rating changes. Example: lowering `attack_vector` to
+`L` and `confidentiality` to `L` with "The only caller of `yaml.load` is
+`parse_manifest` in `scripts/import.py:88`, which `cli/commands.py:212` invokes
+for an operator-supplied path behind the `--allow-unsafe-import` flag that
+`deploy/prod.yaml` never sets. No HTTP route reaches that function, so an
+attacker must already hold shell access on the job host, and the parsed data is
+build metadata rather than customer records."
+
+Omit all the contextual fields when the published rating already fits, and when
+the evidence is thin. A contextual rating is a claim you must be able to
+defend, and it never replaces `advisory_cvss` as the published reference.
 
 Verify the CVE with `web_search` when available before reporting. Never guess or
 hallucinate a CVE id.
@@ -244,10 +313,12 @@ hallucinate a CVE id.
   `create_dependency_report`.
 - Do not report a finding without a verified CVE id.
 - Do not batch multiple CVEs into one report.
-- Do not omit `advisory_cvss` — the tool rejects it, and it is the single input
-  that determines dependency severity.
+- Do not omit `advisory_cvss` — the tool rejects it, and it rates every finding
+  that carries no contextual breakdown.
 - Do not silently drop a known CVE because it lacks a dynamic PoC — that is the
   exact failure this skill prevents.
 - Do not downgrade advisory severity for lack of dynamic reproduction.
 - Do not claim a `reachability` level the evidence does not prove — `unknown`
   with a reason is always acceptable; an overclaimed level never is.
+- Do not send `contextual_cvss_breakdown` without evidence-backed reasoning, and
+  do not use it to quietly de-rate a CVE you simply could not analyze.

strix/tools/reporting/tool.py

@@ -749,6 +749,61 @@ def _validate_manifest_path(manifest_path: str | None) -> str | None:
     return None
 
 
+_MAX_CONTEXTUAL_REASONING_CHARS = 2000
+
+
+def _validate_contextual_cvss(
+    breakdown: dict[str, str] | None,
+    reasoning: str | None,
+) -> list[str]:
+    errors: list[str] = []
+    if breakdown:
+        for name, valid in _CVSS_VALID.items():
+            value = breakdown.get(name)
+            if value not in valid:
+                errors.append(
+                    f"Invalid contextual_cvss_breakdown {name}: {value}. Must be one of: {valid}"
+                )
+        if not (reasoning or "").strip():
+            errors.append(
+                "contextual_cvss_reasoning is required when contextual_cvss_breakdown is "
+                "set: state what you observed in this codebase that justifies the "
+                "contextual rating. A contextual score with no reasoning is not shown."
+            )
+    return errors
+
+
+def _validate_advisory_cvss(advisory_cvss: float | None) -> str | None:
+    if advisory_cvss is None:
+        return (
+            "advisory_cvss is required: read the published advisory base score "
+            "(0.0-10.0) off the advisory (trivy CVSS / NVD / GHSA). It is the "
+            "published reference the finding is rated against — do not omit it "
+            "or the finding cannot be rated."
+        )
+    if not 0.0 <= advisory_cvss <= 10.0:
+        return f"advisory_cvss must be between 0.0 and 10.0, got {advisory_cvss}"
+    return None
+
+
+def _resolve_dependency_rating(
+    advisory_cvss: float | None,
+    contextual_cvss_breakdown: dict[str, str] | None,
+) -> tuple[float | None, str, float | None, str | None]:
+    """Rate the finding.
+
+    A contextual breakdown works exactly like a normal finding's
+    ``cvss_breakdown``: the agent supplies the 8 metrics as observed in this
+    codebase and the score/vector are computed from them. When provided it
+    rates the finding; the advisory score stays as the published reference.
+    """
+    if contextual_cvss_breakdown:
+        score, severity, vector = _calculate_cvss(contextual_cvss_breakdown)
+        return score, severity, score, vector
+    score, severity = _dependency_severity(advisory_cvss)
+    return score, severity, None, None
+
+
 def _build_dependency_metadata(
     *,
     package_name: str,
@@ -760,11 +815,18 @@ def _build_dependency_metadata(
     manifest_path: str | None = None,
     reachability: str | None = None,
     reachability_evidence: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, str]:
-    metadata = {
+    advisory_cvss: float | None = None,
+    contextual_cvss_breakdown: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    contextual_cvss_score: float | None = None,
+    contextual_cvss_vector: str | None = None,
+    contextual_cvss_reasoning: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    metadata: dict[str, Any] = {
         "package_name": package_name.strip(),
         "installed_version": installed_version.strip(),
     }
+    if advisory_cvss is not None:
+        metadata["advisory_cvss"] = advisory_cvss
     if package_ecosystem and package_ecosystem.strip():
         metadata["package_ecosystem"] = package_ecosystem.strip()
     if manifest_path and manifest_path.strip():
@@ -781,6 +843,20 @@ def _build_dependency_metadata(
         metadata["reachability"] = reachability.strip()
         if reachability_evidence and reachability_evidence.strip():
             metadata["reachability_evidence"] = reachability_evidence.strip()
+    # Contextual CVSS is only meaningful as the full breakdown, its computed
+    # score/vector, and the reasoning a reader can check — an incomplete set
+    # is dropped.
+    reasoning = str(contextual_cvss_reasoning or "").strip()
+    if (
+        contextual_cvss_breakdown
+        and contextual_cvss_score is not None
+        and contextual_cvss_vector
+        and reasoning
+    ):
+        metadata["contextual_cvss_breakdown"] = contextual_cvss_breakdown
+        metadata["contextual_cvss_score"] = contextual_cvss_score
+        metadata["contextual_cvss_vector"] = contextual_cvss_vector
+        metadata["contextual_cvss_reasoning"] = reasoning[:_MAX_CONTEXTUAL_REASONING_CHARS]
     return metadata
 
 
@@ -852,6 +928,8 @@ async def _do_create_dependency(  # noqa: PLR0912
     manifest_path: str | None = None,
     reachability: str = "unknown",
     reachability_evidence: str | None = None,
+    contextual_cvss_breakdown: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    contextual_cvss_reasoning: str | None = None,
     agent_id: str | None = None,
     agent_name: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
@@ -904,19 +982,21 @@ async def _do_create_dependency(  # noqa: PLR0912
             "govulncheck call path). Never claim a reachability level without evidence."
         )
 
-    if advisory_cvss is None:
-        errors.append(
-            "advisory_cvss is required: read the published advisory base score "
-            "(0.0-10.0) off the advisory (trivy CVSS / NVD / GHSA). Severity is "
-            "derived solely from it — do not omit it or the finding cannot be rated."
-        )
-    elif not 0.0 <= advisory_cvss <= 10.0:
-        errors.append(f"advisory_cvss must be between 0.0 and 10.0, got {advisory_cvss}")
+    errors.extend(_validate_contextual_cvss(contextual_cvss_breakdown, contextual_cvss_reasoning))
+
+    advisory_err = _validate_advisory_cvss(advisory_cvss)
+    if advisory_err:
+        errors.append(advisory_err)
 
     if errors:
         return {"success": False, "error": "Validation failed", "errors": errors}
 
-    cvss_score, severity = _dependency_severity(advisory_cvss)
+    try:
+        cvss_score, severity, contextual_score, contextual_vector = _resolve_dependency_rating(
+            advisory_cvss, contextual_cvss_breakdown
+        )
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        return {"success": False, "error": "Validation failed", "errors": [str(exc)]}
     dependency_metadata = _build_dependency_metadata(
         package_name=package_name,
         installed_version=installed_version,
@@ -927,6 +1007,11 @@ async def _do_create_dependency(  # noqa: PLR0912
         manifest_path=manifest_path,
         reachability=reachability,
         reachability_evidence=reachability_evidence,
+        advisory_cvss=advisory_cvss,
+        contextual_cvss_breakdown=contextual_cvss_breakdown,
+        contextual_cvss_score=contextual_score,
+        contextual_cvss_vector=contextual_vector,
+        contextual_cvss_reasoning=contextual_cvss_reasoning,
     )
     evidence = _build_dependency_evidence(
         cve=parsed_cve,
@@ -1038,6 +1123,8 @@ async def create_dependency_report(
     dependency_path: str | None = None,
     reachability: str = "unknown",
     reachability_evidence: str | None = None,
+    contextual_cvss_breakdown: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    contextual_cvss_reasoning: str | None = None,
 ) -> str:
     """File a known-CVE dependency (SCA) finding — one report per CVE x package.
 
@@ -1080,8 +1167,10 @@ async def create_dependency_report(
       proved a path from application code to the vulnerable function.
     - ``unknown`` — usage analysis was not performed or was inconclusive.
 
-    Severity is still derived solely from ``advisory_cvss`` — the
-    reachability level never changes the rating, only prioritization.
+    Severity comes from ``contextual_cvss_breakdown`` when you provide one
+    (computed exactly like a normal finding's ``cvss_breakdown``), otherwise
+    from ``advisory_cvss``. The reachability level alone never changes the
+    rating, only prioritization.
 
     **Formatting**: use markdown in text fields (``**bold**``, ``inline
     code`` for package/version identifiers, fenced code blocks for
@@ -1102,8 +1191,9 @@ async def create_dependency_report(
         cwe: ``CWE-NNN`` (most specific) if certain, else omit.
         advisory_cvss: **Required.** Published advisory base score
             (0.0-10.0) — read it off the advisory (trivy CVSS / NVD / GHSA).
-            Severity is derived solely from this score, so it must be the
-            real published value; do not guess or omit it.
+            It is the published reference the finding is rated against and
+            rates the finding whenever you give no contextual breakdown, so
+            it must be the real published value; do not guess or omit it.
         technical_analysis: Optional deeper mechanism/root-cause detail.
         fix_effort: One of ``trivial`` / ``low`` / ``medium`` / ``high``
             (dependency upgrades are usually ``trivial``/``low``).
@@ -1131,6 +1221,51 @@ async def create_dependency_report(
             (required for any level other than ``unknown``): repo-relative
             ``file:line`` of the import or symbol usage, the matched
             advisory symbols, or the govulncheck call-path excerpt.
+            Whenever you found the vulnerable symbol in use, also give the
+            **source-to-sink trace** here: start at the vulnerable package
+            call site and walk backwards hop by hop to the entry point
+            that carries untrusted input (HTTP route, CLI argument, queue
+            message, webhook, config file), going one step deeper whenever
+            a hop is a wrapper. Write it as ``entry point -> intermediate
+            call -> package call`` with a ``file:line`` per hop, name what
+            each hop enforces (auth, role check, validation, a flag that
+            is off in production), and say who controls the input. State
+            it plainly when no entry point reaches the sink — that is the
+            most useful result a reader can get.
+        contextual_cvss_breakdown: Optional full CVSS v3.1 rating of this
+            CVE **in this codebase** — the same 8-metric object as
+            ``create_vulnerability_report``'s ``cvss_breakdown``:
+            ``attack_vector`` (N/A/L/P), ``attack_complexity`` (L/H),
+            ``privileges_required`` (N/L/H), ``user_interaction`` (N/R),
+            ``scope`` (U/C), ``confidentiality`` / ``integrity`` /
+            ``availability`` (N/L/H). All 8 metrics are required when the
+            field is set, and the contextual score/vector are computed
+            from them — you never supply a score. Start from the
+            advisory's published metrics and change only what the
+            **source-to-sink trace** you recorded in
+            ``reachability_evidence`` proves is different here: derive
+            ``attack_vector`` / ``privileges_required`` /
+            ``user_interaction`` from what the entry point actually
+            requires, ``attack_complexity`` from the preconditions the
+            hops enforce, and the impact metrics from the data and
+            privileges reachable at the sink. When provided, this rating
+            determines the finding's severity; ``advisory_cvss`` stays as
+            the published reference. Omit the field when the trace does
+            not change the published rating, or when you could not
+            complete the trace.
+        contextual_cvss_reasoning: **Required whenever**
+            ``contextual_cvss_breakdown`` is set. Two to four detailed
+            sentences that a reviewer can verify without opening the repo:
+            how the application uses the package, which call sites or
+            configuration you inspected (repo-relative ``file:line``),
+            which input reaches the vulnerable code and whether an
+            attacker controls it, and what the adjustment therefore
+            changes. State the source-to-sink chain explicitly, hop by
+            hop, as ``entry point -> intermediate call -> package call``
+            with a ``file:line`` for each hop. Cite concrete evidence,
+            never a generic statement such as "low risk". The user reads
+            this text next to the adjusted score, so an adjustment
+            without it is discarded.
     """
     agent_id, agent_name = _caller_identity(ctx)
 
@@ -1155,6 +1290,8 @@ async def create_dependency_report(
         manifest_path=manifest_path,
         reachability=reachability,
         reachability_evidence=reachability_evidence,
+        contextual_cvss_breakdown=contextual_cvss_breakdown,
+        contextual_cvss_reasoning=contextual_cvss_reasoning,
         agent_id=agent_id,
         agent_name=agent_name,
     )

tests/test_reporting_fields.py

@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ async def test_dependency_report_sets_class_and_metadata(report_state: ReportSta
     assert report["dependency_metadata"] == {
         "package_name": "lodash",
         "installed_version": "4.17.20",
+        "advisory_cvss": 7.2,
         "package_ecosystem": "npm",
         "manifest_path": "package-lock.json",
         "fixed_version": "4.17.21",
@@ -372,7 +373,7 @@ async def test_dependency_report_omits_unknown_reachability(report_state: Report
         fix_effort="low",
     )
 
-    assert result["success"] is True
+    assert result["success"] is True, result
     metadata = report_state.vulnerability_reports[0]["dependency_metadata"]
     assert "reachability" not in metadata
     assert "reachability_evidence" not in metadata
@@ -463,6 +464,7 @@ async def test_dependency_report_dedupe_candidate_includes_dependency_metadata(
         "dependency_metadata": {
             "package_name": "sample",
             "installed_version": "1.0.0",
+            "advisory_cvss": 0.0,
             "package_ecosystem": "npm",
             "manifest_path": "package-lock.json",
             "fixed_version": "1.0.1",
@@ -877,3 +879,156 @@ def test_vuln_tool_exposes_new_params() -> None:
     dep_required = create_dependency_report.params_json_schema["required"]
     assert "package_ecosystem" in dep_required
     assert "advisory_cvss" in dep_required
+
+
+def test_dep_tool_exposes_contextual_cvss_params() -> None:
+    dep_props = create_dependency_report.params_json_schema["properties"]
+    for field in (
+        "contextual_cvss_breakdown",
+        "contextual_cvss_reasoning",
+    ):
+        assert field in dep_props
+    assert "source-to-sink" in dep_props["contextual_cvss_breakdown"]["description"].lower()
+    assert "source-to-sink" in dep_props["reachability_evidence"]["description"].lower()
+    assert "file:line" in dep_props["contextual_cvss_reasoning"]["description"].lower()
+
+
+_CONTEXTUAL_BREAKDOWN = {
+    "attack_vector": "L",
+    "attack_complexity": "H",
+    "privileges_required": "H",
+    "user_interaction": "N",
+    "scope": "U",
+    "confidentiality": "L",
+    "integrity": "L",
+    "availability": "N",
+}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_dependency_report_computes_contextual_cvss(
+    report_state: ReportState,
+) -> None:
+    result = await _do_create_dependency(
+        title="CVE-2021-23337 in lodash 4.17.20",
+        description="Command injection via template.",
+        target="repo/package.json",
+        cve="CVE-2021-23337",
+        package_name="lodash",
+        installed_version="4.17.20",
+        impact="Arbitrary command execution.",
+        remediation_steps="Upgrade to 4.17.21.",
+        assumptions="Assumes the template sink is reachable.",
+        package_ecosystem="npm",
+        advisory_cvss=7.2,
+        technical_analysis=None,
+        fixed_version="4.17.21",
+        cwe="CWE-94",
+        fix_effort="trivial",
+        manifest_path="package-lock.json",
+        contextual_cvss_breakdown=_CONTEXTUAL_BREAKDOWN,
+        contextual_cvss_reasoning="Only scripts/import.py reaches the sink.",
+    )
+    assert result["success"] is True, result
+    report = report_state.vulnerability_reports[0]
+    metadata = report["dependency_metadata"]
+    assert metadata["advisory_cvss"] == 7.2
+    assert metadata["contextual_cvss_breakdown"] == _CONTEXTUAL_BREAKDOWN
+    assert metadata["contextual_cvss_vector"] == ("CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N")
+    assert metadata["contextual_cvss_score"] == pytest.approx(3.0, abs=0.05)
+    assert metadata["contextual_cvss_reasoning"] == "Only scripts/import.py reaches the sink."
+    # The contextual rating determines the finding's score/severity, exactly
+    # like a normal finding's cvss_breakdown.
+    assert report["cvss"] == metadata["contextual_cvss_score"]
+    assert report["severity"] == "low"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_dependency_report_rates_from_advisory_without_contextual(
+    report_state: ReportState,
+) -> None:
+    result = await _do_create_dependency(
+        title="CVE-2021-23337 in lodash 4.17.20",
+        description="Command injection via template.",
+        target="repo/package.json",
+        cve="CVE-2021-23337",
+        package_name="lodash",
+        installed_version="4.17.20",
+        impact="Arbitrary command execution.",
+        remediation_steps="Upgrade to 4.17.21.",
+        assumptions="Assumes the template sink is reachable.",
+        package_ecosystem="npm",
+        advisory_cvss=7.2,
+        technical_analysis=None,
+        fixed_version="4.17.21",
+        cwe="CWE-94",
+        fix_effort="trivial",
+        manifest_path="package-lock.json",
+    )
+    assert result["success"] is True, result
+    report = report_state.vulnerability_reports[0]
+    assert report["cvss"] == 7.2
+    assert report["severity"] == "high"
+    metadata = report["dependency_metadata"]
+    assert metadata["advisory_cvss"] == 7.2
+    assert "contextual_cvss_breakdown" not in metadata
+    assert "contextual_cvss_score" not in metadata
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_dependency_report_rejects_incomplete_contextual_breakdown(
+    report_state: ReportState,
+) -> None:
+    result = await _do_create_dependency(
+        title="CVE-2021-23337 in lodash 4.17.20",
+        description="Command injection via template.",
+        target="repo/package.json",
+        cve="CVE-2021-23337",
+        package_name="lodash",
+        installed_version="4.17.20",
+        impact="Arbitrary command execution.",
+        remediation_steps="Upgrade to 4.17.21.",
+        assumptions="Assumes the template sink is reachable.",
+        package_ecosystem="npm",
+        advisory_cvss=7.2,
+        technical_analysis=None,
+        fixed_version="4.17.21",
+        cwe="CWE-94",
+        fix_effort="trivial",
+        manifest_path="package-lock.json",
+        contextual_cvss_breakdown={"attack_vector": "L", "attack_complexity": "Z"},
+        contextual_cvss_reasoning="Only scripts/import.py reaches the sink.",
+    )
+    assert result["success"] is False
+    assert any("attack_complexity" in error for error in result["errors"])
+    assert any("privileges_required" in error for error in result["errors"])
+    assert report_state.vulnerability_reports == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_dependency_report_rejects_contextual_breakdown_without_reasoning(
+    report_state: ReportState,
+) -> None:
+    result = await _do_create_dependency(
+        title="CVE-2021-23337 in lodash 4.17.20",
+        description="Command injection via template.",
+        target="repo/package.json",
+        cve="CVE-2021-23337",
+        package_name="lodash",
+        installed_version="4.17.20",
+        impact="Arbitrary command execution.",
+        remediation_steps="Upgrade to 4.17.21.",
+        assumptions="Assumes the template sink is reachable.",
+        package_ecosystem="npm",
+        advisory_cvss=7.2,
+        technical_analysis=None,
+        fixed_version="4.17.21",
+        cwe="CWE-94",
+        fix_effort="trivial",
+        manifest_path="package-lock.json",
+        contextual_cvss_breakdown=_CONTEXTUAL_BREAKDOWN,
+        contextual_cvss_reasoning="   ",
+    )
+    assert result["success"] is False
+    assert any("contextual_cvss_reasoning is required" in error for error in result["errors"])
+    assert report_state.vulnerability_reports == []